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INTRODUCTION
The legal field is at a critical moment of renewal and reinvention for the twenty-first century. In an analytical tour de
force, contemporary legal thought is promoting a shift from the
traditional New Deal regulatory era to a "Renew Deal" governance paradigm. Different schools of thought within legal academia are breaking from conventional models of regulation,
administration, and adjudication, and introducing a new regime for a new century. Pointing to the false dilemma between
centralized regulation and deregulatory devolution, there is a
growing consensus in legal scholarship that innovative approaches to law, lawmaking, and lawyering are possible and
necessary. At the same time, a myriad of policy initiatives in
different fields are employing new regulatory approaches in legal practice that reflect this theoretical vision. Administrative
agencies at the federal and state levels are increasingly promoting outreach programs and issuing nonbinding guidelines
in lieu of their traditional top-down rule promulgation, implementation, and enforcement activities. New legislation in areas
such as eco-management and information technology provides
opportunities for private parties to opt out of the conventional
legal regime and manage their environment through collaborative and dynamic planning. Courts and administrators increasingly rely on voluntary compliance as a defense against liability
in employment discrimination cases. In all of these contexts,
government harnesses the power of new technologies, market
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innovation, and civic engagement to enable different stakeholders to contribute to the project of governance.
This Article introduces the emerging vision as a paradigm
shift from a regulatory to a governance model, signifying a collective intellectual and programmatic project for a new legal
regime. The new governance model connotes a decentering of
legal scholarship, challenging the traditional focus on formal
regulation as the dominant locus of change. The model enables
practices that dislocate traditional state-produced regulation
from its privileged place, while at the same time maintaining
the cohesion and large-scale goals of an integrated legal system. It thereby provokes a long-awaited synthesis of thought
within legal academia, addressing the pervasiveness of both
regulatory and market failures. Ingeniously integrating insights from law and economics and critical legal scholarship, it
further promises a renewed dialogue between those who champion centralized top-down regulation and those who advocate
devolution, deregulation, and privatization. The Article maintains that a key strength of the new governance model is its
explicit suggestion that economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.
Over a half-century ago, the New Deal signified a paradigm shift in the American polity. Under the mandate of relief,
recovery, and reform, the modern regulatory administrative
state was created. In the context of world war and economic
depression, law was conceptualized as national, top-down, and
sanctioned. The New Deal regulatory model sought to consolidate formerly dispersed powers into the newly founded expert
regulatory agencies and to direct economic and social activities
at the national level. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, against the backdrop of global competition, changing patterns in market organization, and a declining commitment to
direct government intervention, contemporary legal thought
and practice are pointing to the emergence of a new paradigm-governance-that ties together recent developments in
the political economy with advances in legal and democratic
theory. Governance signifies the range of activities, functions,
and exercise of control by both public and private actors in the
promotion of social, political, and economic ends. The new governance model supports the replacement of the New Deal's hierarchy and control with a more participatory and collaborative
model, in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving policy goals. The adoption of govern-
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ance-based policies redefines state-society interactions and encourages multiple stakeholders to share traditional roles of
governance. Highlighting the increasing significance of normgenerating nongovernmental actors, the model promotes a
movement downward and outward, transferring responsibilities to states, localities, and the private sector-including private businesses and nonprofit organizations. Lawmaking shifts
from a top-down, command-and-control framework to a reflexive approach, which is process oriented and tailored to local circumstances. At the same time, by linking together geographically and materially dispersed law reform efforts, the model
provides innovative ways to coordinate local efforts and to prevent the isolation of problems. Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and encouraging the replication of success stories from local or private levels become
central goals of government. Legal orchestration is achieved
through interpenetration of policy boundaries, new public/private partnerships, and next-generation policy strategies
such as negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-based rules, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure regimes, and coordinated information collection.
This Article integrates the insights of recent legal approaches into a single framework called the Renew Deal school.
The Article both asserts the emergence of a new model and
critically explores the interaction among its various elements.
It unpacks the widespread claims of newness in legal theory, as
well as in practice, asking why legal projects are seeking to be
innovative and to what they are responding. At the same time,
it offers a comprehensive map for understanding the uncharted
terrain of renewal projects collectively, addressing contingencies and internal tensions among the possible meanings and interpretations of the emerging model. Prominent scholarly
works at the microlevel of doctrinal areas, the macrolevel of
constitutional and administrative law, and the metalevel of jurisprudence all advocate the necessity and the possibility of renewal through a new governance model. The new paradigm is
instigating change in a wide spectrum of policy issues and
fields, ranging from employment and environmental protection;
to welfare, family, health, and education laws; to policing and
criminal justice administration; to state takings, torts and consumer protection; to transportation, information technology,
privacy, and corporate shareholder protections. This Article
demonstrates how the governance model emerges from a myr-
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iad of recent scholarly theories including the following: "reflex-

ive law,"' "soft law," 2 "collaborative governance," 3 "democratic

experimentalism,"' 4 "responsive regulation,"5 "outsourcing regu-

lation," 6 "reconstitutive law," 7 "post-regulatory law,"8 "revitaliz-

ing regulation," 9 "regulatory pluralism,"' 0 "decentering regulation,"'"i
"meta-regulation,"'12
"contractarian
law,"13

1. ALBERTO FEBBRAJO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY
AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW
PERSPECTIVE (1992); REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT REGULATION (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen
eds., 1994) [hereinafter REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW].

2. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in
the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, EUR. L.J. (forthcoming 2004); KERSTIN JACOBSSON, INNOVATIONS IN EU
GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EMPLOYMENT POLICY CO-ORDINATION (Stockholm
Center for Organizational Research, Working Paper No. 2001:12, 2001), at
http://www.score.su.se/pdfs/2001- l12.pdf.
3. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
4. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER,
DEMOCRACY
REALIZED: THE
PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and
InstitutionalDesign, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998) [hereinafter A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism]; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) [hereinafter Drug Treatment Courts
and Experimentalist Government].
5. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002).
6. DARA
O'ROURKE,
Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing
NonGovernmental Systems of Labor Standardsand Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J.
1 (2003).
7. Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986).
8. Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of
Post-RegulatoryLaw, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986); David Trubek & Louise Trubek, Post-Regulatory Law
& Lawyering (Wisconsin Law School Course 940-015) (unpublished syllabus
and bibliography, on file with author).
9. Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278,
1280 (1993).
10. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism:Designing
Policy Mixes for EnvironmentalProtection,21 LAW & POLY 49 (1999).
11. Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understandingthe Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 103 (2001).
12. Bronwen Morgan, Regulating the Regulators: Meta-Regulation as a
Strategy for Reinventing Government in Australia, 1 PUB. MGMT. 50 (1999).
13. David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian"
Paradigmin Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35.

347

THE RENEW DEAL

2004]

"communicative governance," 14 "negotiated governance,"'15 "de17
stabilization rights," 16 "cooperative implementation,"' "interac19
8
tive compliance,"' "public laboratories," "deepened democracy
governance," 20 "pragmatic
and empowered participatory
2
lawyering," 1 "nonrival partnership,"' 22 and "a daring legal system." 23 It argues that these subsets of ideas should be understood together as generating a powerful vision within legal
thought about the need for renewal through a shift to the governance paradigm. The theoretically-integrated, Renew Deal
model serves to better inform policymakers in prescribe and
normatively evaluate policies, legal function, and democratic
ideals.
The Article begins by introducing the myriad of claims for
renewal within legal thought and practice. Part I discusses the
emergence of the twenty-first-century Renew Deal vision
against the backdrop of the twentieth-century New Deal.
Rather than merely a transition from one set of rules to the
next, it describes the connection between renewal and permanent innovation as the key to understanding the new governance model. While the concept of regulation carries with it the
baggage of boundaries and predetermined solutions, the con14. Jan Kooiman, Findings, Speculations and Recommendations, in
MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 249 (Jan

Kooiman ed., 1993).
15. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
16. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
17. Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535 (1996).
18.

CORPORATE

LAWBREAKING

AND

INTERACTIVE

COMPLIANCE:

RESOLVING THE REGULATION-DEREGULATION DICHOTOMY (Jay A. Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy eds., 1991); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY,
INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY
COMPULSION (1988).

19. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 183 (2003).
20.

DEEPENING

DEMOCRACY:

INSTITUTIONAL

INNOVATIONS

IN

EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright
eds., 2003).
21. William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
22.

MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE

PUBLIC GOOD (2002).
23. Id.
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temporary concept of governance is open, dynamic, and diverse
with a built-in temporal dimension. Part II traces the various
rationales and motivations that drive the theoretical and practical efforts for a Renew Deal. It argues that the contemporary
moment of renewal is simultaneously motivated by both external push factors of the new political economy and internal developments within legal thought concerning the inherent limitations of traditional regulatory theory. The analysis reveals
the coexistence of parallel modes of reasoning, internal and external to legal thought, including the following: crisis and opportunity; action and reaction; regression, progression, and cyclic;
transition
and
permanence;
replacement
and
complementarity; and authentic law and outside-of-the-law
constructs. Drawing on these internal and external dynamics
for reform, Part II further demonstrates how the governance
model is linked to sectoral isomorphism among the public sector, the market, and the nonprofit, or "civil society," third sector. It argues that the market and civil society are at once the
platform and the analogy for triggering isomorphic changes in
the organization of public governance.
Part III provides a comprehensive roadmap of the dimensions and organizing principles of the governance model. These
features consist of increased participation of nonstate actors,
stakeholder collaboration, diversity and competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains,
flexibility and noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic
learning, and legal orchestration among proliferated normgenerating entities. The challenge is to understand these dimensions of the new legal model as operating together, along
with the contingencies and internal debates over meaning and
bricolage that inevitably arise in an emerging school of
thought. The new policy tools and mechanisms that are integral to the governance principles are evaluated and considered
within the efforts to improve democratic practices. Part IV
critically documents the practical application of governance
principles in the following three areas: employment law, environmental law, and digital technology law. First, new workplace policies-including occupational safety and health administration, employment discrimination, and vocational
training programs-provide important insights into the ways
the legal regime is confronting the new political economy and
constructing innovative policies to produce socially responsible
market practices. The recent enactment of the Workforce In-
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vestment Act (WIA), as well as newly adopted programs of the
federal Occupational Health and Safety Agency (OSHA) and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), provide practical testing grounds to examine large-scale shifts
from regulation to governance. In environmental law, a second
leading area of governance, scholars and activists are developing the concept of civic environmentalism, which confronts the
failures of traditional regulatory schemes and promotes participatory and decentralized arrangements to better conserve
the ecosystem and natural resources. In particular, Part IV.B
examines the 2000 revised federal guidelines for Habitat Conservation Planning (HCP) under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). The new policy encourages private stakeholders to engage in participatory governance as an alternative to top-down
regulation. Finally, in a third principal governance domain, information technology law, the ever-expanding domain of the
Internet provides a momentous illustration of the implementation of governance principles in a new technological infrastructure. Regulatory agencies have begun harnessing the power of
digital technologies to meet the informational and organizational demands of rulemaking and to expand civic involvement
in policymaking, for example, through the enactment and implementation of the 2002 E-Government Act. At the same time,
private industry and nongovernmental organizations are using
information technology to expand their public activities and
agendas, fostering new forms of norm-generating institutions.
The concept of cyberdemocracy and its regulatory challenges
are considered in relation to current legal debates about digital
regulation and design.
While the struggle among regulatory, market, and governance approaches persists, the new governance paradigm enables a synthesis of thought within legal academia. Part V argues that the governance model is purposely and ingeniously
designed as a model of theoretical and practical hybridization,
drawing together elements from rival schools of thought. In
practice, it addresses the pervasiveness of both regulatory and
market failures. In legal theory, hybridization involves the integration of insights from both law and economics and critical
legal scholarship, and the rejection of the oppositional stance
that these schools have previously taken. In turn, the integrative project enables the realignment of commitments between
advocates of centralized regulation and advocates of deregulatory privatization. Most importantly, the Renew Deal illumi-
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nates the ways in which, under certain conditions, economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.
This Article concludes with a discussion of the central
normative canons that are evoked by the nascent governance
regime. Building on both the theoretical and programmatic
analyses of the emerging paradigm, Part VI introduces several
sets of critical challenges to the new conceptual framework.
First, it considers situations of compatibility-as opposed to interchangeability-between the traditional regulatory model
and the new governance model. Second, it describes tensions
that arise between the emphasis on direct engagement, as well
as the notion of pluralized authority, championed by the new
model and the ongoing need for an expert representative government in the new polity. Third, the issue of power in a collaborative participatory legal regime is explicitly explored. A
central strength of the governance model is its appeal to both
progressive social reform agendas that support bottom-up democratic empowerment and exponents of projects of privatization and devolution. It is precisely for this reason, however,
that the Renew Deal must confront difficult choices and further
develop its underlying values, enhancing the particular circumstances in which governance succeeds. In the concluding section, the Article relates principles of the governance model to
our complex understanding of democracy, arguing for ongoing
substantive normative evaluation, even as we advance to the
more pluralized and process-oriented governance model.
I. THE SPIRIT OF RENEWAL IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THOUGHT
In describing the emergence of a new legal regime, the
claim to novelty is inexorably ambitious and problematic. Undoubtedly, there are politics of innovation in academia, as in
other communities of knowledge. A claim of newness often carries with it several exciting promises, including progress, originality, optimism, and the introduction of cutting-edge ideas.
Newness as politics can also serve as a strategy for forgetting
differences and moving beyond past disagreements; it is a way
to conceal preassigned identities and enter into an ongoing discourse that previously seemed gridlocked by the ideas of familiar, but mutually exclusive, incumbents. This Article is motivated by the need for an articulation and evaluation of
contemporary legal thought, which ubiquitously declares itself
at a stage of renewal.
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In his remarkable book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn describes a paradigm as a "set of recurrent
and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their
24
conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications." A
paradigm draws a picture of the world, including the constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by the members of
a community. 25 A new paradigm emerges through a revolution,
a noncumulative developmental episode in which an older
paradigm is understood to be replaced in whole or part by one
that is new and incompatible. 26 A revolution takes place when
the existing paradigm ceases to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature and thought. While new paraolder ones, continuous links to earlier moddigms may replace 27
els invariably exist.
Over six decades ago, the New Deal brought a paradigm
shift to American society. The establishment of the New Deal
by President Franklin Roosevelt is widely understood as one of
the most significant events in American politics of the twentieth century. As Bruce Ackerman has described, "[a] halfcentury ago, our legal system was reeling under one of the
greatest shocks in its history. Although America had experienced many depressions before, it had never confided political
power to a leadership so evidently willing to respond by ques28
tioning the legitimacy of laissez faire itself." Responding to

the burdens and risks of the Depression and two world wars,
the New Deal instigated the creation of the modern regulatory
and administrative state. The New Deal paradigm invoked
three Rs-relief, recovery, and reform, but it was the legal developments that united all three under the umbrella of the big
"R" of regulation. In a short period of time, a sweeping set of

24. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43
(1962).
25. See JOHN A. VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: FROM
CLASSICAL REALISM TO NEOTRADITIONALISM 22-23 (1998) (defining paradigm

as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are
studying).
26. KUHN, supra note 24, at 110.
27. Labeling is of the essence, as it shapes and informs the imaginative
spectrum. New governance approaches have received a variety of names. Some
contribute more than others to the very elements the model seeks to promote.
Terms such as "post-regulatory" or "soft law" can, in my view, be problematic,
as they begin with a position of either/or and accept an inferior position of law
vis-i-vis the regulatory model.
28.

BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6 (1984).
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new regulations, regulatory agencies, and federal and state
29
programs were created.
As we enter the twenty-first century, commentators from
across the political spectrum are signaling a second revolutionary paradigm shift-the Renew Deal. As with the New Deal,
the Renew Deal vision of governance aims to tie developments
in technology, globalization, communications, economic organization, and privatization, as well as the collapse of states and

ideologies, the unification of regimes like the European Union

(EU), and the rise of nonstate and stateless actors in both peace
and war together with developments in legal and democratic
theory, including the decline of unified theories and the dissatisfaction with oppositional and fragmented schools. At this
moment, a window has opened that engages the attention and
energy of diverse thinkers in the legal world.3 0
In the emerging Renew Deal, the claims of a new legal regime are self-descriptive. Commentators from a wide range of

29.

See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940 (1963) (describing the social and political
events of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first two terms).
30. See infra Part II. Whether the shift to the Renew Deal is directly cor-

related with actual developments in the world or internally integrated by a
myriad of legal scholars who are using similar terms and concepts and are inspiring and being inspired by others, is secondary to the actual emergence of a
vision. Before the New Deal, pragmatism was understood to be the knot that
pulled different strands of intellectual thought together-the emergence of
cultural pluralism, the fascination with pure science and the logic of scientific
inquiry, the development of probability theory as a means for coping with randomness and uncertainty and the spread of historicist approaches to study
culture, the rapid assimilation of Darwinian theory of evolution, and the suspicion of institutional authority. See, e.g., MICHAL ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM
AND THE LAW: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13-14 (2002) (suggesting that pragmatism should be understood as a rupture and a foundational moment in American thought); CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B. Rosenthal et al. eds., 1999) (showcasing
the intellectual contributions of prominent contemporary pragmatist scholars);
THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND
CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (profiling the major currents in modern
American pragmatic thought); CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF
PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989) (chronicling the history of
American pragmatism from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Richard Rorey and the
challenge of postmodernity). See generally Louis Menand, Introduction to
Pragmatism,in PRAGMATISM: A READER, at xxvi (Louis Menand ed., 1997). In
the succeeding decades after the New Deal, the "space race" of the 1960s and
1970s further fostered expectation about the capacities of top-down reform and
optimism about technology as an all-encompassing response to social need. See
WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY
05' Ti-iF PA CF An v (1 QRM
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legal fields agree that there is a contemporary "broad consensus in favor of the need for some kind of change in the current
regulatory system." 31 As one author describes, "[n]ot since the
New Deal has the direction of the administrative state been
The language of regulatory reinsubject to such contestation.
3 2
ubiquitous."
is
vention
Proclaiming a new post-New Deal paradigm has also been
ubiquitous in the political arena. During his presidency, President Clinton stated that the New Deal "helped to restore our

31. Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives
on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999).
32. Freeman, supra note 3, at 3; see also BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE
PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995) (discussing the shifts and developments in
regulatory analysis and the federal bureaucracy during the Reagan years);
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
THOMAS 0.
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Nicholas W.
Allard, Reinventing Rate Regulation, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 63 (1993) (analyzing
the efficacy of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992); Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267, 279 (2002) (inquiring into the idea "that
public choice theory need not involve either the strong motivational assumption of self-interest or the reductionary premise of perfect information and rationality"); Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress
Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521 (1994) (recounting the shortcomings of the
EPA's Regulatory Agenda and offering suggestions for improvement); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405 (1996) (scrutinizing efforts by the executive and legislative branches to reform the administrative state); Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to
Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (exploring the needs of the contemporary administrative state); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) (evaluating Executive
Order 12,866 and its place in the Clinton administration's plan to reinvent
government); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public
Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001) (examining the
trend towards an "elaborate system of third-partygovernment in which crucial
elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-governmental or
other governmental actors"); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap:
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1
(2002) (investigating attempts to overhaul the administrative state in the
European Union); Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance:Advocating for Healthcare,2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (arguing that public
interest lawyers must change their tactics to remain relevant in a world where
the center of government is shifting back to the states); Peter F. Drucker,
Really Reinventing Government, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1995, at 49 (arguing that the need for reform is so severe that slashing bureaucracies is inadequate, and suggesting that reforms in the private sector be adopted in the public sector).

354

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

Nation to prosperity and defined the relationship between our
people and their Government for half a century.... That approach worked in its time. But we today, we face a very different time and very different conditions." 33 Like his Republican
counterparts, President Clinton repeatedly asserted that "[t]he
era of big [g]overnment is over." 34 At a bill-signing ceremony,
he declared that it was time for power to shift from the federal
to the state and local levels:
We are recognizing that the pendulum has swung too far, and that we
have to rely on the initiative, the creativity, the determination and
the decision making of people at the State and local level to carry

much of the load for America as we move into the 21st century. 35

Yet, the Renew Deal shift is not simply a swing back from
a point to which "the pendulum has swung too far." A remarkable aspect of the contemporary calls for a new paradigm is the
way the concept of change and renewal continues to inform the
new vision even as it replaces elements of the older model. The
connection between renewal and permanent innovation is
therefore key to understanding the Renew Deal governance
model. The promise is not merely a shift from one regime to another, from one set of legal doctrines to another, or from one
method of regulation to another; but rather an entirely new regime that will have the built-in ability to innovate and constantly renew itself. Newness itself becomes the essential substance of the emerging paradigm. The idea of dynamic
innovation is intrinsic to the theory. The organizing principles
of the governance model are designed to allow the new paradigm to evolve organically. Its leading features, such as dynamic learning, process orientation, iteration, innovation, and
adaptability, all constitute a time dimension within the model.
The goal of this newness in legal thought is to imagine the ar33.

President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the

Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 24, 1995), in 31 WKLY. COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 97, 97 (1995).

34. President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996), in 32 WKLY. COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 90, 90 (1996); see also Steven G. Calabresi,
"The Era of Big Government Is Over," 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1998) (reviewing

ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1997)).

35. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (Mar. 22, 1995), in 31 WKLY. COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 453, 455 (1995), quoted in Laurens Walker, The
End of the New Deal and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,82 IOWA L. REV.
1269, 1278 (1997).
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chitecture of a legal system that is most likely to support constant improvement: The overriding task in the design of arrangements conducive to practical progress is therefore always
to imagine and establish the arrangements for cooperation, in
the small and in the36 large, that are least likely to prevent permanent innovation.
II. THE PUSH AND PULL FOR RENEWAL
A. THE COMPETING LOGICS OF THE RENEW DEAL: CLOSING THE
GAP OR LEADING THE WAY
What motivates the drive for a new governance model?
Several sets of competing logics run through the vision of renewal. The primary set of logics juxtaposes external and internal reaction. While the dominant narrative of reaction relies on
external triggers created by new realities of the political economy, a competing account emphasizes the internal push for
new approaches to sociolegal theory. Externally, law reacts to
change in the circumstances of the outside world. These circumstances might include globalization, privatization, technology, increased market competition, economic recession, and alternating modes of production. At the same time, it is
internally motivated by the inadequacies of existing theories,
stagnation in the current state of legal discourse, and the need
to progress beyond conceptual binaries-including left/right,
critical/constructive, expressive/scientific, formal/informal, pubhave misinformed
lic/private, and regulated/unregulated-that
37
previous schools of thought.
A related set of logics provokes the images of both progression and regression in the shift from a regulatory to a governance model. While many descriptions invoke the rhetoric of
36. UNGER, supra note 4, at 184.
37. The duality of political economy developments and theoretical conceptualization comes through explicitly in introductory notes on reflexive law:
Reflexive labour law is both a theoretical concept and a description of
a certain development of modern labour law systems. As a theoretical
concept it applies a particular version of general legal theory, i.e.,
autopoietics to labour law. As a descriptive concept it interprets and
reconstructs trends in labour law ....
REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 1, at 7-8. This tension is similarly visible
in A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4. The first subtitle of Dorf and Sabel's article is "The Crisis." Id. at 270. Thereafter, the authors shift to the description of progress and advancements internal to legal
thought. Id. at 270-88.
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progress and growth by describing the transformation in evolutionary terms, a competing rhetoric highlights crisis and decline in existing capabilities and public commitment. While one
path of reasoning reflects political disillusionment with the
postwar model of the bureaucratic welfare state, the second
signifies a relegitimation of the legal process by shifting to a
more advanced form of public, deliberative participation. These
coexisting rationales emphasize an additional tension concerning the temporal duration of the transformation-whether the
shift to governance is understood as part of a transitional period toward an unknown future or a permanent new framework
that replaces the traditional regulatory paradigm. Moreover,
while the Renew Deal literature often depicts the new approaches of the governance model as alternatives to conventional regulatory approaches, it simultaneously assumes their
complementarity.
A final set of competing ideas that run throughout the literature involves the allocation of the new governance model
within or without law's empire. While one underlying line of
reasoning emphasizes the legal externality of the new model as
being in sharp opposition to regulation, a competing narrative
uses the rhetoric of authenticity and resurgence to suggest that
the Renew Deal governance model represents a newer and
truer, form of law, lawmaking, and public administration.38
Rather than deciding between competing motivators, our
focus should be on the conditions, both internal and external to
legal thought, that make the new vision possible. Indeed, instead of asking what is truly motivating and authentically new
in the model, the key questions concern the range of developments and changes that have made the principles of the new
governance model salient and feasible at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
B. EXTERNAL PUSH FACTORS: LAW FOLLOWS THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY
The first set of rationales for the Renew Deal is reactive.
The premise is that, as the world changes, patterns of law and
governance must change with it. As we move into the twenty-

38.

See generally Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism: Criti-

cal Legal Conciousness and Transformative

Politics (2003) (unpublished

manuscript, on file with author) (describing the tension between depictions of
new reform strategies as legal and extra-legal).
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first century, the economic, social, and political landscapes are
constantly in motion. Consequently, legal thought and practice
must transform themselves to adjust to new realities: "The
world will not stand still and let us enjoy our freedoms. It will
continually make itself anew, and as it does, we must consider
the ever-changing predicament of liberty, and the 39ever new
methods by which it may be augmented or curtailed."
A remarkable number of recent legal articles therefore begin with a description of a change in the circumstances in the
outside world, including increased global competition and fiscal
crises; new modes of production and patterns of employment;
changing ecology; and advancements in communication, science, and technology. 40 In reaction, law needs to continually
close the gap and adapt to these circumstances: "A rapidly
changing world that is moving toward a new phase of moder41
nity requires innovative legal and policy strategies." If the political economy has changed, legal theorists and practitioners
need to rethink the traditional roles of law.
The first step therefore is to diagnose the discontinuities
between the demands of the twenty-first century and the capacities of the regulatory state:
Where society demands flexibility and dynamism, the state offers bureaucracy and rules. Where society requires legal instruments that
are almost self-implementing, the state builds an elaborate oversight
apparatus. While societies need a legal system that induces selfreflection toward "sustainable" behavior, the state maintains a legal
strategy of forcing desired behavior42from outside the firm, through
threats of exposure and punishment.

This analysis reflects the idea that life has reached a new
degree of complexity which renders a central control-andcommand structure impossible: "[I]n a complex and rapidly
changing world it is manifestly impossible to write rules that
39. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 58
(2004).
40.

See,

e.g.,

MODERN

GOVERNANCE:

NEW

GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY

INTERACTIONS (Jan Kooiman ed., 1993) (containing a collection of essays on

the new realities in Europe that demand a different conception of state/society

relations); Jan Kooiman, Governance and Governability: Using Complexity,
Dynamics and Diversity, in MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENTSOCIETY INTERACTIONS, supra at 35; William F. Pedersen, Contracting with
the Regulated for Better Regulations, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1067 (2001).
41. Fiorino, supra note 31, at 464-67 (stating "the world is changing, so
law and patterns of governance must change with it").

42. Id. at 464.
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cover the particulars of current circumstances in any sphere of
activity."43 Moreover, the conditions of the new market are
those of uncertainty, unpredictability, and volatility. "[P]olicy
has to be flexible and revisable to cope with an increasingly
complex and volatile world.. . ."44 Law should recognize the
new reality of "radical indeterminacy"45 and the "pervasiveness
of unintended consequences." 46 These twenty-first century realities no longer allow for the traditional statist project, but
rather require the proliferation of newly diverse sources of
47
norms and strategies.
New governance approaches are also needed to address the
increased speed of change in the new economy. 48 Flexibility and
adaptability are key in remaining competitive in the globalized
market. Scientific innovation, as well as unpredictable strains
of heightened competition, require techniques which incorporate constant change and improvement.
In addition to the new levels of complexity, unpredictability, and dynamic change in society, law must also react to increasing heterogeneity. The New Deal model was created upon
the assumptions of a former era, in which uniformity and stability were considerably more widespread. As described in Part
IV, the typical New Deal economic enterprise was a large and
relatively stable industrial company, while today the workplace
43. Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government, supra note
4, at 837. For a discussion relating to new understandings about the complexity of ecosystems, see Annecoos Wiersema, Extinction and Uncertainty: Reconciling Ecology and Law in International Legal Regimes for Protection of Species and Ecosystems 3 (unpublished SJD colloquium Dec. 2003, on file with
author): 'While, over the past few decades, ecologists have increasingly recognized the complexity and the lack of stability in nature, lawyers seeking protection of these ecological systems have been slow to catch up." Id.; see also
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231
(1995) ("Conventional regulation is continually outpaced by the increasing
complexity of environmental problems.")
44. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 17.
45. Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S
INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 292 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds.,
2002).
46. A Constitutionof Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 285.
47. Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 71-72 (1998); see
also A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 270
("[O]ur national affairs are too complex, diverse, and volatile to be governed by
lapidary expressions of the public will-laws of Congress, administrative
rules, judicial judgments-that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the
cases to which they will eventually be applied.").
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48
is vastly heterogeneous, networked, and constantly changing.

Similarly, the accumulation of new scientific knowledge about
the diverse and changing nature of different ecological systems
requires the response of environmental policy. A significant
impediment for legal reform today is the diversity of the mar-

ket and the wide range of social issues and problems, which require the adoption of a wide range of organizational forms and

policies. Contemporary legal scholarship recognizes that, today,
no single model of social organization exists and thus a unitary
conception of the regulation of diverse social fields and contexts
is impossible. 49 There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing the regulatory state. No standard regulations can

effectively govern the multiplicity of settings in which social aclegal intion operates. The nature of the new economy requires
50
diverse.
and
multiple
be
to
stitutions themselves

Technological advances and changes in market infrastructure have been conducive to these new demands for openness
51
and "radicali[z]ed modernity." They have also added a new
layer of settings to which legal thought must react. Namely, the
physicality of the regulated unit has itself changed. Advances
in technology and communication are increasingly facilitating
self-regulation within the private market by enabling more in48. See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4;
Fiorino, supra note 31.
50. In more abstract terms, these changes can be theorized as the changes
in our perceptions of modernity. While the New Deal was founded on the
premises of modernism, including certainty, order, rationality, universality,
and objectivity, the Renew Deal is motivated by the assumptions of the "radicalization of modernity" (in some versions, postmodernism), including indeterminacy, disequilibrium, particularism, diversity, experientialism, subjectivity, and the possibility that chaos is openness. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 50-52 (1990); see also BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION AND
EMANCIPATION 21-22 (2002) (explaining the tension between regulation and
emancipation in a postmodern understanding of the law).
51. Giddens characterizes radicalized modernity, or accelerated high
modernity, as the unprecedented rapidity of change, the encompassing scope
of change, and the increased commodification of social action. GIDDENS, supra
note 50, at 149-50. Through time/space distinctions, social disembedding, accepted systems of knowledge, and self-monitoring, radical modernity promotes
global integration and increased local and global coordination. Id. This is in
fact opposed to the conditions described by postmodern theorists of fragmentation and disorganization. See id.; cf. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY (1990) (describing the historical construction of the intellectual project of postmodernity but ultimately finding a renewal of Enlightenment ideals).
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formation sharing and lowering the barriers of entry. For example, advances in air travel have increased competition
among airlines; thereby reducing some of the need for antitrust
regulation. 52 Similarly, the natural monopoly of microwave
transmission has decreased in telecommunications.53 As described in Part IV, the explosion of Internet technologies and
cable broadcasting has eliminated some of the rationales for
regulation of information, while creating other types of risks. 54
A central example is the way new cybercommunications technology has lowered the threshold for groups to act collectively,
triggering the emergence of new kinds of norm-generating institutions. 55 Furthermore, the digital revolution has made it
easy to copy, transmit, and distribute materials, as well as to
connect with others through communication networks at drastically lower costs. 56 These physical and architectural innova-

tions require corresponding developments in legal theory.5 7
Finally, recent developments in the political economy have
revealed new gaps between democratic practices and prevailing
constitutional theory.58 Globalization, primarily the unification
of nations in Europe, has brought into question the adequacy of
the concept of a demos. Within legal theory, globalization has
raised concerns about a democratic deficit. 59 The need for a bet52. Cf. Bruce B. Wilson, Railroads,Airlines, and the Antitrust Laws in the
Post-Regulatory World: Common Concerns and Shared Lessons, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 711, 717-18 (1991) (asserting that railroads can learn from the airlines'
adoption of electronic ratemaking and electronic reservation system and the
subsequent antitrust litigation).
53. PETER H. SCHUCK, The Politics of Regulation, in THE LIMITS OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 117, 123-24 (2000).
54. See infra Part IV.C.
55. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 38-64 (1993).

56. Balkin, supra note 39, at 6-7.
57. In response to these new digital realities, Jack Balkin argues,
[A]s the world changes around us, as the possibilities and problems of
new technologies are revealed, our conception of the free speech principle begins to change with them. Our sense of what freedom of
speech is, why we value it, and how best to preserve that which we
value, reframes itself in the changing milieu.
Id. at 55.
58. See, e.g., A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, supra note 4,
at 272 (describing the crisis of constitutional theory premised on a choice between the Constitution or institutional democracy as "deliberately alarmist").
59. See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 451 (1999); Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1149 (2003); Joseph S. Nye Jr., Globaliza-
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ter theory for the new polity bridges most directly the external
and the internal drives for renewal. In the face of new realities
and changing needs, these concerns have created a platform to
which legal thought must react in addressing the inadequacies
of existing models of regulation and lawmaking.
C. THE INTERNAL PULL: THE DIRECTIVE OF LEGAL THOUGHT
The second set of motivations for the Renew Deal is active
in nature, rather than reactive. It represents an internal pull
for renewal from within legal thought. These rationales have as
their starting point the inadequacy of existing approaches
within the world of law. The focus is on the inherent limitations
of conventional regulatory instruments, as well as the inadequacies of a legal regime based solely on market incentives.
Under the traditional regulatory model, law itself has become
so complex and dense that it is inevitably self-defying. The Renew Deal regulatory model, relying on substantive commandand-control legislation, has itself created the "crisis of the interventionist state." 60 A more advanced and sustainable theory
of law-in-society must be developed to replace the deficiencies
of the existing model.
The active internal line of reasoning is evolutionary in tone
and Darwinian in spirit. It includes a discourse of progression
and evolution, and explores common stages through which the
legal regimes of most nations progress. The future of the law in
the twenty-first century lies in the mutant forms and experiments which prove to be fittest and survive the demands of tomorrow. The evolutionist pull factors are manifested most
clearly in the writings on reflexive law and autopoietic systems.
In his Introduction to Autopoietic Law, Gunther Teubner asks,
Is the practice of legal reasoning bound to end in "strange loops",
"tangled hierarchies", and "reflexivity dilemmas"? Is the legal process
nothing but a closed cycle of recurrent legal operations: "computation
of
of computation of computation... "?And are the social dynamics
61
the legal system based upon the "paradoxes of self-reference"?

Exemplifying the internal demand for renewal, Teubner
begins by describing the crisis in legal theory-the crisis of a
tion's Democratic Deficit: How To Make International Institutions More Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2001).
60. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern
Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239, 267 (1983).

61. Gunther Teubner, Introductionto Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC: A
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (citations omitted).
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split between legal theory and legal sociology. Teubner advances autopoiesis as a new approach to legal thought that can
both recognize and transcend the crisis. 62 Teubner describes
autopoiesis, a "new and promising research strategy... to
identify circular relationships within the legal system." 63 Drawing on Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, Teubner argues that
the complexity of modern life and society requires a new, nextstage approach to regulation, that of reflexive law, in which law
facilitates the internal discourse and coordination of other systems. Reflexive law reforms social practices by influencing the
self-referential capacities of other social institutions. 64 Teubner
outlines an attractive paradox that surfaces in the new model.
The more the legal system, as an autopoietic system, is closed
(operative closeness), the more it can be radically open (cognitive openness). 65 The more it is autonomous, the more it can
both reference and investigate social facts, political demands,
social science research, and human needs. 66
Renew Deal scholars, operating under broader approaches
than the European reflexive law school of thought, subscribe to
the evolution of modern law through three legal paradigms.
Generally, there is a linear progression from: (1) a system that
merely facilitates private ordering to (2) a regulatory model and
then (3) from the regulatory state to a governance approach.
The first stage in the evolution of modern legal systems, the
background ordering and maintenance of private entitlements,
consists of formal law, a minimalist set of rules within the
bounds of which private actors are free to carry out their own
transactions. Economies have traditionally relied on formal law
as a thin regulatory framework for freedom of contract and
property security. Because formal law does not correct the inadequacies and inequities of the market, however, modern legal
systems universally move to a second evolutionary stage, in
which they develop bodies of substantive law. In the substantive law stage, the thick regulatory state is formed. 67 In the
62. Id.
63. Id. Reflexive law and autopoiesis break the taboo of circularity in legal
thinking. Id. It is a moment of "transferring circularity from the world of ideas
to that of hard facts." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id.
67. While there are significant variances in the constitution of various
substantive social regulatory regimes across developed countries, there has
been a general move to regulate some form of welfare state. See generally
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United States, Roosevelt's New Deal crystallized this second
stage. It reflected the judgment that social subsystems are incapable of self-adjustment and need to be ordered by a centralized authority. 68 The regulatory stage requires the formation of
a bureaucratic omnipresent government that intervenes purposively, through goal-oriented policies in such diverse areas as
consumer protection, welfare, health and safety, education, and
nondiscrimination.
Despite its merits, substantive law inevitably and uniformly reaches a crisis. The self-reproducing nature of all other
social fields produces a regulatory trilemma. The regulatory
model is fated to be either undereffective, overeffective, or distorted vis-A-vis other social fields. First, the use of substantive
law is likely in most circumstances to be underinclusive and ineffective in producing meaningful changes in behavior without
risking the destruction of other subsystems (undereffectiveness). 69 Second, substantive law may indeed turn out
to be too effective and consequently destroy the internal fabric
of subsystems (overlegalization or juridification of society by
law). 70 Finally, regulation itself risks becoming colonized by the
regulated subsystems. That is, it becomes too politicized, or
"economized," by the centers of power of the system with which
it is interacting (capture). Law needs new techniques to cir-

GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM
(1990); WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL

ECONOMIES (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 1996).

68. Stewart, supra note 7, at 93. In the American context, Richard Stewart describes the three stages as a shift from constitutive law, which legally
recognizes and supports private ordering, defines constituents' power and entitlements, and establishes procedures for resolving disputes, to prescriptive
law. Id. Prescriptive rules specify and dictate what conduct is required from
individuals. Id. at 89-90.
69. Teubner, supra note 8, at 310-12; see also Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647,
1650 (1989); Helmut Wilke, Three Types of Legal Structure: The Conditional,
the Purposive, and the Relational Program, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 8, at 280, 282-87.
70. Gunther Teubner, Juridification:Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions,
in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE
AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 9
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1987); see also DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 32, at 55
(referring to modern law's loss of its original function as a mediator between
social regulation and social emancipation); Stewart, supra note 7, at 90 (describing prescriptive law as an inevitable, preempting choice within subsystems).
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cumvent this trilemma and to engage society in a better and
more productive way.
The need for a third transformation in the legal paradigm
is consequently a necessary stage that every society reaches in
its search for justice and order. This is achieved by implementing reflexive or reconstitutive legal strategies that restructure
subsystems rather than simply prescribe substantive orders. 71
And indeed, through comparative observations, scholars find
empirically that these are the actual progressive stages of most
legal systems. For example, studying thirteen countries, Martin
Janicke and Helmut Weidner conclude that most nations progress from a strategy of dispersion of pollution (formal marketbased law) to direct regulatory control (substantive regulatory
law), and then progress to a more complex policy approach,
which includes building cooperative relationships with the private market (reflexive, governance law). 72

Straddling the internal and external motivations for a new
legal paradigm are changes in the goals of legal action. Not
only have the techniques of law become outmoded and the need
to design second generation legal strategies become apparent,
the aspirations of law and policy have themselves undergone
transformation. Peter Schuck describes the old regulatory
model of the New Deal as "economic or cartel regulation." He
further suggests that, since the beginning of the 1970s (and
still within the regulatory model), substantive law has experienced a shift from economic to social regulation, aimed at enhancing health, safety, environmental quality, equal opportunity, and quality of life. 73 Social regulation, unlike economic

regulation, confers on an administrative agency cross-industry
jurisdiction. 74 Such regulation is a more complex task, requiring different types of knowledge, information,, and political
support. While social legislation under the regulatory model
still entails compliance requirements of uniform rules, the
changing fabric of legal goals moves us closer to an internal
71.
72.

Stewart, supra note 7, at 90; Teubner, supra note 8, at 299.
Martin Janicke & Helmut Weidner, Summary: Global Environmental

Policy Learning, in NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY OF CAPACITY-BUILDING 299, 310-12 (Martin Janicke & Helmut
Weidner eds., 1997).
73. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 123. Schuck compares the rate of return on
natural gas to the safety of the air to exemplify the difference in economic and
social regulation. Id.
74. See infra notes 295-317 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA's
wide jurisdiction as innovative at the time of its establishment).
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evolution in legal approaches. Demonstrative of such changes
in policy goals has been the move in Western countries in the
past decade to adopt new social policies, as nations shift from a
75
passive bureaucratic welfare state to active approaches. As
will be further explored in the next sections, both in the United
States and in Europe, social policy has changed from the maintenance of a permanent social safety net to strategies geared
toward an adaptable and dynamic workforce. 76 Again, the political economy, along with social and legal theory, have motivated these changes in policy aspirations and the techniques
for their realization.
The governance model is a natural successor to the regulatory model. It addresses the changes in both the goals and capabilities of legal regulation, and avoids the central deficiencies
of substantive law. The governance stage fundamentally transforms legal control into a dynamic, reflexive, and flexible regime. Its principles promote the internal self-regulatory capacities of other social fields (or subsystems) with which it
interacts. Unlike the regulatory model, it is not self-destructive,
but self-sustaining.
The coexistence of external and internal logics in the moment of transformation is exemplified in this context by the influence of the new economy on legal theory. The Renew Deal
governance model imports features from the organization of the
market into the public sphere. 77 At the same time, albeit to a
lesser degree, it orchestrates the importation of public values
into the new private-sector economy. 78 A recurring theme of the
new model is that state and government agencies should learn

75.

See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Johnathan Zeitlin, Active Welfare, Ex-

perimental Governance, and Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The New Transformation of Europe (unpublished draft prepared for the International Conference of the Hellenic Presidency of the European Union (May 21-22, 2003), on
file with author) (discussing recent changes in social welfare policy in the EU).
76. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Questions About Social Europe by an American Observer, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 437 (2000); Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 75;
Trubek & Trubek, supranote 2.
77. MINOW, supra note 22, at 6-49 (explaining that nonprofits increasingly use the techniques of private industries to enhance their effectiveness);
see also infra Parts III.C, III.G (discussing the influence of market organization on Renew Deal scholarship).
78. There have been recent calls for expanding this aspect within the
growing body of Renew Deal literature. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization,116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnership:Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2003).
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from the practices of private organizational models and market-based management theories. The use of private firms as an
analogy to other social spheres reflects the growing opinion
that broad developments in the market economy trigger direct
changes in law. In many contexts, the interconnections between
the object of regulation (the economy) and the strategy by
which it is regulated (law) motivate the push for renewal
through the adoption of market practices in the public sphere.
It is often more plausible, however, that legal thought is adopting a practice patterned after and correlated with the changing
American market as an analogous sphere of good practices to
be replicated in other spheres of life. Both possibilities link contemporary problems in the organization of the economy to innovative legal theory on regulation and governance. Thus, as
scholars and reformers increasingly observe private-sector developments, regulatory agencies and public officials are facing
heightened pressures to imitate the efficiencies of the private
sector. For example, government is urged to become lean and
flexible through the reduction of size and costs. One central
way to reduce the size of the public sector is through accelerated privatization projects, reducing the size of bureaucracy
primarily by contracting out public functions to private par79
ties.
Other institutional economic approaches are similarly influencing the principles of public management. For example, in
Reinventing Government, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler suggest bringing Japanese business models of entrepreneurial,
team-oriented management to bear on American governmental
institutions.8 0 An entrepreneurial government is one that begins with identifying its customers, determining their needs,
and moving forward to identify the best practices that would
meet these needs.8 1 Under this subset of rationales, the basic
assumptions of a market economy-profit motivation under
competitive supply and demand conditions-are often projected
onto public management ideals. As we shall further see in Part
III, these developments correspond with the organizing princi-

79. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance (Mar. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
80. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 232-34

(1992).
81. Id.
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including flexibility, competition,
ples of the governance model
82
learning.
and
adaptability,
D. CYCLES OF RENEWAL
A final dimension of the motivation for change is cyclical in
nature. The dynamics of intellectual renewal, particularly in
the field of law, which is strongly characterized by being based
both in practice and in aspiration can be understood over time
Clinton's speech, a
as rhythmic. The image evoked in President
"pendulum that has moved too far,"8 3 expresses the idea of recurring waves. In legal practice and institutional design, as
well as legal thought, there is a natural cycle of renewal, followed by ossification and entrenchment, followed in turn by
another wave of renewal.
In legal practice, scholars point to recurring barriers to innovation as part of the institutional fabric of the profession.
These barriers include the difficulties of modifying written
texts, the formal and informal impact of precedent, the doctrine
84
of stare decisis, and the professional adherence to status quo.
As new doctrines are developed, they increasingly become part
of the system and entrenched in particular meanings and practices. Innovative processes gradually become formalized, and,
eventually, there is renewed need to think outside of the regulatory tool box, and to develop newer approaches. Often this
means the invention of previously informal practices. These
new practices will eventually become more formalized. This cycle creates a rhythm, very much like seasonal regeneration, of
calls for far-reaching innovations by every generation of legal
academics. Todd Rakoff, describing shifts between formal and
informal modes of administrative law, suggests such a recurring pattern:
What we see in the American experience is a cyclical phenomenon in
which less formal modes of regulation are invented; over time, they
formalized; and then newer, less formal modes
become increasingly
85
are developed.

82. See infra Part III.
83. Clinton, supra note 35, at 455.
84. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 (2002) (arguing that the ineffectiveness of
American labor law is due to its "insulation from democratic renewal and local
innovation").
85. Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 170 (2000).
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In the context of the decline of American labor law, Cynthia Estlund similarly argues that the shrinking scope of collective bargaining is traceable to the law's longstanding insulation
from renewal and innovation. 86 The collective bargaining regime created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was
the New Deal's answer to labor market discontents.8 7 Not long
after its enactment, however, the new statutory regime came to
be viewed as deeply problematic by labor law scholars. They
argued that during the decades succeeding the enactment of
the NLRA, the courts, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), and other administrative bodies interpreted and implemented the statutory regime in ways that "deradicalized"
the Act; thereby creating a rigid legal regime that naturalized a
particular, limited vision of collective bargaining that was systematically hostile to labor militancy.8 8 And indeed, from the
1960s to the 1980s, as unionism declined, individual employment law expanded and specific, substantive federal regulations on workplace issues increased from about forty-four to
over two hundred.8 9 During the 1990s, the government withdrew from some of its roles as an active player in the regulation
of employment. 90 Today, commitment to employment regulation
and its enforcement has eroded. This retreat has created some
renewed interest in the foundations of collective labor laws. As
Estlund points out, although labor laws now appear rigid and
inefficient, the essence of collective bargaining responds to precisely the same demands for renewal, flexibility, and change

86.

Estlund, supra note 84, at 1527.

87. See National Labor Reform Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-69 (2000); Orly
Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: FourDimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121
(2001).

88. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 251 (1997);
Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281-93 (1977);
Lobel, supra note 87, at 184-87.
89.

PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE

NEW LABOR MARKET 47 (2001) (citing John Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67, 67-74 (1976)).

90.

Orly Lobel, OrchestratedExperimentalism in the Regulation of Work,

101 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2161 (2003) (reviewing OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note

89).

2004]

THE RENEW DEAL

369

91
that are pervasive in contemporary legal thought. There is an
historical logic to the pattern:

[The "ossified" labor law regime] is at least potentially decentralized,
tailored to local circumstances, flexible, and democratic. Indeed, collective bargaining would seem to represent a promising "third way"
between the harsh regimen of individual contract and the muchmaligned paradigm of centralized "command and control" regulation.
That is no accident. The New Deal's institutionalization of collective
bargaining was designed to rectify the failings of individual "liberty of
contract" at a time when mandated minimum terms were still constitutionally and politically suspect, and the increasing role of minimum
standards legislation since then is often described as a response to the
decline of collective bargaining and the regulatory vacuum it has left
behind. There would thus be a certain historical logic to the revival of
imposition of unicollective bargaining at a time when the centralized
92
form regulations is increasingly questioned.

Like many other scholars who have called for renewal, Estlund identifies possibilities for change paved by the process of
ossification itself. This paradox of ossification93 leading to renewal is a recurring theme in legal scholarship.
As in doctrinal fields like administrative, labor, and employment law, the more abstract field of legal theory calls for
regeneration during every new generation of legal scholars. Repetitive similarities exist in modes of mediating94contradiction
in different structures of successive legal schools. The solution
also repeats-destabilization through the reinvention of a new
paradigm and new conceptual frameworks for change. Paraphrasing Michel Foucault, Stepan Woods asks how it is that le91. Estlund, supra note 84, at 1528; see also Stewart, supra note 7, at 94
(describing early federal regulatory programs, particularly labor law and securities law as reconstitutive or reflexive strategies that promote "self-regulatory
practices rather than ...comprehensive central prescription of conduct").
92. Estlund, supra note 84, at 1528-29.
93. But see Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1047, 1080 (2002). Schlag argues that the opposite is also true-too much
renewal energy risks ossification by exhaustion: "The energy aesthetic is
threatened by its own explosive, uncontrollable force. Ironically, it is also
threatened with exhaustion: the expenditure of energy leads to its depletion."
Id.
94. Orly Lobel, Retrieving the Projects Beyond Deconstruction: Channeling the Social in Private Law Theory (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (describing a pendulum of private law theory, embodying "recurring patterns: the existence of both individual and social is identified, attempts are made to distinguish, justify and confine the social to distinct
boundaries"); see also Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 96-97 (1991) (describing legal argumentation as "a
product of the actual history of a particular legal discourse" that is incomplete
and changing).
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gal scholars repeatedly attempt to sever the "king's head," yet
the next generation always seems to find the head back on the
9
sovereign's shoulders: 5
Exploding, fragmenting or contextualizing the state, law, sovereignty,
public, private and so on, have been regular features of criticism and
innovation in the social sciences and law throughout the last century,
so that proclaiming the "death of the state" (or law or sovereignty) has
become part of the ritual of renewal in discipline after discipline.96

David Kennedy makes a radical expression of the possibility that, in fact, there is nothing new under the sun in the international law field of legal scholarship. Describing repetitive
reform agendas in the field of international law, Kennedy
states: "The discipline of international law today is cheek by
jowl with people calling for new thinking and renewal, even as
they offer up the most shopworn ideas and initiatives ....
For
international lawyers, the performances of renewal, criticism,
and reform are central to professional identity and compe97
tence."
While we should take seriously the occurrences of cyclical
renewal, this pattern does not undermine the contemporary
moment of a high peak of the cycle that is driving the Renew
Deal paradigm shift. Moreover, despite the value in the reflexive exploration of recurring patterns of renewal, these claims
should not be overstated. Even as history repeats, we never
truly face the same challenges twice. We can and must learn
from renewal efforts (successes as well as failures) of former
eras, yet the particular constellation of multiple factors at the
beginning of the twenty-first century makes the current experience of renewal unique. The internal and external factors triggering the emergence of a new vision interact powerfully to
challenge, revive, and reaffirm our fundamental principles as a
society:

95. Stepan Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada:Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 129, 189 (2003).
96. Id.
97. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335, 335-37 (2000). According to Kennedy:
The occasion invites thought about the role of novelty and innovation
in the field-what is it, how does it happen, how should it be valued? ... [Flor more than a century, these lawyers have shared an argumentative terrain which can be analyzed using the tools of structural or semiotic analysis that have now been applied to the doctrinal
terminology of various other legal fields.

2004]

THE RENEW DEAL

For only through constant rethinking, in the face of changed circumstances, can we recall and rediscover what our deepest commitments
truly are. What appears to be change is actually continuity; what98 appears to be revision is actually the deepest form of remembrance.

Most importantly, in the contemporary vision for renewal,
the strength of the governance paradigm is its integral commitment to innovation as an ongoing, collective, intellectual,
and programmatic project. The construct of openness sheds
conceptually, epistemologically, and institutionally the baggage
of predetermined solutions and widens our imaginative spectrum. What is particularly promising about the Renew Deal
governance model is its self-conscious promise to continue the
process of energized renewal from within the new paradigm.
III. THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF THE RENEW
DEAL GOVERNANCE MODEL
A. PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIP

During the New Deal era, a key feature of the organization
of law and order was the commitment to centralized, institutional decision-making authorities relying on professional, official expertise: "The New Deal believed in experts. Those who
rationalized its regulatory initiatives regarded expertise and
specialization as the particular strengths of the administrative
process."99
The central proposition of the New Deal regulatory model
was that a few well-educated, specially trained, and publicly
appointed professionals could make the best decisions about
10 0
The belief in experts and the need for regunational policies.
reinforcing. The project of centralized somutually
lation were
focused factfinding and professional
required
cial engineering
how, with the rise of reguladescribed
Frankfurter
Felix
skills.
this country of the deliberin
need
in
singularly
are
tion, "we

98.

Balkin, supra note 39, at 56.

99. JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 44 (1978); see also JAMES M. LANDIS,
reguTHE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938) (describing how the rise of

lation increased the need for expertise).
100. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1997).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

Table 1: Coexisting Rationales for a Paradigm Shift
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10 1
ateness and truthfulness of really scientific expertness."' Administrative law was developed under the idea that the regulatory policymaking powers of administrative agencies are10 based
2
The
on their superior knowledge, information, and expertise.
of
development
the
influenced
commitment to agency expertise
agency
to
deference
and
legal doctrines involving delegation
expertise, and permitting certain divergence from the scope of
10 3
External participadelegation to the implementation stage.
and legitimacy
expertise
the
to
threat
a
tion was thought of as
would be inagencies
expert
since
of the administrative state,
by pricapture
to
prone
more
thus
and
fluenced by self-interest 10 4
pressures.
vate industry
The new governance model challenges these conventional
assumptions. It broadens the decision-making playing field by
involving more actors in the various stages of the legal process.
It also diversifies the types of expertise and experience that
these new actors bring to the table. Renew Deal governance is a
regime based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens
from passive to active roles. The exercise of normative authority is pluralized.
Increased participation permeates the many levels and
stages of legal process-legislation, promulgation of rules, implementation of policies, and enforcement. In the last several
decades, a range of policies has attempted to increase the participation of nongovernmental individuals and groups in public
processes. 105 New groups demand more access to policy proc-

101. FREEDMAN, supra note 99, at 45 (quoting Note, The Democratic Faith
of Felix Frankfurter,25 STAN. L. REV. 430, 433 n.16 (1973)) (emphasis added).
102. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 91 (1994) ("[A]lthough agencies may set regulatory policy, they do not
make controversial, value-laden choices, but rather use their expertise to solve
technical problems left to them by Congress.").
103. See generally Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419, 422 (1987)
(examining the nondelgation doctrine in the context of "reformist liberal ideals
about administration").
104. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative
Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1954) (describing administrative action as "reflect[ing] predominantly the solution desired by the
industrial group").
105. As early as the 1970s, with environmental programs leading the way,
there were attempts to promote participation of the people whose interests the
policies were intended to serve. Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J.
525, 526, 534-35 (1972).
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esses and a role in governing social institutions. Multiparty involvement is understood as a way of creating norms, cultivating
reform, and managing new market realities. As we shall see,
the overall goal of participation is broader than simply ensuring the achievement of policy goals; it enhances the ability of
citizens to participate in political and civic life.
At the stage of implementation, stakeholder participation
has been referred to as "a revolution in the technology of public
action." 10 6 Participation has included the creation of a system of
third-party government, in which the public sector uses extensively third-party agents to carry out public functions, such as
the delivery of social services. 107 Sharing tasks and responsibilities with the private sector creates more interdependence
between government and the market. In turn, increased participation leads to fluid and permeable boundaries between private and public. 108 This cycle thus explains, for example, how
today's body of federal employees is one-third smaller percapita than it was immediately after the New Deal, even
though massive new responsibilities have been undertaken by
government. 109
From this perspective, the Renew Deal model embodies a
spatial dimension-a shift away from the singular focus on the
formal legal arena and formal officials to activism in the second
sphere of the private, for-profit sector, and the third sphere of
civil society. Calls for a spatial shift appear not only at the local
level, but also at the transnational and international levels,
evoking the image of a global civil society."1o Of particular im-

106. See Symposium, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1319, 1334 (2001) (remarks by Lester M. Salamon).
107.

LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-

NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 104-05 (1995); The

Changing Shape of Government, supra note 106, at 1334 (remarks by Lester
M. Salamon).
108. MINOW, supra note 22, at 142-74.
109.

JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS,

PRIVATE MEANS 4-5 (1989) (describing systematic efforts to reduce the size of
the federal government despite constant demand for public spending); PAUL C.
LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1999) (noting that the number of

full-time federal government employees would increase by nearly eleven million if employees of private contractors and providers were included); Mashaw,
supra note 79, at 46.
110. In the environmental context, see, for example, RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ,
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL

GOVERNANCE 49-78

(1996); PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC POLITICS
3-5 (1996).
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portance is the role of private ordering and self-regulation, particularly new instances of private standard setting, accreditation, and certification plans by independent activists, as well as
11 1
monitoring by both nonprofits and for-profit consulting firms.
New governance policies seek to enable individuals and organizations to act as private attorney generals and to block watch
12
public action."
113
and the
Unlike the earlier writings on legal pluralism
114
the governance model
recent writings on law and organizing,
offers a framework that enables us to view the different sectors-state, market, and civil society-as part of one comprehensive, interlocking system. The focus is on government interactions with private actors in public action. The concept of
important to the model than the descrippartnership is more 115
tion of spatial shifts.
New participatory arrangements emerge at all levels of
government and nongovernment action. For example, at the international level, the idea of "transgovernmental regulatory
networks" is attracting increasing attention as "a new and attractive form of global governance, enhancing the ability of
States to work together to address common problems without
111. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY:
DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 14 (1999); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in

the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking
Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1015-16 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347,
352-55 (2001) (discussing the rise of transgovernmental regulatory networks);

Business Ethics: Sweatshop Wars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 62-63
(discussing audits of "social accountability 8000" certificates by firms such as
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG); COUNCIL ON
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES ACCREDITATION AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF SA 8000
STANDARDS, at http://www.cepaa.org/SA8000/SA8000.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
112. Peter Dobkin Hall, Crisis in Governance: Comments (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
113. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1 (1981) (noting the
widely held view among legal professionals that justice is a product created
and distributed exclusively by the state).
114. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection
on Law and Organizing,48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Lobel, supra note 38.
115. See, e.g., SALAMON, supra note 107, at 104-05 (challenging the argument that increased partnership between government and nonprofit sectors
would infringe on the latter's independence or autonomy); Freeman, supra
note 3, at 6 (arguing that a model of the administrative process that emphasizes problem solving and shared responsibility better serves goals of efficiency
and legitimacy).
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the centralized bureaucracy of formal international institutions. They are fast, flexible, and decentralized-attributes that
allow them to function particularly well in a rapidly changing
information environment."16 Similarly, in the context of the
EU, scholars describe new policy networks of government officials, civil servants, social partners (labor and industry associations), and civil society in multilevel, public/private transnational networks.1 1 7 At the more local level, American lawyers
describe the emerging context of multidisciplinary networks,
for example in the realms of environmental policy 118 and health
care. 119 Increasingly, local professionals and community groups
are coming together with the aim of figuring out the schema for
responsible and effective delivery of social policy.120
B. COLLABORATION
The commitment to collaboration follows naturally from
the commitment to participation, since an inclusive structure
facilitates multiparty cooperative exchanges. Under the traditional regulatory model, industry and private individuals are
the object of regulation. Their agency is limited to choosing
whether to comply with the regulations to which they are subjected. Information flows selectively to the top while decisions
flow down, following rigid parameters, and leaving decision
116. Slaughter, supra note 111, at 347; see THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN,
COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES 38 (John Lewis Gaddis et al. eds., 1995)

(defining transgovernmental coalitions as "transboundary networks among
subunits of national governments forming in the absence of central and authoritative national decisions"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global
EconomyTthrough Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 179 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Anne-Marie Slaugh-

ter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 195 (1997). But cf. Sol
Picciotto, Networks in InternationalEconomic Integration:Fragmented States
and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1035-45
(1996-1997).
117. JACOBSSON, supra note 2, at 5-6; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at
23.
118. For example, the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Performance (MSWG) was organized in 1996. The MSWG convenes parties in the
business, nongovernmental organizations, academic, and government sectors
to discuss the development and use of new tools within the context of public
policy to achieve environmental performance. See Multi-State Working Group
on Environmental Performance Web Site (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.
mswg.org.
119. Trubek, supra note 32.
120. Id.
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making to a small, detached group of number-crunching experts. 121 Consequently, the regulatory model promotes adversarial relations, mutual distrust, and conflict. In contrast, under the governance model, individuals are norm-generating
subjects. They are involved in the process of developing the
norms of behavior and changing them. The governance model
thus views traditional patterns of hierarchical top-down regulatory control as obsolete. It advocates instead the adoption of cooperative governance based on continuous interaction and
sharing of responsibility. 122 It signifies a move to partnership,
to horizontal relationships, and to two-way communications.
The goal is to create microsystems of open communication in
which policy is imagined, managed, and maintained.
In a cooperative regime, the role of government changes
from regulator and controller to facilitator, and law becomes a
shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering activity. 123 Government, industry, and civil society groups all share

responsibility for achieving policy goals. Industry is expected to
participate as part of a search for common goals, not just.rigidly asserting its narrow economic or political interests.
Congress has recently endorsed the spirit of collaborative
rulemaking by standardizing regulatory negotiation in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, which was permanently reauthorized in 1996.124 Negotiated rulemaking is a process through
which stakeholders come together to negotiate and reach consensus as to the substance of regulation. As early as 1982,
Philip Harter published an article entitled Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise.125 Harter proposed the features of
negotiated rulemaking as a way of giving stakeholders more
voice in the regulatory process. 126 The process enables the sharing of information and the comparison of practices and outcomes among various participants. 127 The creation of a realm of
regulatory negotiation is also intended to encourage discussion

121. Farber, supra note 9, at 1280.
122. See Fiorino, supra note 31, at 464.
123. Freeman, supra note 3, at 28-30.
124. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994 & Supp.
I 1995); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320,
§ 11(a), 110 Stat. 3870, 3873.
125. Philip J. Harter, NegotiatingRegulations:A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1983).
126. Id. at 65-67.
127. Id. at 30-31.
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and establish a space for collaboratively reaching decisions,
ideally through consensus building.128
The collaborative approach further affects the relations
among social actors. The governance model urges dialogue at
all levels of the economy-local communities, sectors of the
economy, regional, national and transnational levels-and encourages more links among social movements. 129 At the nongovernmental level, the model draws on the idea of multiparty
social action that involves parties in relatively undefined relationships. 130 In a collaborative environment, the capacities as
well as the identities of the participants evolve substantially
over time.' 3' Collaboration thus promotes mutual accountability, defined as "accountability among autonomous actors committed to shared values and visions and to relationships of mutual trust and influence that enable renegotiating expectations
and capacities to respond to uncertainty and change."'132 It requires the identification of shared goals, which often requires
abandoning entrenched positions that construct other actors as
the problem, rather than as partners to a solution. 33
The principle of collaboration therefore involves the recognition of interdependencies among social actors. Regulatory approaches to social policy have often been criticized for being
based on a rights discourse which has a trump quality. Regulation entails a winner-takes-all approach, implying a message of
zero sum distribution. Much of the struggle for rights is framed
competitively:

See id. at 28-29.
See Lobel, supra note 90, at 2157-62 (examining the collaborative
impact on the labor market).
L. David Brown, Multiparty Social Action and Mutual Accountability,
in GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND MORAL COMMUNITY (Alnoor Ebrahim & Edward Weisband eds, forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 15-16, on file with author).
131. Id.
132. Id. (manuscript at 7) (emphasis omitted).
133. See, e.g., L. David Brown, Building Civil Society Legitimacy and Ac128.
129.
model's
130.

countability with Domain Accountability Systems, in PHILANTHROPY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA (Cynthia Sanborn et al. eds., forthcoming

2004) (discussing civil society organizations' contribution to governance and
social problem solving); L. David Brown & Mark H. Moore, Accountability,
Strategy, and InternationalNongovernmental Organizations,30 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 569 (2001) (discussing the importance of accountability
among international nongovernmental development and environmental organizations).
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Particularly where hard resources are involved, it is alarmingly easy
to see that winner-take-all civil rights contests can take shape. Affirmative action programs are rife with such contests, which pit one
recognized civil rights constituency against another. For instance, in
minority business enterprise programs, blacks and Latinos have had
white women speed ahead of them in
ample opportunity to observe
1 34
contests for finite resources.

However, in reality, the ends of social policy are multiple
and hard to measure. 13 5 The nature of social life is extremely
complex and interdependent. A collaborative model increases
the need for parties to work together to realize their interests
and goals in a mutually respectful way. A shift from adversarial legalism to collaboration entails a move from an image of
win-lose situations to a win-win environment. All actors come
to realize their interlocking interest in the processes of governance. As will be discussed in the succeeding sections, such an
environment heightens the need to include procedures that ensure that parties' interests and externalities are taken into account, negotiation processes are adequately structured, and the
bargaining power of stakeholders is addressed.
C. DIVERSITY AND COMPETITION

The command-and-control regulatory model of the New
Deal era sought to control market rates, control entry into industries, and command the minimum conditions and requirements of production and service. 136 The aim was to unify, standardize, make activities routine, and, frequently, to suppress
divergence. Responding to the increased complexity, diversity,
and volatility of the new market, the Renew Deal aims conversely to promote diversification, pluralization of solutions,
and increased competition.
A central critique of the old regulatory model is its onesize-fits-all approach. 137 The premise of the governance model
134. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 115, 131 (David Kairys ed.,
1998).
135. See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 222-28 (1990)
(describing the "Basic Contradictions Thesis" as the contention that public
programs and policy domains always have multiple purposes, which are often
difficult to achieve simultaneously).
136. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 121.
137. See, e.g., Philip E. Karmel, Achieving Radical Reductions in Cleanup
Costs, in NEW SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS AND
REAL ESTATE DEALS 2003, at 371 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course,

380

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

is that, in order for a legal regime to be sustainable, it must encompass a multitude of values and account for conflict and
compromise. It must acknowledge the diversity and changing

interests of many stakeholders. 138 It must recognize the legiti-

macy of private economic interests while appealing to public
values.
A second premise underlying the idea of diversity and plurality is derived from the principles of collaboration and participation-that no one institution possesses the ability to regulate all aspects of contemporary public life. Institutional design
based on inclusion and the proliferation of normative authorities encourages the adoption of a wide variety of approaches,
methodologies, and practices. This design must be coupled with
the development of comparative measures to assess the relative
success of varying methods in comparable circumstances. The
new model must also create pressures and incentives to generate the information that would allow for such comparisons. 139
The generation of interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional
competition-through processes of decentralization, privatization, and participatory administration, as well as the sharing of
information and incentives for comparison-signifies new public management tools of the governance model.
Some scholars, assuming the Renew Deal is transitional,
call for more "experimentation with and evaluation of multiple
approaches before settling on one or a few approaches that
demonstrate superior performance."'' 40 The most sophisticated
articulations of the governance model, however, understand
competition and diversity not as a temporary strategy before
choosing the superior solution in any given scenario, but rather
as a means for continuous change and improvement. 4 1 In both
Handbook Series No. N-499, 2003) (asserting that there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to the problems of environmental cleanups); Lobel, supra note 90 (remarking that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems of the new
labor market).
138.

See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECOPRAGMATISM 12-13 (1999) (asserting

that environmental law must remain flexible and pluralistic to take diverse
interests into account).
139. See Minow, supra note 78, at 1242-43 (arguing that public/private
partnerships can regulate schools, social services, prisons, and welfare more
efficiently due to the incentives generated by market style competition).
140. OSTERMAN ETAL., supra note 89, at 165.
141. Lobel, supra note 90; Minow, supra note 78; cf. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 8 (arguing that EU law regulating social policy should adopt a hybrid
approach that transcends the hard/soft law distinctions by emphasizing diversity).
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versions competition is understood as good and effective. However, the model is open to the possibility that in certain situations these assumptions may be found illusory, for example,
when efforts to involve more actors in fact lead to the creation
142
of private monopolies.
D. DECENTRALIZATION AND SUBSIDIARITY
During the New Deal era, centralization was thought to be
essential to overcoming the economic crisis that the nation
faced. 143 The Depression revealed the pervasive interdependencies of the economy. The national extent of the crisis made it
difficult for reformers to believe that the individual states could
solve their grave problems without a centralized federal order. 144 The New Deal regulatory model sought therefore to consolidate formerly dispersed power, often into the hands of the
newly founded regulatory agencies and programs. 145 In contrast, the Renew Deal advocates a movement downward and
outward-a transfer of responsibilities to the states and localiincluding private businesses and
ties and to the private sector,
146
nonprofit organizations.
142. See DONAHUE, supra note 109, at 222 (claiming that privatization
would not be a sufficient remedy for the complex public realm); ORLY LOBEL,
REGULATING COEXISTENCE IN THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: CROSS-SEcToR
COLLABORATION IN A WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (Harvard Univ., John F.

Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Hauser Center for Nonprofit Org., Working Paper, No. 21,
2003), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hauser/publications/working-papers/work
ingpaperlist.htm. A second tension occurs between an understanding of competition and diversity as instrumental-as a means to produce the best results-and an embrace of diversity, pluralism, and choice. Whether in the
market or in civil society, pluralism and diversity must be embraced as intrinsic goods, promoting respect, tolerance, and valuation of the variety of norms
within society. On the many meanings of diversity and pluralism, instrumental as well as intrinsic, see PETER SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING
GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE (2003). See also Minow, supra note 78, at

1244-45 (claiming that the public/private collaboration can potentially create
"a vibrant and nontoxic pluralism").
143. Walker, supra note 100, at 1275.
144.

See DONALD F. KETTL, THE REGULATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

27 (1983) ("Roosevelt's programs were based on a novel sense of the national
government's purpose. Serious problems that affected the country, even if they
were economic as opposed to military or diplomatic, were national problems
that deserved a national solution."); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 425 (1987).
145. Walker, supra note 100, at 1275-76; David Yassky, A Two-Tiered
Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 431, 437-38
(1989).
146. Trubek, supra note 32, at 72-76.
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Decentralization serves at least four different purposes.
First, it promotes the governance principles we have just explored-participation, diversity, competition, and experimentation. A decentralized public design realizes Justice Brandeis'
metaphor of the states as laboratories of experimentation. 147
Each state and locality contributes to the evolution of law by
first creating various programs that enact and test reforms,
and then subsequently accepting or rejecting them. As a result
of increased diversity and competition, decentralization further
promotes choice and responsiveness. 148
Second, decentralization affirms the pragmatic idea of subsidiarity, including the localness and partiality of human
knowledge, and the difficulty of translation between localities. 149 In 1912, William James wrote about the humility of the
human perspective:
Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed
to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even
prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations. It is enough to
ask of each of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities
and make the most of his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field. 50

As a guiding principle of social organization, subsidiarity
maintains that all governmental tasks are best carried out at
the level closest to those affected by them. Central authorities
should leave the widest scope possible for local discretion to fill
in the details of broadly defined policies. Those closest to the
problem possess the best information leading toward a potential solution. Therefore, the specific elaboration and application
of common standards needs local knowledge to reach the desired objectives. Local entities are consequently understood to
be more properly situated to manage functions by which they
are affected than a dominant central organization.

147. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
148. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA:
THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 173 (1992).
149. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990)

(arguing that pragmatism is a preferable means of approaching problems due
to a "full awareness of the limitations of human reason with a sense of the 'localness' of human knowledge").
150. William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in ON
SOME OF LIFE'S IDEALS 46 (1912).
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A third function of decentralization is the creation of relational density and synergy.1 51 While the New Deal created a
system of bureaucracies often experienced as faceless and inaccessible, 152 one of the goals of the governance model is to "replace remote impersonal relations ...

with face-to-face rela-

tions," and convert impersonal duties into personal ones. 153 A
relatively small-scale geographic focus gives people a sense of
connectedness. Indeed, there are psychological and anthropological indications that scale matters for successful engagefor people to comment-the smaller the scale, the easier it is 154
municate and to reach sustainable solutions.
Describing the rise of the Community Economic Development Movement in the 1990s, Bill Simon argues that the spatial shift to decentralization provides people with "a sense of
place," preventing them from experiencing public life as "anonymity... divorced from its surroundings." 155 Similarly, Todd
Rakoff, focusing on the temporal dimensions of social interaction, deplores the contemporary decline of engagement of ordinary citizens in the public and civic sphere. Analogous to
Simon's sense of place framework, Rakoff argues for providing
people with a sense of time. Rakoff joins an increasing number
of scholars who worry that we are investing too much of our
and hence neglecting
time in economically productive activities,
56
our civic and expressive activities.
151. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 227 (2002).
152. William H. Clune, Unreasonablenessand Alienation in the Continuing

Relationships of Welfare State Bureaucracy: From Regulatory Complexity to
Economic Democracy, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 707, 715-17; Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1382 (1984);

Ian R. MacNeil, Bureacracy, Liberalism, and Community-American Style, 79

Nw. U. L. REV. 900, 907 (1984); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy,and
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1232 (1983).
153. SIMON, supra note 151, at 50 (citing Lewis D. Solomon, Microenter-

prise: Human Reconstruction in America's Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 191, 193-202 (1992)).

154. Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 157 (2000).
155. SIMON, supra note 151, at 41 (citing OFFICE OF COMTY. PLANNING &
DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV., A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITYBASED STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE
COMMUNITIES 13 (1994)).
156. See Orly Lobel, The Law of Social Time, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 357
(2003) (reviewing TODD RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE
BALANCE OF LIFE (2002)). In recent years, Robert Putnam has been a leading
voice in the argument that while societies have traditionally benefited from
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A fourth rationale for decentralization follows naturally
from the generation of multiple links among groups and individuals. The aspiration of the governance model is that increased engagement will contribute to the building of deliberative and collaborative capacities, thus sustaining an
environment for democratic engagement. In the context of
community development, Simon explains the function of multiplying the roles, capacities, and contexts in which people interact in a community. Neighbors become able to view one another
in their relationships as sellers-consumers,
employersemployees, property owners-tenants, planners-citizens, and
administrators-service recipients. 15 7 When people encounter
one another repeatedly,
Each encounter is an opportunity to develop collaborative capacities,
and there is a synergy among the relations. People's self-confidence,
their knowledge of their neighbors, and their capacities for negotiation and deliberation spill over from one sector to another and hence
develop cumulatively with collaboration across different areas. 158

Finally, there is some ambiguity in the added value of generating synergy. By some accounts, generating synergy creates
empathy and mutual trust among people. 159 But other versions
contend that social density has the potential to produce additional layers of social control and mutual surveillance. 160 In
economic terms, each of these possibilities may be viewed as a
process in which externalities are internalized. Both versions
assume that under certain circumstances individuals will follow norms against their immediate self-interest, even in absence of the threat of formal regulatory sanction. But while the
civil society associations, today's societies are experiencing a troubling decline
in associational life. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIc TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Robert D.

Putnam, The Strange Disappearanceof Civic America, 24 AM. PROSPECT 34
(1996).
157. SIMON, supra note 151, at 41.
158. Id. at 49.

159. Id.; see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND
THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 8 (1995); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's"Fourth

Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988).

160. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-MaintenancePolicing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301-08
(1998); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039, 1074-89 (2002).
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first view describes a process of negotiated shared visions and
values, the second in effect projects traditional understandings
of human motivations (e.g., fear of sanction) from the formal
regulatory realm to the governance environment. Recalling
game theory models, it suggests that under the right architecture-increased social density that generates collaboration and
interdependence-people will follow norms and conform without formal regulatory means because of the necessity of repeat
dealings, adverse effects on reputation, relationship-based
credibility, possibility of retribution, and the increased likeli16 1

hood of reciprocation.

This final tension further complicates the relationship between decentralization and diversity. The best interpretation of
the governance model is that divergence is generative and desirable. However, following the alternative interpretation of
synergy as creating pressures to conform, an architectural pan162 springs forth, emerging
optic with "eyes upon the street"
"the experience of being
from the competing analysis that
163
deviance."
watched itself inhibits
E. INTEGRATION OF POLICY DOMAINS

The governance model recognizes that doctrinal divides
and boundaries between legal fields are contingent and are often defined through negotiation and revision. It therefore encourages the questioning of these divides through openness and
fluidity of policy domains. The features of participation, collaboration, decentralization, and diversity all have the potential to illuminate how widely dispersed issues are nonetheless
connected at the level of those who are most influenced by
them. Governance scholarship acknowledges that the focus of
our zoom lens determines much of what we see in the complex
world we face.
In a regulatory model, law is fragmented into distinct,
specified subfields. By contrast, the governance model takes a
holistic approach to problem solving, aiming for a synoptic view
161. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1990); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico,
Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003).
162. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35
(1961); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 201 (1979) (explaining the regulatory effect of a panoptic presence

in society).
163. SIMON, supra note 151, at 50.
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of conditions as they exist simultaneously over a broad disciplinary spectrum. The constant question to be asked is what is
left outside of the policy picture. Renew Deal scholarship aims
to show how most social problems involve multiple issues including the interconnections between housing, employment,
family, welfare, health, transportation, banking, and entrepre6
neurship.1 4
A large-scale example of the adoption of a governance approach is the novel policy process recently adopted by the EU,
collectively termed the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
The process illustrates the significance of policy integration.
The OMC was established in 2000 at the Lisbon European
Council as a process of governance designed to spread best
practices among EU member states.165 The OMC serves member states by coordinating their social policies in areas such as
employment, education, and health. The newly-adopted process
allows the development of common goals without the formal requirement of state compliance and is therefore considered to be
a novel form of soft law. The committees established under the
OMC reveal how sectoral divides between legal fields are contingent and are defined through negotiation and struggle. 166
The emphasis of OMC processes is on policy linkage, integrating different considerations and aspects with the aim to account for the interconnections among issues such as economic
policy, employment, fiscal and wage policy, social inclusion,
pensions, immigration and the environment.67 By integrating
these issues, policy debates at the EU level aim to uproot structural impediments to human development, for example, by focusing on both supply-side and demand-side barriers to employment.
164.
165.
OPEN

See, e.g., id.
EUROPEAN UNION COMM. OF THE REGIONS, CONFERENCE ON THE
METHOD
OF
COORDINATION
(OMC):
IMPROVING
EUROPEAN

GOVERNANCE? (Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2002), http://consiglio.regione.emiliaromagna.
it/europaIMonitorEuropa/Monitor_4/conferenza%20sull%20governance.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
166. Created in 2000, the European Employment Strategy (EES) committee was the first OMC committee established. Id. More recent committees address policy questions on social exclusion, education, and pensions. See Caroline de la Porte, Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for
OrganisingActivities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, 8 EUR. L.J.
38 (2002); Joanne Scott & David Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002).
167. GrAinne de Bdrca, The ConstitutionalChallenge of New Governance in
the European Union, 28 EuR. L. REV. 814, 824 (2003).
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In both Europe and the United States, the rethinking of social policies has been largely motivated by the need to take a
more active, holistic approach to welfare, social safety nets, and
social mobility. 168 As we shall see in the domain of U.S. workforce development reform, and as has been integral to the design of the OMC, a governance approach to social provision emphasizes integration of related policy issues, such as the
availability of vocational training, placement services, health
care, child care, transportation, and tax credits. In the context
of health care, legal scholars now advocate a broader approach
to chronic disease management, pointing to recent initiatives
that have been undertaken in the field. By forging relationships with the community and schools, diverse professionalsincluding lawyers, doctors, social workers, and educatorscollaborate to address such broad issues as housing conditions,
nutrition, environmental policy, consumerism, and prevention. 16 9 The metaphor of chronic problems persisting because of
solutions pervades
their isolation from structurally integrated
170
literature.
governance
Deal
Renew
Finally, it should be noted that the integration of policy
domains in the Renew Deal era is often generated by a change
in the terms of the debate. A new appellation for an ongoing social problem frees participants from preconceptions of the range
of familiar questions and the stereotypical answers of the past.
For instance, in the context of Social Europe and the transformation of European welfare regimes, Kenneth Armstrong describes a shift from a "poverty" to a "social exclusion" discourse.1 71 In the American context, commentators suggest that
an opposite shift-from a welfare discourse to a poverty discourse-may generate new ideas and responses.172
168.

LOBEL, supra note 142.

169. Trubek, supra note 32, at 575.
170. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1020 ("Destabilization
rights are claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from
the normal processes of political accountability.").
171. Kenneth A. Armstrong, Tackling Social Exclusion Through OMC: Reshaping the Boundaries of EU Governance, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 170, 173 (Tanja A. Borzel & Rachel A.

Cichowski eds., 2003); see also The European Convention, Final Report of
Working Group XI on Social Europe, Conv 516/1/03 Revl, Brussels, Feb. 4,
2003.
172.

For a collection of essays discussing the import of social welfare for

American democracy and balancing the delivery of assistance to the poor between the government and nonprofit organizations, see WHO WILL PROVIDE?
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F. FLEXIBILITY AND NONCOERCIVENESS (OR SOFTNESS-IN-LAW)
The governance model aims to create a flexible and fluid

policy environment that fosters "softer" processes that either
replace or complement the traditional "hard" ordering of the
regulatory model. Scholars suggest a leap outside the regulatory box, developing new mechanisms to replace top-down ordering, implementation, and enforcement.173 Over the past decades, commentators across the political spectrum have come to
see aspects of the regulatory model as inherently cumbersome,
ineffective, and heavily executed. Moreover, the gaps between
law-in-the-books and law-in-action, have led many to seek more
integrated approaches to law reform. The rapid rise of secondary, informal markets and underground economiescharacterized by vast noncompliance, and underenforcement,
and lucrative opportunities coexisting with pervasive exploitation-has further challenged the notion that traditional regulation can bring meaningful change in globalizing economies.174
Finally, the broad dissatisfaction with the formalities of bureaucratic procedures in relation to the experience of citizenship has registered with scholars and practitioners. Increasingly, the new vision includes softer processes, which will
create an environment more conducive to participation and dialogue.
There is a wide spectrum of what softer processes and increased flexibility might mean for law reform. Some Renew
Deal scholars depict governance processes as informalization,
while others, including myself, prefer to describe degrees and
variations of formality.175 The term "soft law" has been used in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE (Mary
Jo

Bane et al. eds., 2000).
173. Trubek, supra note 32.
174. On informal or underground economies, see SASKIA SASSEN,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 153-72 (1998); Richard Epstein, The
Moral and PracticalDilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE L.J.
2157 (1994); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE
L.J. 2179 (1994); Orly Lobel, Class and Care: The Roles of Private Intermediaries in the In-home Care Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (2001); Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Advanced IndustrializedSociety: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103
YALE L.J. 2305 (1994).
175. On the use of the concept of informality in contemporary legal scholarship, see Annelise Riles, User Friendly: Informality and Expertise, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 613 (2002). See also Lobel, supra note 38. William H. Simon has
referred to certain variations in the degrees of formalities in decision making
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legal scholarship in a variety of ways. At one extreme, soft law
regimes are comprised of interwoven rules of conduct, established and enforced within the private realm in the absence of a
176
Jerry Mashaw defines soft
hard-binding regulatory regime.
law as consisting of "social accountability" regimes that are "infinitely negotiable, continuously revisable, often unspoken, oscillating between deep respect for individual choices and177relentThis
less social pressure to conform to group norms."
but
regulation
formal
with
law
approach urges us not to equate
inmultiple
include
to
law
of
rather to decenter the concept
norms.
generated
nonstate
particularly
stances of normativity,
By requiring a move away from conventional notions of regulation, it calls for alternative avenues of reform, building on earlier formulations of the legal pluralism school of thought. Recent legal scholarship has looked at the role of soft law regimes
and nonregulatory instruments in diverse contexts, including
international law, labor and employment law, consumer laws,
178
These nonregulatory instruand environmental regimes.
corporate codes of convoluntary
labeling,
ments include social
by nongovernmencertification
and
duct, private accreditation,
179
actors.
tal
At its best, however, the governance model assumes a
harder definition of soft law; one that preserves an active role
for the state and the legal regime. First, the type of soft law
norms described above should be understood as interwoven and
existing within an authoritative legal system. Even when actors who do not have the formal capacity to make law generate
as "personal formality." In the context of the community economic develop-

ment movement, see SIMON, supra note 151.

176. See Steven R. Ratner, InternationalLaw: The Trials of Global Norms,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 65; see also David Trubek et al., Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: InternationalRegimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1194 (2000). On
"soft law" labor regimes, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and
Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 93, 121-23 (1999). On soft law in the context of environmental policy,
see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the InternationalLaw of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 432 (1991). For a discussion of soft law in the
European context, see, for example, NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH

(1999).
177. Mashaw, supra note 79.
178. Id.
179. A Hard Look at Soft Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, 82 AM. SOC Y INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988) [hereinafter Hard
Look at Soft Law].
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norms, the Renew Deal paradigm recognizes how these nongovernmental actors are sustained by the background rules of
the legal system.
Second, governance scholars focus on the range of signals
of authority within formal institutions.180 Any given agency
undertakes different activities that exert different degrees of
authority as to the finality, rigidity, and control of their signals.
Formal signals exist by which the same norm-generating institution distinguishes between hard law utterances and other
communications, for example by choosing between oral and
written deliberations, by the naming of documents, or by the
procedures taken to make its activities known publicly.lsl For
example, in recent years, several administrative agencies have
issued "good guidance practices" instead of more conventional
regulations.18 2 In the mid-1990s, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) decreased the number of its regulations by fifty percent compared with its activities during the 1970s and 1980s.
But over the same time period, the number of guidance documents it has issued increased by four hundred percent.18 3 The
underlying assumption of these softer expressions of intent is
that they will allow greater flexibility while still considerably
affecting conduct. In industries in which regulated parties are
repeat players, the relationship with the agency often provides
a greater incentive for compliance than the issuance of harder

regulation. 184
A third understanding of regulatory flexibility within the
governance model involves the process by which authoritative
decisions are issued. Hard regulatory processes often include
rigid requirements about the scope of participation, the forms
of exchange between participants, and the ways in which decisions can be reached, such as the notice and comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. 8 5 Softer processes loosen these requirements to allow open communication,
fluid participation, and consensus-based deliberation. One ef180. Id. at 373 (remarks by Michael Reisman); Rakoff, supra note 85, at
168.
181. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos
and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983).
182. Rakoff, supra note 85, at 167.
183. Id. at 168.
184. Id. at 169-70.
185. See generally Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice
and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317 (1989).
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fect of a more flexible attitude toward reaching decisions is that
it allows more integration between stages of the legal process.
Unlike the regulatory model, the governance model does not insist that legislation, implementation, enforcement, and adjudication are separate stages; but rather seeks to form dynamic
interactions among these processes.
A final element of softness in the governance model involves the sanctions that are attached to legal directives. Flexibility implies variation in the communications of intention to
6
control and discipline deviance.' 8 Less coercive sanctions can
promote flexibility in implementation and compliance. For example, a requirement for reporting is considered softer than
mandatory fines in the case of noncompliance. This aspect of
soft law has been described in the context of the increasing
the imposition
adoption of reporting requirements rather than
87
unsanctioned.
but
of penalties as structured
It is important to mention two other possible understandings of softness-in-law that are more conventional and have developed within the traditional regulatory model. The most
common accounting of degrees of softness and hardness of law
involves the content of the law and the degree of openness in its
articulation.18 8 This analysis has been an integral part of the
regulatory era, invoking the traditional realist concept of the
choice between rules and standards. While this is not a novel
feature of the governance model, this more traditional accounting continues to interact with other forms of softening under
the new model. For example, recently adopted performancebased regulation, designed to allow a range of reasonable interpretations that can meet the legal requirement of comparable
outcomes, promotes flexibility in the means adopted to achieve

186. See, e.g., Hard Look at Soft Law, supra note 179, at 375 (remarks by
Michael Reisman).
187. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2.
188. This is the early legal realist understanding about rules versus standards, further elaborated through generations of critical legal thinking. See
generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1941); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
58 (1992) (defining legal directive as a rule when the directive binds a decision
maker to respond a certain way with the decision to the facts and defining a
legal directive as a standard when the directive "tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy
to a fact situation").
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the specified goals. 18 9 Private firms are given incentives to
search for the least costly approach to abide by the performance
requirements. Often, along with the adoption of such mechanisms, firms are required to design plans that outline how certain goals will be achieved. The governmental agency assists
the development of these plans, as well as approving or certifying them. Subsequently, firms need to show compliance with
their own plans or provide reasons for divergence from them.
They may alter the plans as conditions. or new knowledge arrives.
A second and final understanding of softness that existed
within the regulatory tradition is that actual enforcement of a
law is weak, even as the threat of formal sanctions continues.
Again, this is certainly not an innovative approach of the governance model, but it interacts with other variations of formality and informality in the legal system. Weak enforcement
combines with softness when public commitment changes, such
as in sodomy laws, or when there is a vast apparatus rendered
invisible to public policy, such as in the case of the thriving underground economies of global cities. 19 0 From a regulatory perspective, this kind of softness is usually seen as an unintended,
undesirable result. However, from a governance perspective, it
is understood as a potential tool. Hence, Renew Deal commentators have proposed formalizing this feature of incomplete enforcement and law-in-action flexibility. While under the regulatory model, regulations usually apply to all members of an
industry, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite propose that, in
some situations, "partial-industry regulation" is superior to allor-nothing regulatory policies.191 They claim that regulating
only a subset of firms in an industry can engender "a system of
checks and balances in which the regulated and unregulated
portions of the market each curb the excesses of the alternative
form of market governance. Partial-industry regulation can
189. See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-BasedRegulation: Prospects
and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN.
L. REV. 705, 711 (2003).
190. On informal or underground economies, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. Sodomy laws are a highly politicized example of changing

public norms and values that influence the enforcement of laws that continue

to be on the books, but less dramatic examples are widespread. See Ryan
Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms,
and Social Panoptics,89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 644 (2001).
191. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-IndustryRegulation: A Monopsony Standardfor Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992).

THE RENEW DEAL

2004]

393

thus promote efficiency by restraining monopoly power without
giving rise to the evils of either captured or benighted regula192

tion."

Many of the writings within the governance model promote
softness in more than one of these possible dimensions. Returning to the European OMC, the new EU governance approach
has been defined as a soft law process. 193 In fact, the OMC embodies a combination of several flexible elements. It is soft law
because it "has general and open-ended guidelines rather than
rules [recalling the traditional standards vs. rules axis], provides no formal sanctions for Member States that do not follow
not justithe guidelines [communications of intentions], and 1is
94
ciable [absence of formal enforcement mechanism]."'
As with other principles of the governance model, different
rationales abound as to why, in certain contexts, soft mechanisms may be preferable to hard regulation. First, the complexity of many modern issues does not allow for obvious solution.
Renew Deal thinking recognizes that it is often better to allow
a range of interpretation, deviance, and trial and error without
the constraints of rigid orders and fear of formal sanctions. A
soft law approach reduces the often perverse incentives im195
posed by liability and sanctions.
A second reason to use soft law involves circumstances in
which the gap between the aspired norm and the existing reality is so large that hard regulatory provisions are meaningless.
Many proposals for social and economic rights in developing
countries rest in this rationale. 196 The underlying idea is that it
is better for the normative order to recognize in advance the
impossibility of immediate change and to explicitly acknowledge the space between real and ideal. Softer mechanisms allow a regime to establish minimum levels of adherence and to
formalize advancement toward higher, aspirational stan97

dards.1
192.

Id.

193. Armstrong, supra note 171, at 193; de Birca, supra note 167, at 82326; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
194. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
195. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing employment discrimination); see also

Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 521-22 (2001).
196. See generally HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 35-46 (2d ed. 2000).

197.

See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework

for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1998); John C.
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A related set of circumstances also points to the desirability of a softer governance approach. Often, large differences exist in the capacity of different entities under the law's authority
to reach the desired regulatory goals. 198 This situation may be
most evident where law operates on differently situated polities, for example international conventions or European unification. In sum, when material resources are greatly limited or
social barriers to implementation are high, it might be preferable to promote certain policies in a flexible, noncoercive way.
A fourth context in which legal scholars advocate the softer
approach of the governance model over the traditional coerciveness of the regulatory model is where there is intense disagreement among decision-making authorities. At times, no
consensus can be reached within a single legislative or administrative body; at other times, in an environment of regulatory
competition, controversy results over the authority of the forum
to legislate. 199 This latter situation is exemplified in the EU,
where competition between member states and the union over
hard legislative competence has led, in some areas, to the coexistence of national hard law and supranational semisoft law.
A fifth context occurs in circumstances where there is too
much political weakness to reach hard legislation or too much
ideological resistance to ensure implementation. In such cases,
if there is a de facto lack of competency to legislate, softer initiatives may often be enough to achieve similar results through
a noncoercive, nonregulatory approach. Such is the case with
international labor standards, in which activists have sought
Dernbach, Targets, Timetables and Effective Implementing Mechanisms: Necessary Building Blocks for Sustainable Development, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL.

L. & POLY REV. 79, 93-94 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a
New Paradigm?,89 GEO. L.J. 257, 366-67 (2001); William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 177-79 (2001) (describing the need for "operationally significant goals").
198. This is, for example, a rationale for soft law approaches for the integration of Europe-where differently situated countries come together under a
new legal regime. See Scott & Trubek, supra note 166, at 4-8; de Bdrca, supra
note 167, at 827-30.
199. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova et al., Labor and Finance as Inevitably
Transnational: Globalization Demands a Sophisticated and Transnational
Lens, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 109, 109-14 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting. The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 82 (2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 70-72 (2002).
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market-based pressures, coupled with the background support
of official international and national bodies, to turn corporate
20 0
codes of conduct into soft law norms.
Finally, an overarching justification for softer, flexible approaches to policy is that they increase the overall legitimacy of
the system. Soft law is experienced by the different stakeholders in a polity as less oppressive than regulatory means
and force. Semivoluntary compliance encourages an environment of nonfear and increases people's willingness to contribute freely to the efforts of public policy; thus supporting other
governance principles, including collaboration, diversity, and
learning.
G. FALLIBILITY, ADAPTABILITY, AND DYNAMIC LEARNING
Since a basic premise of the governance model is the inevitability and the fertility of change, the new vision is optimistic
about uncertainty and doubt. In fact, unlike the traditional
regulatory model, governance treats ambiguity as an opportunity rather than a burden to overcome. As we will further explore in Part V, theoretical and practical hybridization is a key
strength of the model. The coexistence of competing rationales
for the shift to the Renew Deal paradigm, its richness of elements, and its open and fluid multitiered architecture all contribute to its boundless potential as a new paradigm.
The governance model engages Justice Jackson's famous
declaration that "[wie are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final." 20 1 In social life
and public policy, nothing is ever final, not even adjudication.
All arrangements are inherently fallible. The operative metaphor is that of living systems, where organic mutations and deviations can prove to be fitter, stronger, and more socially desirable.
The regulatory model has often proved stagnant and sluggish, curtailing revision and improvement. "[M]ost of the classic
complaints about public bureaucracies are really criticisms of
200. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralismand the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 424-25 (2001); Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary
Corporate Codes of Conduct: What's Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 351-63
(2001); Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1075, 1098-99 (2002).
201. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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agencies for being too legalistic (too rigid, unimaginative, process-oriented, etc.) in their strict adherence to the statute, at

least as they understand

it."202

While regulation has been an ordering act, governing is a
learning process. The new model is better positioned to accept
uncertainty and diversity, advancing iteratively toward workable solutions. The role of law is to promote practices that allow
revision and improvement. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel describe their vision for an experimentalist regime as the open
acknowledgment of the incomplete and ambiguous character of
the initial specification of means and ends, and the use of the
lack of specificity as a prod to inquiry and discovery. 203 When
technology is widespread and knowable and standards are easy
to define, command-and-control regimes might be preferable.
Yet, under the realities of fast advancements, heterogeneity,
and complexity, the informational and adaptability advantages
of private firms should be configured into the legal system.
Moreover, lack of clarity about appropriate solutions can benefit complex governance domains, because it enables conflicting
parties to come together in multistakeholder negotiations, moving away from, at least tentatively, entrenched positions about
each party's particular interests. 204
Martha Minow, recounting the growing involvement of private actors in public activities, argues that "[p]rivatization
stimulates new knowledge and infrastructure by drawing new
people into businesses previously handled by government. 20 5
By designing institutions that rely on self-discipline and selfsurveillance to ensure performance, Renew Deal governance
scholarship stresses the importance of capacity building of private actors. It borrows private sector techniques such as information pooling, learning-by-monitoring, reliable feedback,
knowledge networks, and benchmarks for best practices. 206
Processes must be kept open since learning can be undermined
by too much specificity about goals, tasks, and roles. All of

202. PETER H. SCHUCK, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, in THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE,
supra note 53, at 251, 262.
203. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
363-64.
204. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1099.
205. Minow, supra note 78, at 1245.
206. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 80, at 195-219.
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these techniques and processes together form a system that is
iterative and dynamic, generating virtuous cycles of innovation.
Sophisticated analyses within the governance school distinguish between different levels of learning. 20 7 In the context
of environmental law, Pieter Glasbergen differentiates between
four types of learning. 208 Among them, technical learning involves the application of a limited number of policy instruments, conceptual learning includes the redefinition of policy
goals and problems, and social learning has to do with the interactions and communication among actors. 20 9 David Trubek
and James Mosher, discussing the desirability of ongoing learning in the EU context, characterize the implementation of the
new European governance initiative of OMC as "an iterative
multi-level, multi-actor process." 210 They similarly describe
three types of learning: first, the fine tuning of existing policy
instruments; second, the modification of instruments; and
third, making changes in policy goals themselves. 211 They argue that policy learning is facilitated by various measures,
many of which are elements of the governance model that have
been explored in the previous parts:
[M]echanisms that destabilize existing understanding; bring together
people with diverse viewpoints in settings that require sustained deliberation about problem-solving; facilitate erosion of boundaries between both policy domains and stakeholders; reconfigure policy networks; encourage decentralized experimentation; produce information
on innovation; require sharing of good practice and experimental results; encourage actors to compare results with those of the best performers in any area; and oblige actors collectively to redefine objec21 2
tives and policies.

In addition to addressing the limits of human knowledge,
the principle of permanent learning is equally cognizant of the
unlimited power of human learning that has been perceived as
a threat under the regulatory model. On the one hand, the peo-

207. Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms,Social Learning, and the State: The
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 288 (1993).
208. Pieter Glasbergen, Learning to Manage the Environment, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 175, 176
(William M. Lafferty & James Meadowcroft eds., 1996).
209. Id.
210. David M. Trubek & James S. Mosher, New Governance, Employment
Policy, and the European Social Model, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN
A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 33, 38-41 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
211. Id. at 46.
212. Id. at 46-47.
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ple who are regulated are the ones with the greatest familiarity
and knowledge relevant to the goals of social policy. On the
other hand, there is the continuous risk that, precisely for the
reason that governmental regulation was required, selfregulation will fail. One could predict with good reason that,
left to their own devices, private groups will not adhere to the
social goals involved. The Renew Deal governance model actively engages Weberian insights about the natural learning
process of organizations designed to overcome legal limitations. 2 13 Consequently, if there are some activities that are
likely to occur (e.g., because they are efficient) but we as a society believe there is reason to control them, then there is a need
to keep law innately dynamic. Max Weber thought it obvious
that,
those who continuously participate in the market intercourse with
their own economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of
the market and interest [in the] situation than the legislators and enforcement officers whose interest is only ideal ....It is those private
interested parties who are in a position to distort the intended meaning of a legal norm to the point of turning it into its very opposite ....214

Weber recognized the inevitable learning cycle of those in
the market that want to avoid regulation-a cycle through
which regulation, even if innovative when conceived, eventually
becomes outmoded. Private actors quickly learn how to avoid
certain provisions, while the regulatory machinery might take
much longer to realize its dictates have been circumvented. 2 15
In the Renew Deal, the legal system's constant engagement
with evaluation, revision, experimentalism, feedback, and
monitoring addresses both types of learning-the positive improvement of policy as well as its avoidance. The new physical
infrastructure of advanced technology helps this practice by allowing better data collection and the comparison of outcomes.
As David Osborne and Ted Gaebler report, "We can generate,
analyze, and communicate a thousand times more information

213. Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 38 (Max Rheinstein ed.
& Edward Shils trans., 1954), quoted in Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process 5657 (1978).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 195, at 475-78 (arguing that employers
develop a systematic ability to learn to avoid discrimination liability in a
command-and-control regime).
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than we could just a generation ago, for a fraction of the
cost."

2 16

Hence, the business of government agencies becomes
"regulatory research and development," rather than regulatory
decision making, requiring "an ethic of experimentalism in
which errors are not viewed as failures.' '2 17 Under the governance model, several policy tools are considered to be especially
adapted to triggering mechanisms for renewal. One such policy
tool is the use of time-centered rules, which specify a preset
timeline or a rhythmic calendar for revision or change, for example sunset rules and temporary decrees. 218 A second central
example of a dynamic policy tool is information-centered laws,
including both private disclosure rules and public sunshine
laws. Increasingly, information or disclosure regimes are policy
tools, ensuring choice and participation. 2 19 For example, on environmental issues, many countries now require industries to
release information on their performance to the community and
interested stakeholders. 220 In areas as diverse as securities
regulation, banking and loan management, health care, pharmaceuticals, and consumer protection, the availability of information on performance, rates, and quality is increasingly

216.
217.
218.

OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 80, at 141.
Freeman, supra note 3, at 31.
In private law, there are also examples of legislation that use time

rules to ensure the generation of new knowledge, improvements, and industry
advancements-like in the preset timelines for the expiration of intellectual
property entitlements. E.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (2002) (The term of a patent begins at the date of issuance and ends twenty years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States.)
219. See, e.g., Pedersen, supra note 197, at 151-52 (arguing information
disclosure programs could effect significant changes in the status and functions of federal regulatory agencies); Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking
DisclosureRegimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431,
472-89 (1986) (advancing a disclosure regime as a means of stabilizing banks).
220. The U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) requires specified categories
of manufacturing facilities to report annually on their use, storage, and release of about six hundred chemicals into the air, water, land, and underground injection wells. Fiorino, supra note 31, at 448. The Environmental Protection Agency then compiles the data in annual reports, often receiving
extensive media coverage:
The TRI does not require firms to install technology or otherwise take
steps to reduce emissions; it is purely an information requirement.
Nonetheless, experience and empirical studies document that firms
respond to the negative publicity that accompanies the release of TRI
information. Companies do not want to be known as leading polluters
in their communities.
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understood as a way to generate better practices. Finally, performance-centered norms are a vital category of new policy
tools that create a shared expectation of comparable outcomes
while allowing the refinement of means and strategies. 221
H. LAW AS COMPETENCE AND ORCHESTRATION
The final feature of the governance model is orchestration.
Orchestration renders all other aspects of the governance
model meaningful, separating the model from flat processes of
devolution and deregulation. From the perspective of the microlens of decentralization, some reform agendas of the Renew
Deal may best be accomplished at the local level. A more accurate view reveals, however, that under the governance model, a
broader network of regional, state, and national efforts must
support programs. 222 While power is decentralized to allow local knowledge to match solutions to their individual circumstances, decentralization must be coupled with regional and national commitments
to coordinate
local efforts
and
communicate lessons in a comprehensive manner. 223
The greatest challenge of orchestration is to prevent the
isolation of problems by linking together geographically and
materially dispersed efforts. Rather than an exclusively localized approach, which focuses only on specific problems in a confined geographical area, at its best, the new governance model
addresses problems in their broader context. 224 The legal system must create opportunities to consider policies regionally
and nationally.
In the Renew Deal vision, the central authority declares a
need and an intention to address an issue and expresses willingness to provide resources. The role of government is to promote and standardize innovations that began locally and pri-

221. Coglianese et al., supra note 189, at 705 (summarizing a workshop
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of performance-based regulations).
222. In the context of community development, see SIMON, supra note 151,
at 167-93. In the context of the new labor market, see Lobel, supra note 90, at
2157-61.
223. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
287-88.
224. Nonorchestration is the greatest difficulty of many policy proposals in
recent years. For example, this has been a primary weakness of many local
development efforts that have been reenergized in the 1990s. See Audrey G.
McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 299-301 (1999).
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vately. 225 Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing
good practices, and researching and replicating success stories
from local or private levels are central goals of government.
Policymakers must observe and encourage a variety of practices that emerge in the market, and then decide how best to
support and complement good practices. The federal government's role,
is less one of direct action than one of providing financial support,
strategic direction, and leadership for other governmental actors....
[Tihe federal role... lies. . . less in championing particular institutions and practices than in mobilizing resources, encouraging experiof alternative apmentation, facilitating comparison and evaluation
226
proaches, and diffusing the best practices.

Orchestration of the best practices found in different conto result in a "virtuous cycle of innovatexts has the potential '22
7
improvement.
tion and
The normative authorities that proliferate within the mandate of an orchestrated system require a delicate, ongoing balance. How can a legal system preserve the implication of hier22s
How does government
archy without being jurispathic?
maintain its authority while promoting the governance capacities of other social actors? Governance scholars encourage the
exercise of a new kind of legal self-restraint. Instead of taking
over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of social processes, law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and re229
It creates incentives
definition of democratic mechanisms.
about behavreflection
and procedures to cultivate internal
230
levels of govmultiple
the
The legal process coordinates
ior.
recalling
Accordingly,
activities.
ernment and nongovernment
of
school)
Process
Legal
the
(or
the processprudential project

225. Cf. Freeman, supra note 3, at 21 (proposing a model of governance in
which administrative agencies facilitate joint problem solving with private entites rather than react to interest representation).
226. OSTERMAN ETAL., supra note 89, at 151.
227. Id. at 178.
228. Robert Cover developed the term "jurispathic" to signify the violence
of legal ordering upon other normative orders. Cover, supra note 181, at 4044.

229. Teubner, supra note 60, at 273-75.
230. REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 1, at 7 ("In distinguishing functions (with respect to society), performance (with respect to other social systems), and reflexion (with respect to the system itself) a sophisticated labour
law approach tries to 'regulate' not only through 'performance' but also
through influencing centres of 'reflexion' within other social subsystems.").
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the 1950s, 231 the governance model treats the legal system as
the interaction of institutions and practices, rather than as a
set of rules.
With the integration of policy domains and fields of foundational law-including constitutional law, administrative law,
and jurisprudence-the Renew Deal vision promotes institutional analysis of the myriad of subsystems in the polity. The
anomaly of the American legal system, in which common law
courts were developed before the full constitution of an administrative state, has affected the path of legal theory by contributing to the dominance of jurisprudence. The governance model
expands the center of legal thought beyond jurisprudence to include legisprudence and processprudence among different social arenas and institutions. The model's broad focus encompasses government agencies, as well as a host of private groups
and organizations, operating together in a more holistic legal
regime. In its treatment of the law as a comprehensive system,
the model again recalls the postwar Legal Process school. 232
The governance model is, however, more sophisticated in the
range of institutions it considers viable and its drive to reconfigure the interactions of these institutions.233 Both private and
public institutions should be open to transformation. "Until we
make the underlying institutional and imaginative structure of
a society explicit we are almost certain to mistake the regularities and routines that persist, so long as the structure is left
undisturbed, for general laws of social organization."2 34

231.

For an introduction to the legal process movement, see HENRY M.

HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). See also infra text accompanying notes 489-

492.
232. For a description of the Legal Process school, see infra notes 489-492.
233. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707,
737-61 (1991) (outlining the new public law movement); Edward L. Rubin,
The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-33 (1996) (describing the methodology and substance of the new legal process).
234.

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, POLITICS: THE CENTRAL TEXTS 6 (Zhi-

yvan Cui ed., 1997). For example, Roberto Unger argues that, despite the redefinition of property in twentieth century American legal thought as a bundle
of legal relations and conflicting rights, legal theory has failed to produce an
understanding that "market economies, like representative democracies and
free civil societies can take radically different institutional forms." UNGER, supra note 4, at 203-04.
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Critical legal theorist Roberto Unger describes legal
thought as having suffered from "institutional fetishism," and
calls on a new generation of thinkers to rebel against this tendency. "The institutional arrangements for production and exchange should be as open to experimental variation as all other
parts of social life." 235 The legal system must therefore promote

experiments with institutional design rather than curtail them.
In the governance model, centralized law does not occupy a
privileged role controlling all other subsystems. Instead, law
coexists with various subsystems, ever gauging the sustainability of the different organizations. 236 The law still dominates,
however, through its capacity to coordinate among different social institutions (e.g., political, economic, legal, family, religion,
education). Governance policies serve to integrate isolated efforts at the subsystem level, coordinating different scales of action. Law's coordinating function is achieved through its "competence competency," the competence to determine other actors'
competencies. The legal system confines itself to a certain set of
questions, namely, the capacities of different actors, arenas and
subsystems; the division of scope and responsibilities among
them; and their self-regulatory institutional processes. Yet, by
this very action, law asserts its primacy in developing procedures and jurisdictional norms for the activities of other social
systems. The European Autopoiesis school, similarly to the earlier American Legal Process school, points to this role of the
law in determining competencies of the different social subsystems. It claims that "legal norms should produce a 'harmonious
fit' between institutional structures and social structures
'237
rather than influence the social structures themselves.

235. UNGER, supra note 4, at 203. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel similarly challenge legal institutional fetishism:

How bizarre the assumption that the one feature of our institutions
that remained fixed as they somehow slipped from unimprovable to
incorrigible is their inaccessibility to deliberate alteration! ... [T]he
legal-process idea of taking the institutions for granted becomes a
[W]hy not suppose simply that the
form of self-fulfilling prophecy ....
institutions of government worked well in the immediate post-War
period because by design, or by good fortune, they fit well with their
environment? In time the environment changed, and the lack of fit
explains the poor performance of the institutions ....
A Constitutionof DemocraticExperimentalism, supra note 4, at 283.
236. Cf. The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 106, at 1334 (remarks by Lester Salamon) (describing the wide variety of forms of public action, many of which involve private entities).
237. Teubner, supra note 60, at 251.
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Similarly, in the American context, governance scholars offer
the concept of "reconstitutive law," 238 describing law's function
in providing rules about the procedure, organization, and constitution of other social fields without directly prescribing individual behavior. In this framework, law ensures that subsystems are responsive to their constituents, defines jurisdictions,
coordinates activities, harmonizes subsystem activities with
national goals, while preserving broad subsystem independence-creating a strategic coupling between national goals and
local authority. 239 Law discerns the relative capacities of different institutions and supports self-sustaining balances in each
context. In this capacity, a governance approach creates a middle ground-a space of regulated autonomy-between substantive regulation and nonregulation. 240 Law continues to play a
crucial role under the governance model, but that role differs
from the regulatory model's conception of law as top-down and
universal.
IV. THREE EMERGING DOMAINS OF GOVERNANCE
As we have seen, the Renew Deal shift from regulation to
governance is affecting a myriad of policy areas. This section
critically explores the recent application of governance principles in three areas where it is particularly prevalent. First, in
the area of employment law, new policies on occupational
safety and health, second-generation employment discrimination, and vocational training programs, provide important insights into the ways the legal regime is confronting the new political economy and constructing innovative policies to produce
socially responsible market practices. Next, in environmental
law, the Renew Deal vision has had some of its earliest influences on policy and institutional design. Environmental scholars have begun developing the concept of civic environmentalism, which confronts the failures of traditional regulatory
schemes and promotes participatory and decentralized arrangements to better conserve the ecology, habitat, and natural
resources. The third area, Internet law, is an important terrain
of implementation of governance principles in a new infrastructure. Technological advances are conducive to new demands of
flexibility, increasingly facilitating reflexive regulation, en238.
239.
240.

Stewart, supra note 7, at 108-09.
Id. at 88, 104-11.
Teubner, supra note 60, at 254.
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Table 2: From Reulation to G*overnance
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abling information and power sharing, and lowering the barriers of entry and engagement. They have also added a new layer
of settings to which legal thought must react. These three leading areas of governance provide insights to both the promise
and complexities of implementing an integrated governance
model in legal fields previously shaped by the New Deal regulatory paradigm.
A. THE NEW WORKPLACE
The new economy, marked by a growing demand for flexihas
bility, increased competitiveness, and rapid globalization,
241 Today's
created new patterns of work and employment.
workplaces promise less stability; contingent employment relations are on the rise. Although any linear account is inevitably
oversimplified, the last few decades have seen a move away
from the "old" model of work-Fordist assembly-line production
and Taylorist scientific management-to a postindustrial mode
and in
of production, which is flexible, lean, and service based,
242
part-time.
and
which work is increasingly outsourced
arrangements,
As employers are adopting more flexible
243 New employment
scarcer,
become
workplace security has
scholars as the
patterns, described by industrial-organization
"casualization of the labor market,"244 the "new psychological
246 re245
employment contract," and the "boundaryless career,"
manage
quire workers to accommodate change rapidly and
humanthe
of
currency
new
the
Indeed,
their own careers.
who
Those
stability.
than
rather
capital era is employability
disare not well situated to this new world of employability247are
Moreproportionately women, minorities, and immigrants.
the reover, new employment patterns have put into question
as its
sponsibility of the state to regulate the workplace as well
241. See Lobel, supra note 87, at 144-53.
242. Id.
for Flexible
243. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting
New Economy, 10 TEX.
and Triangular Employment Relationships in the
WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 112-14 (2003).
244. SASSEN, supra note 174, at 34.

245.

48 UCLA L.
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract,

REV. 519 (2001).
THE BOUNDARYLESS
246. MICHAEL B. ARTHUR & DENISE M. ROUSSEAU,
ERA
A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL
CAREER: A NEW EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPAL FOR

(1996).

247.

See generally Lobel, supra note 174, at 89-92.

408

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

capacities to enforce top-down regulations. The heterogeneity of
the workforce and the workplace has made it more difficult for
a centralized government agency to promulgate rules that will
fit all firms. In today's reality, no single model of work relations
exists, and thus unitary conceptions of the workplace and unitary employment policies are impossible. Although existing legal and social institutions are based on the assumptions of a
former era, in which uniformity and stability were much more
widespread, the nature of the new labor market requires flexible and diverse institutions.248 A governance approach is further needed to address a rapidly changing environment in
which flexibility and adaptability are key to remaining competitive in the new global market. Technological innovations as
well as unpredictable strains of heightened competition require
constant change and adaptation.
New dimensions of the workplace are challenging the traditional ways policymakers and scholars have approached issues of social justice in the area of work. The inadequacy of
substantive prohibitions in the new economy requires alternative methods of social activism and reform. As employment patterns have radically changed in the new economy, misconduct
and inequity must be prevented using strategies outside the
traditional regulatory toolbox. New governance strategies have
been employed in a variety of policies, including vocationaltraining reforms, occupational health and safety regulation,
and antidiscrimination strategies.
1. Vocational Training
Worker training and adult education have always been a
bridge between the state and the market, between welfare and
work, and between low-wage and higher paying jobs. Even
Adam Smith, dubbed father of the invisible hand and laissezfaire markets, believed that vocational education should be
provided free to the working class to guarantee that they would
be able to join society as full, productive citizens. 249 In the past
two decades, however, training has become increasingly important. Changing market requirements and employment patterns
place more value on skills and education than did the earlier
industrial workplace. At the same time, reductions in direct
248. Lobel, supra note 90, at 2157 (citing OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89,
at 35-44).
249. AVIsHAi MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 157 (1996) (citing ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
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welfare provisions constrain the ability of workers to seek aid
outside of the market. These developments have sharpened the
divisions between skilled (rather than stable or secure), upwardly mobile jobs and low-skill "dead-end" jobs.250
Reform agendas for workforce development thus face a
trilemma. First, lifelong learning and training is becoming increasingly important in the new, ever-changing economy. The
changing face of both the workplace and the workforce has
placed a high premium on constant reskilling, networking, and
employability. Second, because of higher mobility, dislocation,
and worker turnover, individual firms have less incentive to invest in skill training, particularly of less-skilled workers. And
third, welfare reform and reductions in direct governmental aid
have created new constraints on the ability of workers to seek
25 1
aid outside of the market.
Federal regulatory initiatives and publicly funded training
programs in the United States have long been criticized for lagging behind the economic realities and falling short of the efforts of other countries. 25 2 A recurring failure has been the lack
of coordination with the needs of the private job market. 253 Existing public institutions, such as local high schools and community colleges, have played a central role in training. However, these training sites did not achieve the much-needed

250. DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 11-13 (1997); see
SASSEN, supra note 174, 138-42.

251. See Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatizationof Poverty Programs,49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2002); Joel F. Handler, US Welfare Reform: The Big Experiment, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A
NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 215 (Jonathan

Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
252. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development
Movement, 2002 WiS. L. REV. 377.
253. W. NORTON GRUBB, LEARNING TO WORK: THE CASE FOR
REINTEGRATING JOB TRAINING AND EDUCATION 70-74 (1996); PAUL
OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION, DISLOCATION, AND

PUBLIC POLICY 90 (1988); Rashid Amjad, Employability in the Global Economy
and the Importance of Training:A Summary of the 1998-99 ILO World Employment Report, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 715, 730-35 (1999); MarieLouise Caravatti, The Role of Governments in the Development of Human Resources Training for Employability: The U.S. Side, 22 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 37, 40
(1996); Lisa M. Lynch & Sandra E. Black, Beyond the Incidence of EmployerProvided Training, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64 (1998); see also Michael
Cragg, Performance Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from the Job
Training PartnershipAct, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 147 (1997) (using the Job
Training Partnership Act to illustrate how the government approach to incentives differs from that of the private sector).
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coordination between taught skills and actual job opportuni-

ties. 254 One of the key difficulties in training is anticipating the

changing balance of supply and demand for different skills and
jobs in a local economy. 255 Uncoordinated efforts have been

largely inadequate to achieve the needed balance. Training also
requires integration with the ability and readiness of firms
themselves to make changes in their organizational structures.
To be most effective, training initiatives must therefore also assume roles in human resource allocation and organizational
256
consulting.
Recognizing the principle challenges of the new economy,
as well as the ongoing failures of the traditional approach to
training, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 replaced
previous federal legislation as the new legal regime for disseminating funding from the United States Department of Labor to local job training programs. 257 A highly decentralized
system, the WIA aims to fully integrate federal grants into local programs and eliminate the lack of coordination present in
the former system. 2 58 Under the previous regime, different organizations and agencies within each state operated narrowly
focused education and training programs. In contrast, applying
the governance principle of policy integration, the WIA creates
local integrated marketplaces, where job seekers can choose
among a broad array of job placement services and educational
programs, as well as comprehensive personal and professional
counseling. It merges into the new system other publicly
funded services, such as special programs focusing on young
adults in secondary and postsecondary vocational education
programs. 259
254.
255.

OSTERMAN, supra note 253, at 90.
See ROSEMARY BATT & PAUL OSTERMAN, WORKPLACE TRAINING
POLICY: CASE STUDIES OF STATE AND LOCAL EXPERIMENTS 59-61 (Econ. Policy
Inst., Working Paper No. 106, 1993) (discussing the problems faced by the

Massachusetts Machine Action Project in its attempts to match supply and
demand in the Springfield local economy).
256. Id. at 58.
257. Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 939 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.). WIA's predecessor was the Job Training
Partnership Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (enacting no currently effective sections).
258. Nan Ellis, Individual Training Accounts Under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998: Is Choice a Good Thing?, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y

235, 236 (2001).
259. For example, the WIA integrates the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and
Applied Technology Education Amendments of 1998. See Pub. L. 105-332, 112
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The WIA establishes a "one-stop" delivery system, which
provides job seekers with neighborhood career centers where
they can access core employment services. 260 The centralized
location, where job seekers can obtain information about all aspects of the job market, is designed to make the job-seeking
process more efficient and to empower individuals to make
choices suited to their career needs and goals. 26 1 This approach
enables citizens to actively participate in the implementation of
training policy. The law also encourages collaboration among
government, industry, and civil society. Each one-stop center is
comprised of public and private partner organizations that provide core services. 262 Required partners include adult education
providers, employment services, welfare-to-work centers, and
unemployment insurance services. 263 Local agencies are
prohibited from directly providing training services, and are
instead required to seek out other (private or public) providers.
Training is provided through individual training accounts, in
effect establishing a voucher system through which a
participant chooses among eligible providers. 264 The one-stop
system provides participants with a list of eligible providers
and their performance information. 265 The WIA mandates universal access to the one-stop system, 266 which includes information on job vacancies, career options and counseling, employment trends, instructions on how to conduct a job search,
student financial aid, unemployment insurance assistance, assistance in establishing eligibility for welfare-to-work case
management, and follow-up sessions. 267 As a result of the decentralized, collaborative approach required by. the Act, training services are directly linked to occupations that are in demand in local areas or other areas to which the individual is
willing to relocate.268

Stat. 3076 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(c)-(d) (2000).
261. Ellis, supra note 258, at 236.
262. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(d)(3)(B).
263. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(d)(4)(F)(iii).
265. Id. § 2864(a)(2)(B)(i), (d)(4)(F)(iii).
266. Id. § 2864(c)(1) (describing accessibility requirements for statewide
one-stop delivery systems).
267. Id. § 2864(d)(2).
268. Id. § 2864(d)(2)(G)(iii).
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The one-stop centers are funded directly by federal block
grants. 269 The amount of funding each center receives annually
depends on its success, based on criteria articulated in the
WIA.270 Performance-based regulation encourages localities to
experiment and to dynamically compare and improve their
practices. The law specifies core performance indicators that focus on rates of entry into and earnings in unsubsidized
employment by participants. 2 71 Levels of performance affect the
federal funding of the local program in subsequent years. 2 72 To
encourage orchestrated learning, the Act also requires that
states and local agencies establish standards for success for organizations that provide training services. 273 It further establishes national employment statistics to help monitor these
standards. 274 Finally, the new system aims to strengthen the
role of the private sector by establishing local, business-led
Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) to act as boards of directors, overseeing the local systems. 275 The WIBs receive information about the performance of each program and are required to seek public input and conduct meetings open to the
public. 2 76 Effectively, community-based partners constitute the
membership of the mandated regional WIBs.277 Such partner-

ship structure captures "the operative efficiencies of associational action, while being sufficiently tutored by local experience and allowing a speed and flexibility in government
response, to satisfy firm demands for such attention to their

269. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
270. Id.
271. 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(2)(A) (listing core performance indicators to be
used to evaluate state workforce investment activities).
272. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
273. States may adopt performance indicators in addition to those prescribed by the WIA. 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(1)(A). Each provider must also submit
information relating to the costs of the program. Id. § 2871(d)(2)(C). The local
board may modify the performance criteria for programs of providers in the
local area by increasing the levels of performance above the minimum levels
established by the governor. Id. § 2871(c)(2).
274. Id. § 655.
275. Id. § 2821 (creating and describing the composition of state workforce
investment boards).
276. Id. § 2821(g).
277. Laura Dresser & Joel Rogers, Part of the Solution: Emerging Workforce Intermediariesin the United States, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE
IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS, supra note 251,
at 266, 287.
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new competitive realties. 278 Through these new network partnerships, several efficiencies are reached, primarily relating to
scale and scope. Partnerships are able to adopt an industrywide approach that allows information sharing, standard setting, and benchmarking both public and private efforts across
workplaces. 279 This allows industry participants to share the
cost of replenishing a pool of skilled labor and facilitates joint
investments. 28 0 By bringing together a growing number of employers, unions, public sector agencies, and community-based
partners, a governance approach enhances learning and problem-solving capacities. It further enables firms to pool their investments in human capital, leverage the accountability of public institutions, and empower a wider range of players in the
28 1
labor market.
Community-based initiatives have been successful in leveraging public funds within the new governance workforce development system. For example, Project QUEST (Quality Employment and Skills Training), an award-winning training
initiative in San Antonio, Texas, illustrates the multitiered action of the governance model. Founded by a national network of
community organizations, the program is funded through a variety of sources, including federal and state grants, and local
government funding. 28 2 Unlike conventional training programs,
Project QUEST is aimed at preparing workers for long-term,
skilled positions that would enable them to break out of poverty. 28 3 The ongoing link to community organizations and local
private businesses has contributed to its success. Project
QUEST managed to secure, in advance, job commitments from
the business community and state funds. 28 4 Integrating policy
domains, Project QUEST takes a comprehensive approach to
workforce development that includes support services such as

278. Id. at 288.
279. Id. at 285.
280. Id. at 286 ("[S]uccessful sectoral initiatives create a 'win-win' situation
for firms, workers, and new labor-market entrants from the community.").
281. Id.
282. Paul Osterman, Organizingthe US Labor Market: National Problems,
Community Strategies, in

GOVERNING

WORK

AND

WELFARE

IN

A NEW

ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS, supra note 251, at 240,
257.
283. Osterman, supra note 282, at 255.
284. Id. at 254, 257.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

child-care subsidies, transportation, and referrals to health
care.

285

By involving a wide range of professionals, agencies, and
civil society organizations, Project QUEST has successfully
broadened the traditional tunnel vision of workforce development issues by linking questions of job training programs to
school reform, living-wage campaigns, and local economic development. 28 6 The principles of subsidiarity and learning are
realized through extensive meetings in which participants tell
stories of past unsatisfactory training programs and economic
dislocation. 28 7 The project has been recognized as successful in
addressing the skills mismatch that employers and employees
historically faced in the area, and that led employers to extensively recruit from outside of the region to fill high-skill jobs. 288

Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Paul Osterman, who has carefully evaluated Project QUEST, describes
the project as "one of the most successful job training programs
28 9
in the nation."

Although Project QUEST has resulted in substantial gains
for its trainees, the program's goals extend beyond its individual clients. From the perspective of orchestration, the aim of
the project is to impact the broader structures of the labor
market, alter hiring patterns, and improve the curricula of
community colleges for all attendees. 290 Through connections to
other community networks, training efforts have been linked to
broader political organizing. 2 91 Initiatives like Project QUEST
have been replicated in other cities through diffusion of the
principles and successful practices exhibited by the new workforce development framework. Each local area has further
modified the applied programs, adapting to local circumstances
and building upon shared information and experiences.
To conclude, the WIA represents a new framework for a
comprehensive "workforce investment" system based on integration of resources, individual choice of training, performance
measurements, and the encouragement of private-public partnerships. The Act promotes learning by requiring the articula285. Id. at 255.
286. Id. at 254, 258.
287. See id. at 255.
288. See id. at 256.
289. Id. at 259.
290. Id. at 256.
291. See id. at 257.
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tion of standards and information sharing; and customizes services according to local and individual needs. Private sector labor market intermediaries are encouraged to take a more active
and formal role in the public system of training. 292 Finally, the
Act explicitly invites experimentation and provides the resources to sustain successful experiments like Project
QUEST. 293 A governance approach to workforce development
enables government and activists to link supply-side efforts
(improving the skills of job seekers), demand-side initiatives
(altering the hiring patterns of firms), and structural-impact
initiatives, including the formation of new intermediary institutions, the revision of employment norms within a community,
and the alternation of long-entrenched practices of existing or294
ganizations.
Occupational Safety and Health
The decades following the New Deal brought subsequent
waves of regulatory programs, such as extensive public safety
and environmental regulation. 295 In 1970, Congress enacted the
2.

Occupational Safety and Health Act. 296 The statute established

the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
within the Labor Department. OSHA was granted broad power
to regulate workplace safety across all industries. Because of
this far-reaching power, the Agency has been controversial
since its establishment, and strong opponents have called for
its dissolution. Indeed, OSHA has been treated by legal scholars as a paradigmatic case study of bureaucratic regulatory
failure and has been accused of gross regulatory unreasonableness. 2 97 There have been drastic proposals to abolish OSHA al-

together based on claims that economic incentives, including
workers' compensation and hazard pay, generate the incentives
needed for worker protection. 298 As Joel Handler has com292. Dresser & Rogers, supra note 277, at 287.
293.

Id.

294. See, e.g., Osterman, supra note 282, at 264.
295. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190,
83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970)).
296. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (2000)).
297. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERTA. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (making repeated

references to OSHA in the authors' attempt to illustrate the problem of regulatory unreasonableness).
298. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT
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mented, "OSHA is usually cited as the prime example of the pathologies of the legal-bureaucratic regime."299
The critique of OSHA practices epitomizes the dissatisfaction with the regulatory model. In its early years, OSHA focused on the promulgation of rules that established universal
standards for issues such as exposure to toxins. The Agency enforced these rules by quasi-random inspections of work sites
and prosecution of violations. At the beginning of the 1980s,
major litigation called into question the validity of some of
OSHA's central top-down regulations. 300 The extensive litigation brought by industry groups reflected the controversy surrounding OSHA's regulatory activity in the business community. In the famous Benzene case, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down OSHA's standard for protecting workers from exposure to benzene.3 01 The court held that OSHA, rather than
having the authority to prevent absolute risks, must first establish the existence of a "significant risk" before it promulgates
preventative standards. 302
In response to both the discontent with its original regulatory approach and to new challenges of regulating health and
safety in the new economy, OSHA has in recent years adopted
innovative approaches that are more akin to the Renew Deal
governance model. 303 In its 2003 management plan, OSHA recRISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION (1993); William J. Maukestad & Charles Helm, Promoting
Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on NonOSHA Legal Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions To Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9 (1989).
299. Joel Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999,
1025 (1988).

300. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Indus. Union
Dep't, v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
301. Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 662.
302. Id. Justice Marshall in his dissent stated:
[Wihen the question involves determination of the acceptable level of
risk, the ultimate decision must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as well as empirically verifiable facts. Factual determinations can at most define the risk in some statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable cannot be based solely on a
resolution of the facts.
Id. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
303. Even in its first years, the legislature directed OSHA to adopt existing
private industry standards by reference. See Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 6(a), 84 Stat. 1593 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 655 (2000)) (suggesting that existing national consensus standards
would be presumptively favored). At OSHA's foundation, the Agency entered
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ognized that increased diversity, a shift from goods to services,
and a decrease in the percentage of workers employed in stable
full-time jobs have changed the American workforce signifi30 4 The Agency acknowlcantly over the past several decades.
edged that these changes require new strategies to address oc30 5 For example, immigrant
cupational safety and health.
workers often work in some of the most dangerous jobs, yet
30 6
The 2003 plan
many are unable to read English instructions.
states that "[tihese demographic and workplace trends complicate the implementation of occupational safety and health programs and argue for enforcement, training, and delivery systems that are different from those that have been relied upon to
date." 307 Similarly, OSHA now acknowledges

that certain

workplace safety issues have been overlooked and neglected
due to the problematic divisions between policy fields. In 2003,
the Agency recognized that the most serious vocational risks
include workplace violence and motor vehicle accidents, two areas that have not been traditionally addressed by the
Agency. 308 To facilitate the governance principles of integration
of policy domains, the Agency aims to establish more collabora30 9
tive relations with other public and private institutions.
Another significant dimension of the Agency's new approach is the adoption of flexible, noncoercive (or "soft") practices. Reacting yet again to new workplace realties and previous failures in its regulatory strategies, OSHA has shifted its
into contractual relations with the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) for the provision of technical support for the development and applica-

tion

of safety standards. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH LAW 56 (4th ed. 1998). ANSI develops these standards through collaboration with corporations or by forming committees from a pool of technical
and professional organizations and trade associations. Id. It oversees the processes of private standard-setting organizations and recommends the incorporation of their conclusions into OSHA standards. Id.
304.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

OSHA 2003-2008 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN, at http://www.osha.gov/
StratPlanPublic/strategicmanagementplan-final.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2004).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. See id. For example, OSHA's jurisdiction is vastly limited by the Department of Transportation's responsibility for covering motor vehicle fatalities.
309. The Agency explained: "Due to the diffuse nature of these problems as
well as jurisdictional issues, reducing these risks will require collaboration
with other federal, state and local organizations." Id.
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emphasis in recent years from extensive elaboration of standards and high rates of inspection to fewer inspections and
more programs of collaborative, semivoluntary compliance. At
the state and federal levels, agencies are experimenting with
innovative governance approaches to occupational health and
safety. For example, California's Occupational Health and
Safety Administration has adopted the California Cooperative
Compliance Program (CCCP), which authorizes unions and
employers to develop and implement safety requirements, delegating governmental inspection and enforcement roles to joint
labor/management safety committees. 310 Through collective
bargaining, unions and employers develop and implement
workplace safety requirements in a collaborative, participatory
manner. As long as this program of audited self-regulation
proves to reduce accidents effectively, the Agency does not intervene in the processes. This gives firms and industries incentives to learn and improve dynamically and to share information with others. Studying the implementation of cooperative
compliance programs in the construction industry in California,
sociologist Joseph Rees found that accident rates at CCCP projects were significantly lower than those at companies operating under the traditional regulatory framework.311 The federal
OSHA has also experimented with similar programs, such as
the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), allowing companies
with exemplary safety records to take over the role of OSHA inspectors themselves and to be exempt from regular inspec312
tions.
As a public administrative agency, OSHA exemplifies the
move to governance approaches to law making, implementa310. JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE 134-74 (1988) (describing in depth the organization and role of the labor/management safety committee).
311. Id. at 2-3.
312. Id. at 1. Some studies on the effect of internal compliance mechanisms
and OSHA violations have, by contrast, found the adoption of ethics codes
programs to be of little impact on corporate illegality. For example, one study
indicates that there is a positive correlation between willful repeat violations
and internal compliance programs, leading the researchers to argue that
the
adoption of such a mechanism is a purposeful way for management to hide
its
involvement and reduce liability for safety violations. Marie McKendall et
al.,
Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367,
380
(2002). But see infra Part VI.C for a discussion of the various factors that
contribute to successful collaboration in the context of occupational health
and
safety.
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tion, and enforcement. OSHA's Strategic Management Plan for
2003-2008 described intentions to increase its use of cooperative programs with the private sector, expanding outreach pro3 13
grams, industry education, and compliance assistance.
OSHA views the development of guidance and standards for occupational safety and working with employers and employees
314
Among its vital activities are
as its primary responsibilities.
consultation services to small businesses, the provision of compliance assistance, outreach, education, and other cooperative
315
According to OSHA's
programs for employers and employees.
reports, injuries and illnesses have been cut nearly in half at
work sites engaged in cooperative relationships with the
Agency. 3 16 OSHA also aims to foster relationships with other
civil society organizations to address critical safety and health
issues, expanding collaborative partnerships, voluntary 3pro17
grams and outreach, education, and compliance assistance.
3.

Employment Discrimination

New employment antidiscrimination strategies are a third
example of the adoption of the governance model in the area of
work. Employment discrimination policies have largely been
based on the civil rights model of the 1950s and 1960s-a regulatory, adversarial regime. The main strategy was the direct
prohibition of certain practices, including illegal consideration
of gender and race in hiring and promotions, followed by topdown implementation and enforcement. The regulatory model
was based on the assumption that employment discrimination
is intentional and relatively easy to comprehend and detect.
or
The regulatory solution was usually a lawsuit for damages 318
practices.
discriminatory
particular
an injunction against the
313. Trade Release, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, U.S.
Department of Labor, Agency Builds on Previous Successes, Sets New Goals
(May 12, 2003), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p_
table=NEWSRELEASES&pid+10214 (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
314. Id.
315.

Id.

316. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2002, at Outcome Goal 3.1,
(last visited
http://www.dol.govLsec/media/reports/annual2002/Goal3-l.htm
Oct. 28, 2004) ("The lost workday injury and illness incidence rate declined by
47 percent at sites engaged in voluntary, cooperative relationships with [the
Department of Labor].").
317.

See id.

318. Although disparate impact suits have been recognized under Title VII
discrimination claims, traditional regulatory approaches have proven inadequate for long-term structural reform. See Sturm, supra note 195, at 469.
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While the regulatory model has been effective in eliminating
the most obvious and direct forms of discrimination, it has not
effectively dealt with more complex and subtle discriminatory
practices.
As the workplace has become more dynamic and multifaceted, discriminatory practices are frequently not the result of a
distinct and direct decision to discriminate but rather of complex practices, including corporate culture, informal norms,
networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation. 319 The complex nature of this type of discrimination "resists definition and
resolution through across-the-board, relatively specific commands and an after-the-fact enforcement mechanism." 320 An
example is the recognition that a workplace can create a "hostile or offensive work environment," even without any single
individual acting as perpetrator. 32 1 The boundaries between legal and illegal conduct are blurred, although the consequences
of discrimination are no less harmful. Susan Sturm describes
the emergence of an alternative governance-based approach,
recently employed in many workplaces, that focuses on ongoing
problem-solving efforts, engaging both outside consultants and
workers themselves in reflexive efforts to eliminate workplace
discrimination.322 By involving workers as key participants in
antidiscrimination efforts, employers recognize their dependency upon the internal insights of those closest to the problem
(i.e., subsidiarity) and their shared interest in eliminating discrimination (i.e., win-win collaboration). These efforts also recognize the significance of explicit articulation and specification
of decision-making criteria and goals in order to allow comparison, learning, and continuous improvement. The voluntary
adoption of ethical codes of conduct in the workplace is a common practice in recent years that encourages employers to articulate the corporation's values and practices. 323 Some companies have also shared lessons and data with other, similarly
situated firms. Another important way of learning is the accumulation and preservation of data on hiring and promotions

319. Id.
320. See id.
321. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
322. See Sturm, supra note 195, at 522-25.
323. Over 90% of Fortune 500 firms report the use of ethics codes of conduct. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing CorporateEthical Codes, 15 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 21 (1996).
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training is
over time. 32 4 Finally, voluntary provision of diversity
325
employers.
by
effort
common
an increasingly
In relation to regulatory approaches, governance strategies
may operate as a defense against liability or against the grant
of punitive damages in case of discrimination allegations by
employees. 326 In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, the U.S.
Supreme Court established a defense to punitive damages in
discrimination suits based on the demonstration by managerial
327
In the
agents of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
good
such
to
point
to
sought
past several years, employers have
compliance
internal
of
faith efforts through the implementation
structures, including self-adopted equal employment policies,
328
Similarly, in Burcodes, and diversity training programs.
Court recogSupreme
the
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
adoption of
the
by
suits
nized a defense to sexual harassment
329
follow
cases
These
firms.
by
internal antiharassment policies
some
leaving
noncoerciveness,
and
the principles of flexibility
disin
experimentation
encourage
to
practices unsanctioned
crimination prevention.
A governance approach to discrimination thus changes the
understanding of the nature and sources of discrimination.
Rather than seeing the worker as the victim and the employer
as the conscious, malicious villain, it understands that discrimination is frequently the consequence of processes and
structures that can be transformed through learning and mutual engagement. 330 The recent adoption of governance strategies has proven to have positive effects on the promotion of
33 1
Moreover, some
equality and tolerance in many workplaces.
in increasing
only
not
of these initiatives have been effective

324. Sturm, supra note 195, at 469.
325. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Development Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 ORG. DYNAMICS 149,
149 (2001) (reporting that 75% of Fortune 500 firms and 36% of other firms
have diversity training in the workplace).
326. Krawiec, supra note 15, at 504.
327. 527 U.S. 526, 542-43 (1999).
328. Krawiec, supra note 15, at 505.
329. 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
330. See Simon, supra note 21, at 75-77.
331. See Loriann Roberson et al., Designing Effective Diversity Training:
Influence of Group Composition and Trainee Experience, 22 J. ORG. BEHAV.
871, 871 (2001) (describing the increased popularity of diversity training in
corporate America during the 1990s).
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workplace equality but also in reducing employee turnover and
the costs of hiring and training.332
However, some scholars have criticized governance approaches to antidiscrimination for allowing employers to avoid
conventional legal liability. If antidiscrimination efforts are
merely cosmetic, a governance regime potentially forms a liability shield. 333 The law allows employers to opt out of the regulatory framework without adequate assurances of the effectiveness of governance. For example, some studies have found that
simply adopting voluntary codes of conduct only alters behavior
in rare occasions, 334 yet courts consider their existence to favor
employers in litigation. A major problem with these new efforts
is that they have emerged mostly as voluntary initiatives or in
the shadow of a litigation threat, rather than as systematic
strategies supported, guided, and required by law. That is, the
principle of legal orchestration has not sufficiently guided these
initiatives. Because they lack a systematic backup, these new
approaches have created wide variance across firms and controversy among employment law scholars as to the desirability
of this change.
Federal agencies have taken an initial, although partial,
step to orchestrate new governance antidiscrimination strategies. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
recently initiated efforts to create stakeholder networks, including advocacy groups, community organizations, and racial
and ethnic groups, to support the accumulation of knowledge
about new strategies to promote equality. 335 Although the
EEOC's purpose is to enforce antidiscrimination laws, it historically lacks power to promulgate rules or to sanction inde-

332. See generally Sturm, supra note 195, at 489-537 (providing examples
of businesses that have effectively addressed equality, turnover, and other
problems through internal workplace regimes).
333. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudenceof Education and Prevention in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1 (2001) (questioning the effectiveness of employee training programs and decrying the Supreme Court's use of such programs as the basis for
an affirmative employer defense to discrimination claims); Krawiec, supra
note 15, at 505.
334. See, e.g., Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between
Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. Bus. ETHICS 247, 253 (2001).
335. PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LITIGATION TASK FORCE REPORT app. c (1998), http:/!
www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task-reports/pch-lit.html (last modified Apr. 2, 1998).
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pendently. 3 36 Instead, its main activities include issuing guidelines and conducting investigations, impact litigation, and me337
It has more recently exdiation of individual violations.
panded its activities to include assisting with compliance,
gathering systematic information, providing technical assistance, and encouraging antidiscrimination public education and
outreach. 338 However, these initiatives have been limited. For
example, while the EEOC collects data on hiring and promotion
patterns from employers, the EEOC does not analyze the in33 9
The Commission continues to view
formation systematically.
enforcing, and sanctioning failmonitoring,
its primary role as
340
noncompliance.
or
ure

B. Civic ENVIRONMENTALISM
Environmental law has been at the forefront of new governance experiments. Challenges to the traditional regulatory
model have had some of their earliest influences in the field of
environmentalism. As Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler
describe, "the rise of environmental consciousness in the late
1960s coincided with the decline of an older dream-the image
of an independent and expert administrative agency creatively
341
regulating a complex social problem in the public interest."
Contemporary debates about domestic environmental regulation in developed countries are characterized by calls for regulatory reinvention and the rejection of the command and control approach. 342 These calls are motivated by both external
and internal push/pull factors for legal reform. A growing critique of top-down adversarial approaches to environmental protection has spawned innovative laws and practices. The need

336. Sturm, supra note 195, at 550.
337. Id.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NATIONAL
338. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN pt. II, http://www.eeoc.gov/about eeoc/plan/nep.html (last
modified Jan. 15, 1997).
339. Sturm, supra note 195, at 551.
340. Id.
341. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR
HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 1

(1981).
342. Kala K. Maluqueeny, Transnational Environmental Governance and
Large Scale Projects: Corporations, Economic Actors, and Financial Institutions 10-11 (2004) (unpublished colloquium abstract, Harvard University Doctor of Juridical Science Program) (on file with author).
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for governance has also been a response to the accumulation of
new scientific knowledge about the nature of the ecology.3 43 Increasingly, scholars advocate a new approach to environmental3
ism known as-civic environmentalism.
44
1.

Economy and Environment

The goals of stakeholders often conflict in the domain of
environmentalism. Nongovernmental organizations seek to
protect living and natural resources. Businesses, as well as labor unions, generally want to minimize limitations on their
economic interests. Governments address public ends, including distributional concerns among localities, the preservation of
the environment, and the promotion of sustainable economic
development. Despite significant divergence of interest, stakeholders have begun questioning the desirability of adversarial
regulatory processes, seeking instead more collaborative approaches to environmental law. Particularly in the face of complex environmental problems, controversies about the management of ecosystems have often amounted to impasses
among activists, corporations, and local and national governments. 345 These cases have resulted in an understanding that
all parties risk losing in an adversarial environment. In some
cases, stakeholders have begun to move away from win/lose
campaigns to engage in institutional governance arrangements
that can produce mutual gains to multiple interests.4 6 A governance approach to environmental law allows parties to es343.

DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 32-34 (1990).
344. DEWITT JOHN,
Civic
ENVIRONMENTALISM:
ALTERNATIVES
TO
REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 7-10 (1994); WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN,
THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 128-41 (2000) (describing the emerging concept of
civic environmentalism as a participatory process with community and regional planning, education, and sense of place); Debra S. Knopman et al., Civic
Environmentalism: Tackling Tough Land-Use Problems with Innovative Governance, 41 ENVIRONMENT 24, 26-28 (1999). For a critique of civic environmentalism, see Rena I. Steinzor, The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,909, 10,916-21 (2000) (finding fault with civic environmentalism's high costs and problematic implementation as compared to the
existing regulatory system).
345. See Brown, supra note 133, at 12.
346. See EDWARD P. WEBER, BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN: GRASSROOTS
ECOSYSTEM

MANAGEMENT,

ACCOUNTABILITY,

AND

SUSTAINABLE

COMMUNITIES (2003) (describing cases in which formerly conflicting parties
moved to more collaborative models, increasing the outcomes from the perspective of all different stakeholders); Brown, supra note 133, at 12-13.
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cape the traditional "economy versus environment" bind that
has so often characterized environmental regulatory conflicts.
Traditional environmental policy constitutes a staggering
number of disperse regulations, which, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "virtually swim before one's eyes." 34 7 Carol Rose
critically describes the difficulty of making sense of top-down
environmental law, stating that "[o]ur legislators churn out
great undigestible [sic] masses of statutes about the environment, which in turn are interpreted by mounds of regulations,
348
all densely packed with bizarre terms and opaque acronyms.
Yet, the nature of ecological resource management requires intergovernmental coordination and continuous experimentation,
learning, and adjustment. 349 The new governance approach of
civic environmentalism aims to be participatory, collaborative,
decentralized, and focused on problem solving. As such, policies
must be integrated to allow those closest to the problem to contemplate their effectiveness and reasonableness. Environmental law scholars suggest that policy should engender a
practice of environmentally responsible reflexive management. 350 In the words of one scholar, "[a] new generation of environmental policy.., must be based on integrative and reflexive laws rather than on the current system of command-andcontrol regulation."3 51 Under such a regime, public authorities
347. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038 (1980) (mem.)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
348. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1991).
349. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward Ecologically SustainableDemocracy?,
in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 219.
350. See, e.g., Orts, supra note 43; see also Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in Environmental
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 207, 210-12

(Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994) (advocating for a self-regulation approach
to environmental legal issues based on Gunther Teubner's model of reflexive
law).
351. Fiorino, supra note 31 (describing the reflexive law approach and its
role in environmental regulation); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive
Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999)
(arguing for use of a reflexive approach to govern the behavior of corporate organizations); Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generationof Environmental Policy:
Government-Business Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,891, 10,902 (2001); see also Neil Gunningham & Darren
Sinclair, IntegrativeRegulation: A Principle-BasedApproach to Environmental
Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853 (1999) (arguing that employing multiple
rather than single-policy instruments and including a broader range of regulatory actors will improve regulation).
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allow for cooperative implementation in which the government
relies upon agents or employees of the regulated entities to help
interpret, implement, and enforce applicable rules. 352 Government restricts its role to assisting in and providing incentives
for self-implementation programs, promoting a system of "interactive compliance." 353 Government further encourages private participation by the dissemination of information to the
public. For example, environmental information disclosure initiatives such as the federal Toxics Release Inventory program
require firms to report their environmental-related activities to
the Environmental Protection Agency, which then releases the
data in a yearly report for use by industries, consumers, and
nongovernmental stakeholders. 3 54 Disclosure requirements
have proven particularly viable in the area of environmental
law where nonprofit organizations have taken an active role as
ecological consultants, land managers, and coordinators of environmental policy implementation. 355
At the federal level, one of the earliest environmental laws,
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),356 embodies
elements of the new governance model. Designed mostly as a
procedural regime, NEPA requires federal agencies to disclose
statements on environmental impact before taking action that
will affect the environment. 357 NEPA effectively requires federal agencies to adopt internal procedures to evaluate the environmental consequences of their decisions and activities. The
statute applies, however, only to government agencies. 358 Environmental law scholars have consequently described it as a "reflexive administrative law" regime. 359 More recent approaches
352.

Michael, supra note 17, at 540-41.

353.

See

generally

CORPORATE

LAWBREAKING

AND

INTERACTIVE

COMPLIANCE, supra note 18 (offering several essays exploring cooperative approaches to interactive corporate compliance based upon the ideas presented
at an April 21, 1990 conference at New York University's Leonard Stern
School of Business).
354. See Fiorino, supra note 31, at 448.
355. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizationsand
the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
692 (1999) (discussing the increasing reliance on nonprofit organizations in
the environmental field).
356. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970).
357. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2000).
358. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 101-102, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4331-4332 (2000).
359. Orts, supra note 43, at 1273.
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to private sector environmental policies are similarly requiring
industries to be reflexive about their practices. The following
section illustrates a comprehensive effort for governance in the
context of habitat conservation.
2.

Endangered Species and Habitat Conservation Planning

An instructive example of the shift from a regulatory to a
governance approach in the field of environmental law is the
development of habitat conservation planning under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).360 In the past, ecologists believed
that nature had an ideal state of equilibrium and that species
related to one another in a direct, linear way. 36 1 Over the past
several decades, modern ecology has come to view nature not as
static, harmonious, and balanced, but rather as a complex web
of connected species with no fixed point of equilibrium. 362 Relying on the former idea of a predictable equilibrium, regulatory
conservation regimes sought to limit direct threats to individual species by permanent top-down regulations. 363 Exemplifying this regulatory approach, the ESA prohibits public and private action that contributes to the extinction of endangered
species. Section 9 of the Act prohibits any person or organization from taking fish or wildlife species listed as endangered by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 364 "Taking" is defined
broadly to include basically any harm to the essential behavioral patterns of wildlife. 365 Until the early-1980s, the ESA established a prohibitive regulatory regime, imposing a nearabsolute ban on land development in areas of wildlife conservation. 36 6 This rigid regime was deemed insensible, not merely by
360. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). See
generally Symposium, The Endangered Species Act Turns 30, 34 ENV. L. 287
(2004) (examining the history and significance of the ESA on its thirtieth anniversary).
361. See, e.g., Wiersema, supra note 43, at 1.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); Paul Boudreaux, Understanding"Take"
in the EndangeredSpecies Act, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 733, 744-48 (2002) (discussing
whether § 9 requires intent or knowledge to take a protected species); see also
Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Take Prohibitionin Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and Conservation of
Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363 (2004) (arguing that § 9 covers injuries to both individual species members and the population of which there are a part).
365. See Cheever & Balster, supra note 364, at 365 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(2004))
366. Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning, in DEEPENING
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businesses, which were prohibited from developing conservationist areas, but also by activists and scientists, who recognized the uncompromising nature of the process. 3 67 The ESA
regime is based on a formal process of listing species as endangered. Its rigidity-an on-off listing-has led to strategic behavior by all interested parties. Ecologists and policymakers questioned the absolute prohibition by the ESA, rather than the
development of more sensible and comprehensive plans to preserve natural habitats. 368 Responding from below to these rigidities, as well as to the new accumulation of scientific knowledge about the ecology, private parties began to come together
to plan more flexible conservation projects. As a result of local
negotiation efforts between environmentalists and developers,
government was presented with consensus agreements that included some taking of habitat in return for guarantees of sufficient open space for long-term species survival. 369
In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to authorize permits
that would allow such takings and encourage more multiparty
planning. 370 The new law encourages an alternative path of
governance by granting permits to nonfederal actors who submit satisfactory Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). 371 It now
allows the taking of endangered species for economic purposes
through this new planning process, if "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 372
The new governance alternative has reframed the debate about

DEMOCRACY:

INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED

PARTICIPATORY

GOVERNANCE, supra note 349, at 144, 146. See generally STEVEN L. YAFFEE,
PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

(1982) (studying the effects of prohibitive policy through an examination of the
formation and implementation of the 1973 ESA).

367.

See Thomas, supra note 366, at 146.

368.

See id.

369. See id. at 146-47 (discussing a compromise reached in the late 1970s
between a landowner, a developer, and ecologists to preserve a butterfly habitat near San Francisco while still allowing some development to occur).
370. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6,
96 Stat. 1411, 1422-1425.
371. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000); see also Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the
Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 376 (1996) (noting that a "permit may be issued only after an HCP is submitted by the applicant and approved by the
[United States Fish and Wildlife Service]").
372. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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species protection from "species versus jobs" to "species and
373
jobs."
The habitat conservation planning process incorporates the
principles of collaboration, diversity, learning, and integration.
A submitted HCP must provide detailed information about the
likely results of proposed activities, the measures that will be
taken to monitor and mitigate adverse impacts, the funding
plan, and alternative actions that were considered.3 7 4 The design of the plan is left to the applicant's discretion, allowing
applicants to be creative and to tailor solutions to local problems.3 7 5 Although the final approval of the plan must be done
by the federal Agency, responsibility for subsequent supervision and coordination of the various interests in the plan can be
delegated to a private intermediary, such as a nonprofit land
conservation environmental organization. 376 Bradley Karkkainen explains:
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) allow landowners to escape the
rigidities of a notoriously inflexible command-style rule, the "no take"
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by drawing up conservation-oriented land-use plans fitted to their own particularized
circumstances. The HCP planning process thus establishes a new locus for policy-making within a regulatory program heretofore defined
almost exclusively by centrally imposed, nationally uniform, categori377
cal rules.

During the 1980s, the use of the optional HCPs was low.
Only during the 1990s, as a result of knowledge diffusion and
the issuance of new federal guidelines, did the number of HCPs
grow rapidly. 373 By 2002, almost 400 HCPs had been ap379
proved.
The habitat conservation planning process generates dependency among actors. 38 0 Applicants need certainty to avoid
future lawsuits. 38 1 Therefore, advocates of habitat conservation
373. Thomas, supra note 366, at 147.
374. Id. at 147-49.
375. Id. at 148.
376. See Breckenridge, supra note 355, at 697-98 (noting the "extensive
interaction of federal, state, and local governments with the Nature Conservancy in the development of habitat conservation plans under the Endangered
Species Act has exemplified the increasingly communicative and collaborative
relationship between government agencies and nonprofit organizations").
377. Karkkainen, supra note 349, at 208-09.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 161.
381. Id.
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planning have argued that the process increases the willingness of stakeholders to share information and resources. 3 2 It
also requires applicants to consider a broader range of issues
beyond endangered species, including "physical infrastructure,
pollution, open space, development patterns, and transporta38 3
tion."
One of the weaknesses of the ESA regulations is that they
do not require coordination among various applicants and between different habitat areas.3 8 4 A broad study of fifty-five
HCPs reveals that the participation process leading to the
plans varies widely, ranging from active and inclusive processes to narrow, closed-door planning. 38 5 Some applicants have
voluntarily chosen to coordinate their plans; in other cases local
governments and developers were unable to find common
ground for a single coordinated plan. 38 6 These variations have
influenced the degree of deliberation and adaptability of the
plans. 38 7 Unlike plans focusing on narrow issues and narrow
geographic areas, large-scale, multipartner HCPs have proven
more aligned with a collaborative and sustainable governance
vision. 38 8 Scholars therefore distinguish between two types of
HCPs-bilateral plans and multiparty adaptive management
plans.38 9 The first type, bilateral planning, allows some regulatory flexibility but does not involve broad participatory or collaborative engagement. 90 The focus of such plans is typically

382.

Id.

383. Id. at 164.
384. See id. at 157 (noting that neither the ESA nor the Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations require coordinated action).
385. JEREMY ANDERSON & STEVEN YAFFEE, BALANCING PUBLIC TRUST AND
PRIVATE INTEREST: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION

PLANNING 0 (1998).
386. See Thomas, supra note 366, at 157-58 (comparing the Coachella Valley broad planning to other less participatory cases, such as in the case of the
seventy HCPs of Travis County, Texas). See generally ANDERSON & YAFFEE,
supra note 385, at 9-11 (discussing varied approaches to HCP negotiations
involving primary parties and outside stakeholders).
387. Thomas, supra note 366, at 159 ("Adaptive management (with monitoring) can also enhance HCPs as schools of democracy by extending deliberation beyond the planning phase in implementation."); see also ANDERSON &
YAFFEE, supra note 385, at 13-16.
388. See Thomas, supra note 366, at 166-67 ("We should focus on multipartner HCPs... so that they better approximate experiments in empowered
participatory governance.").
389. Karkkainen, supra note 349, at 210-12.
390. Id. at 210-11.
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narrow in both scope and geographic scale. 391 By contrast, multiparty adaptive management plans, a more recent model for
HCPs, are larger in scale and scope and employ advanced
strategies of monitoring management and governance. 392 They
involve participation by multiple public and private parties, including landowners, agencies, conservationists, scientists, and
interested citizens. 393 Not surprisingly, however, multipartner
plans are more time consuming and demand both expertise and
complexity. They therefore demonstrate how sustainable governance demands ongoing support and orchestration by government.
In 2000, revised federal guidelines for habitat conservation
planning were issued, encouraging adaptive, iterative planning
akin to multiparty planning. 394 The revised guidelines encourage the adoption of an "adaptive management strategy" in
cases of information gaps. 395 Planners are advised to identify
uncertainty and unresolved questions. 396 The new guidelines
also promote the description of alternative implementation
strategies and proposed monitoring processes to evaluate implementation. 397 These new guidelines are part of an effort to
make habitat conservation planning a sustainable governance
alternative to the regulatory option. The Fish and Wildlife Service has recently created an online system, the Environmental
Conservation Online System (ECOS), which summarizes habitat conservation planning data. 398 Innovations like ECOS recognize that centralized access to documents is needed to enhance sustainability, transparency, and accountability. 399 To
fully realize the governance potential of these new planning
processes, there is a need for more monitoring and coordina-

391. Id. at 211.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 211-12.
394. Thomas, supra note 366, at 155 (citing Notice of Availability of a Final
Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental
Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,241 (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter Notice of Availability]). Although these federal guidelines lack the authority of
formal regulation, they guide both the agency and applicants in the planning
and approval processes.
395. Notice of Availability, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35,252.
396. Thomas, supra note 366, at 153-56.
397. Id. at 155.
398. Id. at 167.
399. See id.
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tion, information pooling and sharing, increased funding, and
participation of diverse citizens. 400
C. E-GOVERNANCE AND CYBERDEMOCRACY
The move from a New Deal command-and-control model to
a Renew Deal governance model can be captured by journalist
Thomas Friedman's metaphor of a shift from walls to webs in
our new global world. 40 1 No other environment is more reflective of the web structure than the World Wide Web. New technology holds the promise of facilitating new processes of governance in various fields. At the same time, it changes the
landscape upon which law operates. Several levels of governance are exemplified through the environment of cyberspace.
First, at the individual citizen level, the Internet enables citizens to become active users of information, proliferating the
process of cultural production. Second, at the subsystem level,
the Internet provides an experimental environment for selfgovernance, establishing participatory nongovernmental standard-setting institutions. Third, at the metasystem level, the
Internet supports the shift from the regulatory to the governance model through the expansion of processes such as eregulation and innovative venues for political and legal activities.
1. Active Citizenship: From Consumers to Users
Emerging in its basic structure in the mid-nineteenth century, predigital mass media was unidirectional. 402 In this information environment, generally including the printed press,
radio, and television, consumers were conceptualized as passive
recipients of information. The technological environment of
mass media was characterized by bottlenecks and gatekeepers,
with a few licensed corporations controlling most of the provision of information. 40 3 The role of law was to regulate the ac-

400. See id.
401. THOMAS
FRIEDMAN,
THE
LEXUS
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 39-58 (1999).

AND

THE

OLIVE

TREE:

402. Balkin, supra note 39, at 10 (stating that mass media in general are
"asymmetrical and unidirectional"); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 563-64 (2000).
403. Balkin, supra note 39, at 10.
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tivities of media providers to40 4ensure that they would better
serve their passive customers.
By contrast, the introduction of cyberspace allows people to
reach audiences outside traditional mass media channels.
Rather than the industrial model of protection of a prepackaged culture for consumption, the Internet has the potential to promote a model of peer-production and nonproprietary
collaboration. 405 The digital revolution has loosened the traditional constraint of bandwidth, as well as constraints on repro40 6 Because information, by
duction and the use of information.
its very nature, is a nonexclusive good, digital technology enables people to use materials produced by mass media in ways
that add, reproduce, and redistribute them.

40 7

The Internet

makes it possible for more individuals to participate in the
design, and transformation of information environcreation,
40 8
ments.
In this new environment, Internet scholars advocate a
category of Internet "users," rejecting the dichotomous world
composed of a small number of professional producers and a
40 9 Users are both consumlarge number of passive consumers.
ers and producers, who receive information and rework it for
further distribution. Users, in effect, active and empowered
in a continuous
citizens, are part of a dialogic conversation
4 10
process of cultural democratic production.
Given the technological innovations of Internet infrastructure, the potential of a shift to a governance approach in the
field of information technology law is high. Governance principles of participation, collaboration, active citizenship, proliferated production, dynamic learning, and adaptability are all potentially supported by the development of cybertechnology.
However, the struggle among the regulatory, market, and gov404. Benkler, supra note 402, at 562.
405. Id.; Balkin, supra note 39, at 22; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 381-400
(2003); David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of
Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004) (arguing that "peer production of governance" is the most effective form of governance to increase online
social order); Katyal, supra note 160, at 1041-42.
406. See Balkin, supra note 39, at 20.
407. See id. at 10-12. Balkin refers to these two new strategies as "routing
around" and "glomming on." Id. at 10-11.
408. See Benkler, supra note 402, at 563.
409. See id. at 562.
410. Balkin, supra note 39, at 3-4.
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ernance models persists. It is often in the interest of businesses
to limit the robust participation that the Internet enables.411
Commercial interests are struggling to enforce limited access
and distribution rights in this new environment. For example,
participatory production in a digital environment is curtailed
when courts ban users from utilizing media materials for political commentary on the Web. A recent example is the case of the
Free Republic Web site, a forum for posting newspaper stories
with a comment. In Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, the Los
Angeles Times, together with the Washington Post, won their
argument that this practice was a violation of their copyrights.
The decision reduced the ability of small nonprofit communities
to administer weblogs that build on traditional mass media reporting as a platform for commentary. 4 12
Moreover, the competition over control and influence in cyberspace is not limited to legal strategies. In addition to questions of intellectual property laws and media licensing, a governance vision for cyberspace illuminates the significance of
spatial design, both in hardware and software, in guiding behavior. On the one hand, technology is being applied to create
devices that limit control, access, use, and participation. On the
other hand, commentators see potential for designing the
physical infrastructure, logical infrastructure, and content layers in ways that are decentralized and prevent the concentration of the digital environment in the hands of few.413
Cyberspace also provides a vivid example of the interpenetration between public and private arenas and actors. Jack
Balkin asks, "Is the Internet a private space or a public
space?"414 Most digital communications networks are privately

held by large corporations.415 From the perspective of these
media owners, "the 'publicness' of digital communications networks is merely a side effect of the use of private property by
private actors."4 16 From another perspective, cyberspace is public because it is a space for general interaction, exchange of information, and public participation.417 In essence, the very
value of the Internet is a function of its general public use.
411. Id. at 15.
412. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
413. Benkler, supra note 402, at 568.
414. Balkin, supra note 39, at 23.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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Rather than recognizing the public nature and significance of
the Internet as a space for participation and democratic engagement, courts are accepting business interests in controlling
the Internet, namely, that the right to speak is a right to be
free from regulation. 418 Through such control, democratic governance is curtailed, since consolidation risks reducing the
quality of public discourse and skews positions and information
in the drive to higher ratings. 4 19 Cass Sunstein, in his book Republic.com, warns against the antidemocratic potential of cyberspace. 420 Sunstein worries that we are moving toward perfect filtering, which will allow individuals to see and read only
the "Daily Me," a narrow collection of voices with which they
already associate and agree. 421 This process will result in precisely the opposite of a democratic, deliberative new space. The
Internet will become an antipublic forum. It will become a segmented, balkanized communications environment, leading to
radical group polarization.
A traditional regulatory response to these worries has been
policies such as the restriction of media concentration through
antitrust laws, imposition of a public interest obligation requiring that programming cover public issues, and the regulation of
422
Balkin argues that, in addimore access to diverse groups.

tion to the traditional recognition of rights and rules, the new
system of democratic participation in the age of the Internet
must be based on technological designs that facilitate decen423 Judicial creation
tralized control and popular participation.
and protection of individual rights alone are not suited for the
new challenges of the Internet. Rather, the focus must shift to
technological designs and standards:
Laws affect how technology is designed, the degree of legal protection
that a certain technology will enjoy, and whether still other technologies that modify or route around existing technological forms of distribution and control will be limited or forbidden. But increasingly,
and administrathese sorts of decisions will be made by legislatures
42 4
tive agencies in consultation with private parties.

Balkin advocates "a robust and ever expanding public domain with generous fair use rights," so that intellectual prop418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 30.
CASs R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 65--69 (2001).
Id. at 44.
Balkin, supra note 39, at 30-31.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 63.

MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW

[89:342

erty laws will not inhibit the spread of culture and knowl25
edge.4

Scholars imagine the virtual space of the Internet as

the frontier of deliberative democracy.426

2. The Subsystem Level and Self-Governance: Internal
Internet Standard Setting
At the level of the Internet as a social subsystem, governance can be described as a predominantly self-regulating system. There have even been famous declarations of the Internet
as a "government-free zone."427 The 1996 Declaration of the In-

dependence of Cyberspace urged "governments of the industrial
world ...you of the past ... [to] leave us alone." 428 However,
the idea of a government-free zone is neither feasible nor desirable. The question is not whether to intervene, but rather how
and what regulatory approach to employ in this new space. 429
The Internet itself was created through governmental efforts,
primarily of the U.S. Department of Defense. Yet as the Internet expanded and became pervasively commercial in the mid1990s, government transferred much of the standard-setting
responsibilities within the cybersystem to nongovernmental institutions.
Most Internet standards processes take place in nongovernmental transnational settings.43o Rulemaking processes are
thus decentered from the formal state level and take place under new conditions. The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) that sets the basic technical standards that define
Internet functions has been identified in legal scholarship as an
example of a deliberative and cooperative rulemaking environment.4 31 IETF, an unincorporated association with constantly
changing members, operates to set standards through negotiations open to all.4 32 Michael Froomkin describes the IETF
425.
426.

Id. at 53.
Gunther Teubner, Lecture at Yale Law School, Coincidentia Opposito-

rum: Networks and the Law Beyond Contract and Organization (Oct. 8, 2003)
(unpublished transcript on file with author).
427. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://www.eff.org/
-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
428. Id.
429.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 420, at 128.

430. A. Michael Froomkin, HABERMAS@DISCOURSE.NET. Toward a
Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 752 (2003).
431. Id.
432. Id. at 755.
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model as a realization of the Habermasian vision of "a reenergized, activist, engaged citizenry working together to create
new small-scale communicative associative institutions that
over time either merge into larger ones or at least join
forces."

433

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and

Numbers (ICANN) is similarly an institution that was envisioned in its conception to exemplify democratic governance.
However, ICANN's success in fulfilling a governance vision is
far more controversial. Indeed, it has been characterized by
some commentators as "an institution besieged" and "utterly
from bias, through selfdisastrous," and "accused of everything
4 34
conspiracy."
out-and-out
to
service,
ICANN was established in 1998 as a nonprofit corporation
charged with setting policy for Internet domain names and addresses. In effect, it was the result of the U.S. government's deissues.4 35
cision to privatize its de facto control over those
ICANN is a transnational and transgovernmental institution,
436 Alwith constituents from multiple places and interests.
though based in California, it is not tied to any particular jurisdiction. It functions as a regulator, executive agency, and adjudicator, with the organizational structure of a corporate
entity. 437 ICANN undertakes extensive regulatory functions,
standard setting, and the development of dispute resolution
mechanisms for conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders. 438 ICANN has also created the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), a private adjudication
4 39
mechanism for trademark and domain name disputes.
Some scholars view ICANN as a way to bypass administrative law, namely the requirement for notice and comment in
rulemaking and judicial review, pursuant to the Administrative
4 40 Yet, ICANN has adopted many administraProcedures Act.

433. Id. at 753.
434. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1153-54.
435. Id. at 1154-55; Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998).
436. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1152; see also Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN
and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 246 (2000).
Bylaws
437. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
www.icann.org/generalfbylaws.htm.
(Apr. 19, 2004), at http://
438. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1152.
439. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.
htm (last modified Aug. 26, 2001).
To
440. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN
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tive features, such as notice and comment and external review
processes. 4 41 The institution is relatively transparent, with its
every decision and practice published online. 442 Its decisionmaking processes are primarily consensus based.443 ICANN has
also adopted processes familiar in representative legislatures,
particularly in the appointment of its board of directors.
Shortly after its establishment as a private, nonprofit organization, pressures mounted to conduct popular democratic elections for its board of directors, drawing on the constituency of
444
the Internet as a whole.

ICANN held elections for several

board seats, yet participation in the elections by the Internet

community proved surprisingly low. 44 5 Dan Hunter argues that

the vast criticism ICANN receives stems precisely from its nature as a quasi-governmental, quasi-corporate, quasi-nonprofit
organization.44 6 Yet, the ICANN model provides an initial example of the possibilities of participation in governance by nongovernmental standard-setting institutions in a globalizing
technological infrastructure.
3. E-Government, E-Rulemaking, and E-Activism
At the metasystem level, the new digital environment is
increasingly serving government and society in the development of innovative legal and political processes. Regulatory
agencies are increasingly harnessing the power of digital technologies to meet the informational demands of rulemaking and
to expand public involvement in policymaking.447 Similarly,
nongovernmental organizations are using the Internet to expand their activities and agendas.
The E-Government Act of 2002448 is part of a series of ef-

forts to improve the federal government's online visibility,
transparency, and accessibility, and to create a federal governRoute Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J 17, 29 (2000).
441. Weinberg, supra note 436, at 228.
442. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1155.
443. Id. at 1153.
444. Id. at 1156.
445. Id. at 1178-79.
446. Id. at 1159.
447.

JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING: A

RESEARCH AGENDA (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working
Paper No. RPP-2002-04, 2002); Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information
Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 354 (2004).
448. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116. Stat. 2899 (codified as amended primarily in
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.A. and 5 U.S.C.A.).
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ment that is more "citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based." 449 The Act reflects the Renew Deal spirit of simultaneously improving effectiveness and legitimacy through governance. It seeks to "enhance the management and promotion
of electronic Government services and processes," and at the
4 50
same time to enhance citizen participation in policymaking.
Federal agencies are required to use the Internet to centralize
information and increase the number of public records that are
accessible online. The Act establishes a new Office of Electronic
Government within the Office of Management and Budget. The
of
Act also requires all federal agencies to consider the impact
451
Internet.
the
to
access
without
e-government on persons
Both federal and state agencies are constructing Web sites
with rulemaking documents, which allow citizens to submit

452
For example, the
electronic comments on proposed rules.

EPA has adopted a system that makes available online full access to all studies, comments, and records of the Agency's rulemaking processes. 45 3 Such initiatives not only reduce the costs
of storage of information, but also allow agencies to better coor454 Coordinating
dinate their staff and interact with citizens.
these efforts, the Bush administration introduced a single point
of access to the federal government online-the FirstGov.gov
Web site. FirstGov.gov allows users to access the Web site of
any federal agency or government program. In 2003, it also
launched a search-and-comment Web portal that is particularly
designed for the electronic filing of public comments on pro-

449. Presidential Memorandum from George W. Bush, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (July 10, 2002), http:I! www.whitehouse.
see Jaime Klima, The Egov/news/releases/2002/07/20020710-6.html;
Government Act: Promoting E-Quality or Exaggerating the Digital Divide?,
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (Apr. 15, 2003), at http://www.law.duke.

edujournals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0009.html.
450. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3601(3)(A) (2004).
451. E-Government Act, § 202, 116 Stat. 2899, 2911 (200).
452. Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and
Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
1421, 1422 (2002).
453.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RULES AND PROPOSED

REGULATIONS, available at http://www.epa.gov/rules.html#proposed (last updated June 8, 2004).
454. Creating a similar online docket, the Department of Transportation
has reported saving over one million dollars per year in storage costs because
of its online system. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 376.
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posed rules, improving the administrative process of notice,
comment, and final rule. 455
E-rulemaking recognizes that the development and implementation of rules is an interdisciplinary effort that requires
the cooperation of various stakeholders.456 The information intensity and complexity required for rulemaking can be facilitated by the use of information technology. 457 Within government, the embrace of the digital environment can increase
cooperation among different offices within a regulatory agency,
as well as among agencies. It can also help overcome problems
of poor data and regulatory incoherence by engaging broader
sectors of the market and civil society. 458 The new portals for
notice and comment help make the public comment process
more interactive and deliberative.459 This improves government
decision making by allowing government to better reach their
policy goals, and increases public participation and democratic
legitimacy. Successfully harnessing new technologies to promote the Renew Deal vision allows government to reduce administrative costs while increasing compliance. At the same
time, the democratic process is potentially improved. Moving
forward, a governance approach suggests that digital technology can further be used to create deliberative forums. Government agencies could create panels of citizens, like traditional
juries, that would advise about rulemaking.460
Similarly, private industry and nongovernmental organizations use the Internet to expand their public activities and
agendas and to more deliberately engage in governance. The
Internet has lowered the threshold for groups to act collectively, triggering the emergence of new kinds of normgenerating institutions.461 In the context of workers' rights for
455. Id. at 355; see FirstGov.gov: The U.S. Government's Official Web Por-

tal, at http://www.firstgov.gov (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
456. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 373.
457. Id. at 356.

458. Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and

Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1234 (2002).
459. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 373; see also Stephen M. Johnson, The
Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participationand Access
to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 27879 (1998).
460.

CARY COGLIANESE, THE INTERNET AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN

RULEMAKING 8 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No.
RWP03-022, 2003).
461. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 2 (1993).
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example, workers are better able to communicate, to
strengthen local leadership, and to provide services such as
benefit portability by using the Internet. 462 The Internet reduces the cost of organizing and providing information, advice,
and services to members. Unions are gradually making fuller
use of the technological capacities to improve communication
and to recruit new members or to establish virtual worker
communities that challenge the traditional National Labor Relations Act model. 463 IBM is an example of a company that resisted traditional unionization under the New Deal framework.
Today, however, an employee Web site-Alliance@IBM-has
been established to provide information about IBM's employment policies and worker relations. 464 Another example of a virtual union is that of the National Writers Union. 465 Again, most
of its members operate without the possibility of traditional collective bargaining. However, the virtual union provides job
postings, information, and advice to members, and has established a lobbying arm that recently participated in a U.S. Supreme Court case on freelance worker copyrights. Similarly, in
other areas of social activism, "dot causes" are a growing form
the
of social organization that rely-partially or completely-on
466
Internet to make their existence and activism possible.
Employment, environment, and information technology
law have been leading domains in the shift from regulation to
governance. They provide us insights to the promises, as well
462. National Bureau of Economic Research Economist Richard Freeman
argues that although the impact of the Internet on union organizing is still to
be realized, the potential is "revolutionary." See W.J. Diamond & R. B. Freeman, Will Unionism Prosper in Cyberspace? The Promise of the Internet for
Employee Organization,40 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 569, 577-88 (2002) (detailing the ways in which unions' use of the Internet will improve and expand labor organizations).
463. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Unions on the Net, THE NATION,
June 24, 2002, at 22.
464. Alliance@IBM: Communications Workers of America, at http:/www.
allianceibm.org (last updated Sept. 30, 2004).
465. National Writers Union, at http://www.nwu.org (last visited Sept. 16,
2004).
466. See John Clark & Nuno Themudo, The Age of Protest: Internet-Based
'Dot Causes' and the Anti-globalization' Movement, in GLOBALIZING CML
ENGAGEMENT 109, 109-11 (John D. Clark ed., 2003) (describing the emergence
of dot causes in recent years). The Internet-based OneWorld network is an example of a dot caus'3 that is dedicated to free information access-it thus operates both at the subsystem and metasystem of transforming social organization through governance. See OneWorld Network, at http://www.oneworld.net
(last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
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as the difficulties, of implementing new governance regimes.
469
Other fields, including health care, 46 7 education, 468 policing,
housing,470 and prison management 471 have begun to experience similar developments.
V. GOVERNANCE AS THEORETICAL HYBRIDIZATION
A. THE THIRD WAY PROMISE
The governance model fosters a mixed ecology. A central
strength of the Renew Deal is that it explicitly and ingeniously
embraces theoretical hybridization, drawing together elements
from rival schools of thought. In its spirit and style, the Renew
Deal is integrative, accommodating, and optimistic. It advocates the proliferation of methods and structures and the
pragmatic acceptance of each. By offering a big tent, it can respond to demands for flexible accommodation in the new economy and varied local conditions, as well as to the ongoing need
for public action. Hybridization enables contemporary legal
thought to live with paradox. For example, the obsessive maintenance of traditional boundaries-including those of public
and private, profit and nonprofit, formal and informal, theory
and practice, secular and religious, left and right-is no longer
a major concern with the shift to the Renew Deal paradigm. 472
On the contrary, the governance model aims to move beyond
these pervasive dichotomies in search of sustainable structures.
Its objective is not to police boundaries, but rather to seek out
and open structures that will facilitate wider imaginative horizons. Furthermore, the model is comfortable making links
among the local, regional, national, and global levels, as multiple overlapping authorities. As will be argued in the succeeding
section, the model accepts a rich definition of democracy, com-

467. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition,29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395 (2003).
468. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 19, at 184.
469. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered
Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & Soc'v 73, 75 (2001);
Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999).
470. Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1047-53.
471. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 807 (1990).
472. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 22; Lobel, supra note 38; Minow, supra
note 78.

20041

THE RENEW DEAL

bining direct, representative, associative, participatory, and deliberative aspects.
The governance model should thus be understood as an attempt to envision a third way between state-based, top-down
regulation and a single-minded reliance on market-based
norms; between centralized command-and-control regulation
and individual free contract. It aims to transcend the conceptual dichotomies of regulation and deregulation; of legal directive and spontaneous market behavior. 4 73 Inventing flexible,
responsive administrative practices may be the only alternative
to big, blunt bureaucracies on the one hand, and private mar474
ket mechanisms on the other.
A key promise of the Renew Deal is its explicit suggestion
that economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can, under
certain conditions, point in the same direction. Governance
principles can increase both efficacy and accountability,
thereby restoring the legitimacy of the legal regime. Governance is efficient because it encompasses multiple arenas and
mechanisms by which to learn, adapt, and improve. It is democratic because it encourages the participation of more citizens and attention to more interests in legal processes. Moreover, the Renew Deal vision reconciles the ongoing tension
between the fear of big government and the need for a public
response to social challenges. 475 Coordinated decentralization
addresses the expectation of Americans that government policy
will reflect their moral values and sense of fairness, but "efficiently, leaving the greatest possible amount of control in the
'4 76
hands of those closest to the problems.

473. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 3-18; Edward L. Rubin, Law
and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 521, 563-65.
474. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2026
(1997). A similar third way reasoning is expressed in the reflexive law literature: "[Rieflexive law represents a legal form especially suited to combine
three advantages: (i) nonintrusive, postregulatory regulation, (ii) a renewed
formal structure preserving the integrity of the legal medium, and (iii) the
normatively desirable combination of freedom and regulation." Andrew Arato,
Reflexive Law, Civil Society and Negative Rights, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 785, 786
(1986).
475. See, e.g., OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 152; A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 271-73 (1998).
476. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 152.
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B. REGULATORY AND MARKET FAILURES ABOUND
As a third way vision, the governance paradigm comes at a
moment when there are rich understandings in the legal world
about the failure of both government regulation and market
nonregulation.4 7 7 The pathologies and chronic problems of both
the public and private sectors are well studied.
Regulatory failures have been at the center of legal study
for several decades. Regulation has been described as having
become "the Stalingrad of domestic political warfare. 4 78 Regulatory deficiencies are understood to include rigidity, monetary
waste, a tendency to uniformity, and the suppression of innovation.47 9 Peter Schuck describes the symptoms of regulatory pathology as "stifled competition, gross inefficiency, hostility to
public participation in agency processes, frustration of innovation, administrative chaos and delay, secrecy, absence of longrange planning, and indifference to competing social objectives."48 0 At the conception stage, regulation is often based on
poor information and policy analyses that oversimplify the issue. 48 1 At the implementation and enforcement stages, interest
group resistance and bureaucratic limits can defeat the goals of
the regulatory efforts. 48 2 Government agencies often lack the
resources to monitor implementation, let alone adequately determine cause and effect. They are also susceptible to rent seeking and capture, where powerful interest groups control and

477. The idea of nonregulation is itself highly problematic because of the
many ways initial private law entitlements and system background rules (e.g.,
property rights, contracts, family, and work) construct interactions within the
market. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1520-22.
478. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 117.
479. See generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549
(1979) (detailing the framework for the anlaysis of economic regulation); Paul
Stephen Dempsey, Market Failureand Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1989) (assessing the costs and benefits of
regulation and dregulation while tracing the history of regulation); Christen
Carlson White, Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of
Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 105 (1996) (analyzing the
San Francisco Regional Water Control Board and its regulatory mission and
enforcement).
480. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 119.
481. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEMNG
THE REGULATORY STATE 84-91 (1990).

482.

Id.
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483
Examples of
disproportionately affect regulatory decisions.
hard to
been
not
have
agencies
government
misbehavior of

trace, ranging from failures of the Food and Drug Administra-

tion to nuclear power control. 484 In the absence of an encompassing governance approach, regulation further risks regressive taxation when the costs of regulation are passed on to
48 5
consumers.

Conversely, market failures include distributional inequities, unincorporated externalities, collective action failures and
free rider problems, information asymmetries, cognitive biases,
and scale inefficiencies. 48 6 Certain markets, for example those
with scarce resources, natural monopolies, or commons (and
"anticommons"), are particularly vulnerable to failure. 48 7 Markets also frequently lack adequate spaces for the public ex48 8
change of ideas.
Some evaluations of regulatory and market failures rely on
factual distinctions between the capacities of market and public
action. In such cases, the choice of public or private action is
empirical and instrumental. Given a certain shared goal, such
as the reduction of industrial pollution, the question is which
institutional arrangement will best achieve the desired results.
Other concerns are based on normative evaluations of the differences between various spheres-political, economic, and
civic life. In such contexts, there may be an intrinsic value to
privatizing, or publicizing, a social function, regardless of which

483.

See, e.g., William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory

Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1861, 1885-92 1941-42 (1995) (addressing capture and rent seeking in
the context of corporate governance).
484. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 119.
485. Id. at 122.
486. See, e.g., ACQUIRING SKILLS: MARKET FAILURES, THEIR SYMPTOMS
AND POLICY RESPONSES (Alison A. Booth & Dennis J. Snower eds., 1996);
Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failuresand the Evolution of State
Regulation of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172-83 (2002).
487. See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION 202-23, 257-83 (1999) (detailing concerns related to the control
of monopolies, the balance between regulation and the fostering of competition, and franchising); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Propertyin the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998)
(developing a theory of "anticommons" property to explain economic failure in
the context of the Soviet shift from socialism to a market economy).
488. See generally MINOW, supra note 22 (arguing that emerging relationships between government and private entities calls for new approaches and a
renewed commitment to public values).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:342

forum is better situated instrumentally to achieve certain
goals.
C. RECONSTRUCTION
The accumulation of insights about regulatory and market
failure reveals the importance of moving beyond existing patterns of lawmaking. In both its experimental construction of
new institutions and in its theoretical linkages, the Renew Deal
is a reconciliatory and reconstructive project, synthesizing the
fundamental lessons of opposing intellectual camps. Just as the
governance model is generated through the interaction between
internal and external forces for change in the legal field, the
model brings together competing theoretical and practical lessons. In this synthesis, the Renew Deal vision again recalls the
Legal Process school of the 1950s, which was reactive in different ways to the emergence of the New Deal paradigm. 4s9 Edward Rubin has described the 1950s legal process scholarship,
as "[t]he last unified approach to legal scholarship. 490 Gary
Peller similarly describes the Legal Process school as "the last
great attempt at a grand synthesis of law in all its institutional
manifestations.4 91 Legal process emerged as a school of
thought at a moment when there was a critical need to explain
the new realities of the growing regulatory administrative state
and to find sources of legitimacy for a new centralized legal
framework. But soon after its birth, ideological polarization developed within legal academia. 492 Two newer schools, critical
legal studies from the Left and law and economics from the
Right, proved especially discordant, which left little room for
unifying moves in the last several decades. 493 However, the new
governance school emerges at a period in which opposing
schools of thought have challenged not only the assumptions
and imperfections of its rivals but also its own premises. In
both practice and theory, the Renew Deal paradigm enables the
489. See generally Erwin N. Griswold, Preface to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS viii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting the effect of the New Deal on the Legal Process
school).
490. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1393.
491. Gary Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561, 568 (1988).
492. Some scholars argue that the break actually coincided with the emergence of the Legal Process school. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 489, at c-cxxv.
493. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1393-94.
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resurgence of broad structural thinking, combining critiques of
conventional legal strategies, as well as the limits of critical insights. 494 In legal practice, breakdowns can be traced through
changes in the professional approaches to "cause" lawyering.
Legal practice has moved from a focus on the administrative
state in the Progressive Era, to court-oriented civil rights litigation in the 1960s and 1970s, to the critical, rebellious, local,
personal, and "outside-of-the-law" positions of "cause" lawyers
in the 1980s and 1990s.

495

In legal academia, both law and eco-

nomics and critical legal studies have been challenging their
own basic assumptions in recent years. 496 In general, economic
494.

For critiques of the critical positioning of progressive practitioners and

thinkers in the 1980s and 1990s, see Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest,
and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SockY REV. 697 (1992); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of ProgressiveLawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099
(1994). In former years, the internalized occupation with law was viewed to be
paradoxically strengthening-the more law was deconstructed, the stronger it
became. Although it was with reference to political/philosophical strands outside of the law, the discourse was narrowed to that of internal legal thought.
The internal critique within the legal world has taken a toll on the ability to
define camps, left or right. A revolution to move to a new paradigm is underway. In spirit and sometimes in body, thinkers are leaving the jurisprudential
center and looking elsewhere for fuel and energy.
495. Trubek, supra note 146, at 272.
496. A behavioral approach to law has been challenging many of the traditional assumptions of law and economics. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN
G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM

(1997); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); see also Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553
(1998). Gary Minda, describing second generation law and economics scholarship explains that "[t]he shift from abstract theory to concrete institutional
analysis has been nurtured by a new understanding of economic theory-an
understanding that views 'theory' merely as a tool for investigating what may
'work' as a solution to some problem .... [T]he second generation views economics as an applied science." GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 87-88 (1995).

Elsewhere, Minda describes that:
The current generation of [law and economics] scholarship tends to be
more modest in its own claims about the role of economics in law and
less accepting of the conservative orientation of property rights analysis of the Chicago School founders. Only a small number of methodological issues appear to be settled; including claims that microeconomic theory is a basis for analyzing law, that demand curves are
downward sloping, and that cost-benefit analysis and the economic
definition of cost (opportunity cost) are essential for intelligent policymaking. Second generation [law and economics] scholars have retreated from the orthodoxy of "efficient" answers for nearly every legal question; instead, the second generation thinkers admit that
"most law and economics questions are still open and likely to remain

448
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theory has become more critical, while critical theorists have
become more constructive. If law and economics analysis has
been conventionally aligned with conservative projects, and
critical scholarship with progressive projects, we have reached
a critical moment within legal thought when it is possible to
question these assumptions from both ends, allowing opponents
to reconcile their pervasive conflicts. Second-generation law
and economics scholars have recognized that government interventions can enhance both liberty and welfare. 497 The economic
understanding of market failures, including problems of collective action and information asymmetries, has expanded. More
than that, the very concept of linear maximization of individual
welfare has been challenged. New institutional economics has
challenged conventional assumptions about economic actors as
isolated individuals engaged in didactic exchanges. 498 Rather,
the new understanding of individuals is that of social beings
whose actions and knowledge are at least partly constructed by
their institutional settings. Drawing on psychological analysis,
behavioral law and economics has introduced the understanding that individual preferences are endogenous, a function of
experience and existing collective norms. 499 As a result, recent
law and economics scholarship recognizes that freedom is not
identical to unlimited choice and that government intervention
is inevitable in a functioning market.
From the perspective of critical legal scholarship, secondgeneration crits, including feminist, critical race, and gay legal
theorists, have challenged the blank rejection by earlier critical
scholars of the legal system as an engine for social change.5 00
These scholars have pointed to the significance of legal rights,
pragmatic programs, and immediate remedies within the existing legal system for disadvantaged minorities. 501 This newer
so for a long time." Second-generation law and economics scholarship

is also more eclectic theoretically and much more sophisticated than
the work of the [law and economics] founding fathers.
Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
599, 607 (1989). From the perspective of critical scholars, second generation
",crits" include critical race theorists, feminist legal theorists, and gay legal
studies scholars. See Handler, supra note 494, at 706-10; Gary Minda, One
Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 367-70 (1994).
497.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 481, at 38-45.

498. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1413.
499. SUNSTEIN, supra note 481, at 40-44.
500. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1407-08.
501. Id. at 1407-08 n.49. On the critical race theorists critique of critical
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scholarship has been more inclined to translate critique into
prescriptive analysis, rather than settling for abstract condemnations.5 02 Next-generation critical scholars have broadened
their inquiry to include the exploration of the multiple roles of
law in achieving social change and the relationship between
government branches in realizing these changes.
The integration of rationales, theories, and systems represents a maturation of legal thought. Rather than oppositional,
the Renew Deal aims for an appreciative positive stance, pulling together disparate ingredients and synthesizing elements
from opposing schools of thought.5 03 Through new governance
approaches, contemporary thinkers can bring together in their
research unlikely pairs, such as privatization and democratic
theory. 504 The theory itself is thus reflexive, in the sense that it
calls for integration in legal practice and correspondingly exemplifies hybridization in the academic field. Indeed, the theoretical basis for the Renew Deal vision mirrors its practical application in its inclusive spirit.
VI. CENTRAL NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
The strengths of the governance model are many and its
future promising, as shown by the increasing adoption of govlegal scholarship, Rubin cites, among other scholars, Kimberle Crenshaw,
Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356 (1988), Richard Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar: Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 304, 307 (1987), and Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 405 (1987). Rubin cites the following feminist theorists:
Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (1992) and Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1991).
502. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1408-09; see also Handler, supra note 494
(urging progressive scholars to combine critique with constructive reform projects); cf. Lobel, supra note 38 (describing the recent trend in legal scholarship
on social change towards advocating extra-legal activism).
503. Richard Stewart describes Cass Sunstein's writing as putting together
"a bit of Hayek, nuggets of public choice theory, a substantial dose of welfare
economics, considerable amounts of Mill and republican political theory, some
New Deal leavening, and a trace of critical legal theory studies spice." Richard
B. Stewart, Regulatory Jurisprudence:Canons Redux?, 79 CAL. L. REV. 807,
810 (1991). Stewart describes this m6lange as "truest to our condition." Id.
504. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Rethinking TraditionalAlignments: Privatization
and Participatory Citizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION
AND MARKETS (Clare Dalton ed., forthcoming 2005).
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ernance approaches in a wide spectrum of legal fields. As is often the case in a paradigm transformation, supporters of the
nascent vision invest great efforts to demonstrate its potential
and strengths, often by imagining the best possible scenarios
for the adoption of the new framework. However, ideal theories
are never risk free. Particularly in the rich setting of governance, with its affluence in meanings, there is also a need to
warn against certain blind spots and difficulties.
Two mirror-image risks exist in the transition to the Renew Deal governance paradigm. First, when advancing a new
model of law, there is some tendency to insist too much on its
newness. The old is easily dismissed as conventional, its approaches antiquated. This tendency often results in aligning old
approaches to law with our critical understandings of power,
legality, action, and change. Thus, for example, some expressions within the Renew Deal literature overstate the allocation
of power within the regulatory framework, while aligning governance with transformative social activism (decentering). In
such cases, power is framed as a characteristic of the regulatory model, while empowerment is the promise of governance.
Similarly, formal regulation is considered present only in certain settings, activities, and spheres of action; other issues and
arenas are depicted as outside traditional legal mechanisms.
These underlying tendencies run the risk of instigating a contemporary bias that universally aligns the regulatory model
with conservative commitments, and the governance model
with transformative politics.
Mirroring the first, a second risk involves the construction
of problematic equivalences (recentering). New governance approaches often assume one-dimensional measurements in
evaluating complex developments. For example, scholars may
imply flat equations between advancement in business administration models and new public management models; between
scientific learning and democratic learning; between smallscale knowledge and large-scale initiatives; and between accountability and responsiveness.
Although the Renew Deal vision is at an early stage in its
elaboration by legal scholars and in its adoption in practice, it
is important to recognize that the case studies we have explored can help us better evaluate the potential of the governance model, as well as its limitations.
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A. ADDITION VS. SUBSTITUTION: THE REGULATORY MODEL AS
COMPATIBLE WITH THE GOVERNANCE MODEL

What is the relationship between the regulatory model and
the newer governance model? Does governance supplement or
replace regulation? To be cautious, implementation of the new
model should resist overly sharp breaks between traditional
approaches and new ones. A statutory mandate may be a first
step in the constitution of a governance model. The longstudied gap between law-on-the-books and law-in-action has
recently been explored not simply as a weakness of the regulatory system, but rather as a strength. Daniel Farber describes
the concept of slippage, the disparity between regulatory mandates and actual enforcement. Negative slippage results from
weak enforcement by regulators and noncompliance by private
actors. 50 5 Positive slippage occurs when regulators assist regulated parties in designing alternatives to compliance on a nego50 6
Such instances resonate with protiated, case-by-case basis.
posals for partial industry regulation advocated by John
50 7
Farber argues that with positive
Braithwaite and Ian Ayres.
slippage, top-down standards may often be the "opening gambits in a prolonged bargaining process" between agencies and
regulated parties.50 8 The dynamics of implementation demonstrate a process that is much more flexible than initially assumed. Therefore, the initial regulation should be understood
the
as "the government's opening demand in negotiations, and 50
9
side."
other
the
to
favorable
more
be
final bargain is likely to
New governance practices of regulatory agencies, such as
the increased issuance of informal guidance, are typically carried out in the shadow of a formal and standardized body of
administrative law. Activities conducted in the shadow of the
law possess background efficiencies when the law allows for
variations in implementation. For example, Jason Johnston
stresses that, in environmental regulation, regional and local
variations in implementation of uniform federal law are precisely what Congress intended and planned for in its incentives

505. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in EnvironmentalLaw, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299
(1999).

506.
507.
508.
509.

Id. at 305-11.
See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 191.
Farber, supra note 505, at 317.
Id. at 316.
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analyses. 51° Similarly, referring to collaborative governance
approaches as "contractarian regulation," David Dana observes:
In the absence of the threat of the application of the default regime of
command-and-control regulation, regulated entities would lack any
economic incentives to negotiate alternative regulatory arrangements .... [I]n fact, we do not observe any contractarian regulatory
activity where there are no applicable background command-andcontrol regulations in place or plausibly threatened to be in place.
Thus, although it is true that contractarian regulation is a reform alternative to command-and-control regulation, it is also true that
command-and-control regulation is a precondition for contractarian
regulation.511

Regulatory approaches not only have ex post effects but
also ex ante effects. They promote self-regulation and create incentives for parties to reach efficient allocations on their own.
Often, actors that recognize the possibility of regulation, which
would order them to alter their behavior, have an incentive to
voluntarily reach a cooperative agreement with their competitors, as we have witnessed in the case of endangered species
and HCPs. Similarly, in the contexts of employment discrimination and occupational safety and health, the possibility of
traditional regulatory liability continues to motivate industries
to improve their practices through self-governance. Several of
the governance-based initiatives explored earlier condition continuation of the programs on proof of effectiveness. In such
cases, regulatory agencies announce that as long as the program effectively reaches its policy goals, the agency will continue to allow increased involvement of nongovernmental participants and allow flexibility in program interpretation and
implementation. The retention of supervisory authority and the
background threat of direct regulation and enforcement
strengthen accountability in the shift to governance. Moreover,
some initiatives, such as the California-OSHA audited selfregulation program, facilitate the shift to governance through
the appointment of government officers to act as problemsolving consultants to the process rather than as enforcement
agents. 512 The continued presence of an official government

510. Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of Environmental Contracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 291 (Eric W.

Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001).
511. Dana, supra note 13, at 47.
512. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 651 (2000).
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representative in a collaborative setting encourages parties to
participate in efforts to sustain responsible practices.
This interaction between flexible compliance and traditional mechanisms is a significant aspect of the Renew Deal.
Discussing the merits of both soft and hard law, David Trubek
and Louise Trubek suggest that "[t]he institutional debate
should be about the relative capacities of different modes to
5 13
Similarly, Richard Stewhandle specific governance tasks."
between
art suggests focusing on the comparative advantage
"prescriptive" and "reconstitutive" strategies.5 14 To be most effective, the governance model must continue to explore such
5 15
in"inter-modal synergy and hybrid.., governance modes,"
cluding the coexistence, complementarities, and mutual reinforcement of traditional regulation and new governance approaches.
B. SCARCE RESOURCES: EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE, AND SOCIAL
ENERGY
A second challenge posed by the shift to a governance
model is striking a balance between the value of direct participation and the need for a high-quality representative democracy. This tension echoes the fragile balance between proliferation of authority and legal orchestration, but the perspective is
different. Under the new model, the valuation of direct engagement and experience risks becoming too populist. The Renew Deal should not abandon a Madisonian notion of democracy, based on checks and balances among branches of
government backed by expert agencies. I have argued that the
best versions of the governance model are those that accept
tension, and do not uniformly choose one way over another.
Here too the model should incorporate tension as part of an ongoing challenge.
There is some tendency in Renew Deal scholarship to replicate weaknesses of particular versions of the American pragmatist tradition. Such tendencies include an aversion to strong
expressions of shared public values and to normative claims of
morality. Stanley Cavell has vividly expressed this tendency as
513. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
514. Stewart, supra note 7, at 93; see also supra notes 71, 238 and accompanying text.
515. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2 (referring in particular to combinations between "hard" and "soft" modes of law in the context of European Union governance).
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"a temptation to meta-snobbery, snobbery over not being a snob
(like pride in transcending pride), an apparent effort to exempt
oneself from the condition of morality (the divided human con-

dition) by surpassing

it."516

The pragmatist impulse is to embrace the ordinary, lay experience. Ralph Waldo Emerson stated, "I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low." 5 17
John Dewey's "democratic faith in common people" involved
scorn for high theory and the praise for practice and small projects. 5 18 Building on these ideas, some thinkers claim the
precedence of direct experience over expertise, contending that
the latter "sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of
experience. It breeds an inability to accept new views from the
very depth of its preoccupation with its own conclusions." 519
At the same time, however, governance embraces the essential significance of transparency and information disclosure.
In the complex, highly technical environment of the twentyfirst century, abundance in information demands an equivalent
abundance in resources and knowledge to apprehend it. The
governance model must assure that disclosure requirements,
such as those we have discussed in the environmental field, will
achieve its intended goals. Given the increased significance and
complexity of information, the simultaneous and ongoing dispersion of decision making creates certain risks. The production, distribution, and processing of information has become the
key source of wealth in the information age. 520 However, information is not worth much if there are insufficient means to use
it, sort it, make sense of it, apply it, and upgrade it. Indeed, too
much information can be debilitating and counterproductive. In
the context of federal agencies, Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst have documented how judicial insistence on exhaustive
information for the federal auto safety program has impaired
the ability of agencies to make important advancements in
safety. 52 1 In the context of individual consumers, psychologists
516.

STANLEY CAVELL, CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME: THE

CONSTITUTION OF EMERSONIAN PERFECTIONISM, at xx-xxi (1988).
517. ALBERSTEIN, supra note 30, at 10 (citing RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Nature, in SELECTED ESSAYS 36 (Larzer Ziffed., 1982)).
518. Id. at 12.
519. GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 25 (1993)
(citing Harold J. Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, HARPER'S MAG., Dec.
1950, at 101).
520. Balkin, supra note 39, at 3.
521. JERRY L. MASHAW AND DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO

THE RENEW DEAL

2004]

have documented the ways in which information ubiquity can
522 Asymmetry
curtail people's ability to make informed choices.
of resources among private groups and differences in the organization of knowledge communities further exacerbate these
problems.

523

Moreover, the digital age has made a new kind of

scarcity pertinent. Spam e-mailing is a paradigmatic example,
illuminating how the costs of information processing, distribu524
tion, and filtering shift from the distributor to the receiver.
The ready availability of ubiquitous information as well as new
ways to transmit it has brought new concern about the scarcity
of audience attention-popularly termed "the eyeball dilemma." 525 In information-based initiatives, such as those we

have discussed in the context of environmental policies and eregulation, variations in the capacity of stakeholders to utilize
newly available data effectively are critical to their ability to
contribute to governance processes in a meaningful way.
The Renew Deal vision must resist the illusion of information and transparency-that the information age, through its
own mechanisms, can solve all problems. The illusion is twofold. First, it elides the tension between the desire of a society
to radically disperse decision making and the insistence on retaining the ability of decision makers to make meaningful
choices. Second, there is some tendency to assume that comprehensive and widespread information on an issue will eventually lead people to converge normatively on the same positions.
In this context, the current dominance of economic expertise presents a particular risk. Pairing proliferated participation with the pervasiveness of economic jargon risks colonization of governance by economic models. Colonization is
particularly dangerous in contexts of organizational reliance on

SAFETY 95-103 (1990).

522. See On Amir and Dan Ariely, The Pain of Deciding: Indecision, Flexibility, and Consumer Choice Online (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (finding that under circumstances of ubiquitous information, consumers are more likely to fall into indecision).
523. See, e.g., John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 48-50 (1993). For more information on
knowledge communities, see MARTIN CARNOY, SUSTAINING THE NEW
ECONOMY: WORK, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 152-89

(2000).

524. Balkin, supra note 39, at 7.
525. Id.
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technical formulae for value-driven policy choices.526 The risk is

enhanced because of the pervasive idea in modern thought that
value judgments are subjective, while statements of fact are
capable of being objectively true and warranted.5 27 The governance model must resist the allocation of decision-making processes at the level of financial knowledge, rather than through
substantive policy debates, even if both potentially occur under
participatory, collaborative, and inclusive conditions.5 28 Due to
this fear and despite the growing enthusiasm about new governance networks, it is not surprising that some perceive such
multilateral participatory networks as a technocratic conspiracy intended to depoliticize issues in ways that will inevitably
benefit the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and
weak. 529 One of the central goals of the new model must therefore be to explore how information ubiquity and technical jargon impairs the ability to truly participate in a polity. 530
526. See generally HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY (2002) (examining the history of the fact/value dichotomy and applying that to the field of economics). The regulatory model seeks to sort out
fact from value. For example, take Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to welfare economics and his concept of human flourishing, and the realization that
questions of economics and questions of ethics cannot be neatly separated. See,
e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). Economics is
most often reluctant to delve into a discussion of what human flourishing
might mean. Such questions are deemed 'subjective,' and therefore not part of
the scientific inquiry. It is thus that the notion of fact has been contrasted in
modern thought both to values judgments and to analytic truth, "preventing
us from seeing how evaluation and description are interwoven and interdependent." PUTNAM, supra,at 3. Rational choice assumes completeness; science
presupposes values, epistemic values, such as coherence and simplicity. Id.
527. Id.; cf. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 931 (2000) (critiquing the narrow scope of values applied in
standard cost-benefit analysis).
528. Within public administration, this risk can be seen when decisionmaking powers are shifted from an agency such as OSHA or the Environmental Protection Agency to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
OMB's lack of substantive expertise provided a frequent cause for criticism.
MCGARITY, supra note 32, at 281. In the corporate world, similar tendencies
have been proven to inhibit innovation. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING
500 (1986); Farber, supra note 9, at 1286-87 (1993).
529. Slaughter, supra note 111, at 347-48.
530. The governance model must also grapple with the problem of incommensurability of different contexts. In some governance literature, big and
small problems are treated as one. On the possibility of moving from one scale
to another, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 229-70 (1990); Carol J. Greenhouse, Figuring the Future:Issues of Time, Power, and Agency in EthnographicProblems of
Scale, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 108 (Bryant G. Garth &
Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
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Several of the case studies that we have explored signify a
continuous need to provide knowledge and training for new entrants. For example, in the context of workforce development
and vocational training, local community-based organizations
have recognized the importance of capacity building of their
members engaged in collaborative private/public partnerships.
Local programs under the new Workforce Investment Act training regime provide nongovernmental partners opportunities to
attend workshops and training sessions on political organizing,
public speaking, and active membership in network community
associations. 531 Recognizing the difficulties in opening up the
public arena to private nonprofessional participants, other governance initiatives similarly require citizens and participating
partner organizations to undergo training in such areas as
budgeting and finance, organizational behavior, strategic planning, and legal issues. 532 Only through adequate ongoing training and government support can a shift to governance successfully combine both participatory decision making and
professionalism. 533 By and large, political and legal theorists
have contrasted theories of democratic representation with
those of direct participation. 534 At its best, the governance
model should aim to combine expertise and experienceinvolving representatives in many avenues while recognizing
the importance of direct engagement.

531. Osterman, supra note 282, at 252.
532. For example, in the context of school reform, restructuring in Chicago
has involved a decentralization of authority from district-wide administration
to Local School Councils (LSCs) that are composed of elected parents, community residents, and teachers, as well as the principals. JOEL HANDLER, DOWN
FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT

199-203 (1996). Chicago's LSCs improved parent and community involvement
and focused greater attention on local needs. Id. Parents and community participants have been required to undergo training in areas such as school budgeting and finance. DEEPENING DEOMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 29.
533. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 532, at 206-09, 234-35.
534. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (1980); Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 268 (1986) ("[T]he alternative is to abandon representative democracy in favor of either the anarchy of direct participation or the tyranny of judicial despotism."); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2469-70 (1991) ("Obviously, democracy cannot exist in a
modern polity as in 'the Greek Polis' or 'the New England town.' Representative democracy replaces direct participation. Nonetheless, democracy can be
measured by the closeness, responsiveness, representativeness, and accountability of the governors to the governed.").
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C. ACCOUNTING FOR POWER IN A NONHIERARCHICAL
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT

We have seen that a basic premise of the governance model
is that participatory, collaborative, and flexible approaches can
generate win-win situations. The theme of win-win is reminiscent of the postwar Legal Process school. In the Hart and Sacks
legal process materials, the theme of multiple winners is described as "the fallacy of the static pie":
The proposition that the supply of the good things of life is not fixed
but expansible holds true even of tangible satisfactions, which the exponents of the dog-eat-dog view of human existence are likely to have
chiefly in mind. It is still more conspicuously true of the intangible
satisfactions of life, which are intensely desired also, and all the more
5 35
intensely as the more urgent of tangible needs are met.

In order to be effective, the governance model must not accept a naive account of the win-win theme. Situations in which
multiple interests are mutually enforcing are context specific.
Unlike first-generation legal processors, most governance
scholarship constructs a more sophisticated depiction of limited
resources in society. In fact, as we have seen, some of the scholarship's leading substantive areas involve the most difficult
contexts of scarce resources, such as low-wage work, welfare,
and distributive social policy. The governance school must
therefore develop a richer basis for approaching collaboration
in situations of pervasive competition, power imbalances, and
limited resources.
It would be irresponsible to discuss the shift from a statecentered regulatory model to a new governance model based on
collaboration and the empowerment of diverse actors without
asking who will win and who will-at least some of the timelose. The significance of bureaucratic structures in the Weberian ideal includes the predictability of a rule-bound administration.5 36 What will replace the formalities of rules in flexible,
collaborative, and relatively informal structures?
We must recognize the possibility that instead of resulting
in a virtuous circle, a shift to governance approaches may produce a vicious cycle under certain circumstances-tilting more
and more entitlements in favor of those already in power. A
central challenge for the governance model is therefore to understand how collaborative environments can be nurtured to
535.

HART & SACKS, supra note 231, at 102-03.

536.

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE

SOCIOLOGY 1394-95 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
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produce equitable results, especially in settings where vast
power imbalances exist. This challenge is particularly resonant
today, as a "deficit-induced imperative to limit government
53 7
Comspending" has become part of our fin de sicle legacy.
538
Durmitment to regulation and its enforcement has eroded.
ing the 1980s and 1990s, government began to withdraw from
its role as an active player in the market, at the same time al539
Disturblocating fewer resources for traditional enforcement.
ingly, some contemporary reform projects "appear merely to be
attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of governance and
experimentation."5 40 Reform agendas for the new economy
must not confuse the adoption of the new governance 54model
1
with a declining commitment to public values and needs.
The transcendence of left/right political alignments within
the legal world has been described in the previous sections as
an important asset of the governance model. Legal scholars
long identified with progressive social reform are recognizing
that governance need not be a clear-cut left or right ideological
project.5 42 This realization enables scholars to engage in a prac-

537. DONAHUE, supra note 109, at 3.
538. See id.; R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare As We Know It, in THE
SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE OF ACTIVIST
GOVERNMENT 382-86, 392-99 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998).
539. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 538, at 382-99.
540. Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers
and Welfare "Reform",26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 745 (1993).
541. See generally Lobel, supra note 90, at 2045-46 (discussing the dynamic between rules and morality).
542. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 101-02 (2003). According to Dernbach:
Sustainable development falls outside the left/right political spectrum
in which most people traditionally think about environmental politics.
Among other things, though, sustainable development.., premised
on the importance of private efforts and the removal of subsidies-two
points that are consistently emphasized by the right (but not exclusively by the right). But it is also premised on an ambitious and broad
set of environmental goals and a desire to eradicate large-scale poverty-two points that are consistently emphasized by the left (but not
only by the left). Because sustainable development is neither left nor
right, liberal nor conservative, and because it is not primarily environmentalist or primarily business-oriented, it does not fit into the
traditional left/right spectrum. Moreover, the emphasis of sustainable
development on thinking and acting for the long-term is hard to fit
into political election cycles.
Id. (citations omitted); cf. Handler, supra note 494, at 722 (describing the
problems of the new populism as "neither left nor right" (quoting CARL BOGGS,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER: EMERGING FORMS OF RADICALISM
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tice of remembering and forgetting, strategically engaging in
"magical realism" or "real utopias"-envisioning the ideal
in
nonideal circumstances.543 While embracing this ambiguity and
uncertainty is a strength of the governance paradigm, it is,
however, not free of risks. Governance proponents need to
make sure that converging to a seemingly unaffiliated discourse does not overlook important questions.
The most promising analyses in the governance school are
those writings that directly consider the question of power.
Shifts from one paradigm to another are always about shifts in
power allocation. Governance processes not only provide a
framework for decision making and action, but also alternate
the power relations among the participants. Thus, governance
scholars have pointed to the need for a growing convergence of
interests to "reach a synergetic effect or a 'win-win' situation."544 The ability of groups to successfully interact under
situations of asymmetrical power is at the center of much debate. While some consider informality-derived from involvement of the relatively unstructured and weak nongovernmental
organizations-as an empowering feature, others view this selfclaimed weakness as strategic powerlessness that only constitutes other means of maintaining existing social hierarchies. 545
Some scholars view cooperative relationships as necessarily
compromising the ability to exert pressure. 546 Others allege
that cooperation can only occur in the rare circumstances in
which the powerful believe empowerment to be a good thing, in

IN THE WEST (1986))).

543. On magical realism, see Lucie White, Global Forces, Life Projects, and
the Place of Care: Conversations with Women in Project Head Start, in
GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION

145, 148 (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000). On "real
utopias," see Erik Olin Wright, The Real Utopias Project: Overview, at http://
www.ssc.wisc.edu/-wright (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
544. Kooiman, supra note 14, at 251.
545. See Lobel, supra note 38, at 28-40.
546. A radical expression of this view is given by Richard Cloward and
Frances Fox Piven, who argue that the power of underprivileged groups lies
precisely in their power to (illegally) disrupt. See generally FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD A.

CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:

WHY THEY

SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1979); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d

ed. 1993). In their view, formal organizing and engagement with other groups,
in negotiation or legal reform activities, is inherently co-optive because it curtails this potential and capacity of disruption, drawing the movement to orderly strategies. Id.

THE RENEW DEAL

2004]

other words, where the powerless have a tangible resource of
value.

547

Generally, when the interests of various actors are more
likely to converge, governance is more likely to be effective.
Writing about the emerging EU regime, Oliver Gerstenberg
and Charles F. Sabel state broadly that the starting point for
their proposed experimentalist model is the implication of radical indeterminacy, and, in particular, "that, in a complex world,
'strong' actors cannot rule out the possibility that they will
548
come to depend on solutions discovered by 'weak' ones."
Other governance scholars have been careful not to make
overarching generalizations. In his book Down From Bureaucracy: The Ambiguities of Privatizationand Empowerment, Joel

547. This debate is deeply present in discussions about the adequate
framework for labor relations and collective bargaining. See generally Lobel,
supra note 87 (discussing the competitive/cooperative duality that empowers
employees in the workplace); Note, Collective Bargainingas an Industrial System: An Argument Against JudicialRevision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1667-68 (1983). These questions
also arise in discussions of Alternative Dispute Resolution. See HANDLER, supra note 532 (providing an excellent account of the promising contexts in
which dependent or powerless groups can cooperate in a meaningful way with
powerful private or public groups and organizations); Valerie A. Sanchez, Back
to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 743-51 (2003); see also infra notes 550-555 and accompanying text. For an exchange about the possibilities of empowerment through
cooperation in the contexts that Joel Handler explores, see Joel F. Handler,
Living with Ambuiguity, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 223 (1998) and Julie A.
White & John Gilliom, Up from the Streets: Handler and the Ambuiguities of
Empowerment and Dependency, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 203 (1998). The lit-

erature on regulatory negotiation also provides insights into the dynamics of
the cooperative-adversarial debate. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, American
Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1279, 1283 (1994) (noting that negotiated rulemaking can be successful in particular contexts of environmental issues); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus
Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J.
1206 (1994) (demonstrating that not all stakeholders are represented in the
model of regulatory negotiation, and discussing instances in which the model
can nonetheless help clarify the values at stake and assist disparate groups in
reaching meaningful consensus within an identified range of choices); see also
Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performanceof Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (providing broad critical views of
regulatory negotiation); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46
DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (same).
548. Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S
INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 292-93 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse

eds., 2002).
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Handler looks explicitly at the consequences of decentralization, deregulation, and privatization to citizen empowerment. 549
Handler rightly understands power struggles as including "not
only the definition of values but also the arenas and procedures
of conflict." 550 Rather than equating the move to the local with
empowerment, he sees the relationship between the "localized"
and "empowered" as contingent and unstable. Handler describes empowerment as a dynamic, reflexive developmental
process that is dependent on context. 55 1 He indicates that shifts
for subordinate groups in terms of where and how regulation
takes place "might only mean 're-regulation under another
master."' 552 Handler further warns that the process of empowerment through governance depends on constant renewal, because such shifts are always unstable, tentative, and easy to
undermine and co-opt by bureaucratizing the local institution
(whether private, public, or hybrid). 55 3 Successful renewal entails taking seriously the concept of process, in which the sharing of power, while not a zero-sum contest, invariably involves
an alteration of power. 554 Always lurking in the background is
the possibility that cooperative relations will become adversarial if one party believes it will be made better off from the
change.555
In many of the contexts we have explored, stronger parties
are able to see the benefits of a shift to the governance model.
These benefits include increased knowledge and information,
the stability that is reached through agreement, and, at times,
the existence of bona fide shared interests. For example, in the
area of health and safety governance initiatives, OSHA has
been able, in certain environments, to successfully promote collaboration within the firm between workers and employers because of a convergence of a number of positive factors. First, all
parties broadly perceive the prevention of accidents as a positive and moral goal. Second, firms often need to maintain a
549. HANDLER, supra note 532.
550. Id. at 4.
551. Id. at 115-16.
552. Id. at 5.
553. Id. at 168.
554. Id. at 216-18. Two categories are distinguished under Handler's
framework: empowerment by invitation, in which the powerful provide the resources for empowerment; and empowerment through conflict, in which the
powerless obtain the resources on their own from the larger community. Id. at
133-219.
555. Id. at 220.
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good public image, and promoting a safe work environment can
contribute to their public relations efforts. As a result, employers are likely to actively engage in the improvement of safety
conditions within their firms. Third, since regulatory violations
are often ambiguous, the cooperative mode has proven at times
to be more effective in preventing accidents and achieving
556
workplace safety.
Sociologist Joe Rees, who carefully studied the implementation of a governance approach to occupational health and
safety in the construction sector in California, found that in
successful cases both management and labor faced strong incentives to cooperate. 557 Management viewed the traditional
inspection system as inadequate and burdensome and sought to
voluntarily improve safety due to the high costs of workers'
compensation. 558 The labor union was motivated to increase its
cooperation with management in order to prevent union decline. 559 There was also a general agreement between manage56 0
ment and workers as to what constituted safety problems.
Moreover, the professional safety engineers within the firms
were relatively independent actors. 56 1 Their independence contributed an additional balanced voice in labor-management
562
Finally,
multiparty discussions about safety improvements.
by
officer
compliance
engaged
but
the appointment of a flexible
facilitation
governmental
the state OSHA ensured continuing
of the program. 563 Building on these sociological observations,
Jody Freeman suggests that the success of collaborative governance as a regime of shared public/private authority depends
on "a fragile conjunction of ingredients." 564 Handler believes
that even in situations of extreme differences in power, a gov-

556. Id.; see also Freeman, supranote 3, at 49-55.
557. REES, supra note 310. Similarly, in the context of coal mine safety,
John Braithwaite has argued that cooperative policy measures better serve
the interests of workers. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE:
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 64 (1985); see also Sidney A. Shapiro &
Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 716-24 (1997) (describing the utility of cooperative approaches to OSHA enforcement).
558. See REES, supra note 557, at 72.
559. Id. at 28-29.
560. Id. at 155.
561. Id. at 101-03.
562. See at 119-25.
563. Id. at 194-96.
564. Freeman, supra note 512, at 652.
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ernance approach can be sustained when expert administrators
or private parties come to rely on the weaker party's knowledge
and cooperation. 65 In such cases, mutually beneficial exchanges can occur.5 66 Handler suggests that transforming relationships from regulatory hierarchy to cooperative governance
requires the creation of "morally decent trust."56 7 In such relations, parties can be open about their motives and interests
without undermining the relationship.5 68 Yet, again, such a collaborative trust environment depends on the formation of reciprocal and concrete incentives. 569
In all of the domains we have documented, it is critical to
distinguish between gaining real power over real decisions and
real resources versus having merely advisory and knowledgedissemination capacities. In the private market, a lucid example of the latter has been the adoption of various managerial
techniques under the title of "employee participation plans." 570

565. JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 13-38
(1990).

566. See id. at 28-31 (describing the context of social service administration and suggesting that both administrators and clients may benefit from cooperative relationships based on negotiation and mutual problem solving).
567. Id. at 136.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 127-29. An early example for participatory empowerment
through the invitation of government is Project Head Start. Established in the
1960s, Head Start was a unique experiment for its time, and has been claimed
by some commentators to be a program that embodies many of the features of
the contemporary governance vision. See, e.g., White, supra note 543, at 148.
Lucie White describes two central features that characterized the novelty of
Head Start. First, it established an open space for gathering as citizens. See
id. at 148-49. Second, it distributed lawmaking powers to the people most affected by the program, the low-income parents of the children for whom the
program was designed. See id. at 160-61. Intended initially to help the children, the program became a sanctuary for the low-income mothers who were
given the opportunity to become involved in its governance. Id. at 149. White
views these features as creating a new constitutional order of plural democracy, rather than simply constituting direct redistribution of resources. Id. at
148. White, like Handler, is nonetheless cautious in making broad generalizations as to the feasibility of replicating these features in any context. See id. at
149-50 (describing the particular political and social context surrounding
Head Start's inception); see also supra notes 551-552 and accompanying text.
A significant aspect of the project, not explicitly mentioned by White, is that it
involved a morally accepted cause-the care of children-for which it is relatively easy to mobilize support. Moreover, project Head Start was a comparatively small program, which raised less resistance than a large expensive program might have. White, supra note 543, at 153.
570. See Lobel, supra note 87, at 150-53 (noting the rise of employee participation plans and listing the different programs that might fall under this
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Many of the recently adopted schemes in the private sector,
such as "self-managed teams," have been depicted as empowering forms of employee voice which can replace traditional adversarial unionism, yet they are often used by management
merely as mechanisms for monitoring, controlling, and exerting
571
In the context of school readditional pressures on workers.
form initiatives, psychologists Dan Lewis and Kathryn Nakagawa similarly distinguish between an enablement paradigm,
in which there is only a technical participation for the ends of
the program, and an empowerment paradigm, in which partici5 72
pation takes on a political end-control over the program.
Unless there is complete identity between parties, there
are always conflicts of interests between the constituents of an
573
Social relationships are both adversareconomic enterprise.
ial and cooperative. In sociology, this reality has been termed
"antagonistic cooperation," which is defined as "[a] relationship
between or among persons in which they join their efforts to
produce something of value to the participants, while at the
same time being in conflict over other things, most particularly
the division among themselves of the product of their joint ef574
forts."
These tensions may be enhanced or mitigated through policy and design, drawing on the concrete incentives for main57 5
taining a governance environment in different legal fields.
The governance model must therefore assume the difficult task
of developing a relational concept of power that is more complex than the simple traditional top-down understandings that
form the analytical basis for the regulatory model. It must acknowledge both the potential and the perils of systems of multiple authorities and interlocking power hierarchies constituted
under its principles.

category).
571. Id. at 169-72.
572. DAN A. LEWIS & KATHRYN NAKAGAWA, RACE AND EDUCATIONAL
REFORM

IN

THE

AMERICAN

METROPOLIS:

A

STUDY

OF

SCHOOL

DECENTRALIZATION passim (1995).
573. Lobel, supra note 87, at 188.
574. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE
L.J. 1855, 2031 (1985).
575. Lobel, supra note 87, at 188.
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CONCLUSION:
GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC THEORYBETWEEN EFFICIENCY, LEGITIMACY, AND FAIRNESS
The legal system is at a critical juncture between the New
Deal regulatory system, deregulatory devolutions, and the Renew Deal governance paradigm. As the foregoing analysis of
renewal projects suggests, three overarching projects are intertwined in the Renew Deal vision: economic efficiency, political
legitimacy, and social democracy.
A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

The governance model promotes more efficient organization of public life, efficient use of public dollars, and effective
delivery of governmental services. It aims, methodologically, to
match means to ends more closely, and to enhance the impact
of law and policy. The efficiency project emphasizes the instrumental nature of the governance model's innovative features.
New governance mechanisms, including incentives for different
stakeholders to internalize externalities, to measure performance, to coordinate, and to share information, all serve to create
and maintain a better-functioning system. Both market and
government practices can improve through the generation of
more competition, choice, and involvement. By involving private industry and drawing on local knowledge, for example, in
disseminating public funds for vocational training or promoting
citizens' electronic participation in rule promulgation by administrative agencies, governance can reduce administrative costs
and increase the cost-effectiveness of policymaking. At the
same time, we have seen that promoting self-governance, industry networks, and social capital within the private sector
can help organizations operate more effectively.
B. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The governance paradigm strives to restore the legitimacy
of the democratic process and the legal system. By actively involving the private sector and supporting multilevel participation, the governance model addresses the increased dissatisfaction with political life and decline of social engagement under
the regulatory regime. To achieve these goals, it stimulates increased participation, deliberation, responsiveness, subsidiarity, diversity, transparency, public scrutiny, and accountability.
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The political project emphasizes that policy stakes must be concrete, clear, transparent, and accessible. It asserts the value of
ongoing mechanisms and procedural safeguards to control
regulatory power and to ensure the legitimacy of collective decisions about public life. By increasing the number of voices
that influence policy, as in the recent experiments of habitat
conservation and Internet standard setting, the aim is to build
an environment of structured deliberation together with differentiated competences among social institutions.
C. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
The third project concerns the question of how to better
achieve and promote the substantive ends that we value as a
public. This project includes both the protection of basic rights
and liberty and institutional responsiveness to human needs.
By promoting goals such as structural equality in the workplace, the protection of animals and natural resources for future generations, or community economic development, the
governance model strives for greater fairness of outcomes and
realities, equitable distribution, and the fair allocation of resources, both material and symbolic.
While theoretical hybridization is a strength of the governance model, choices and balances must be made as the three
projects intertwine. Part VI described the risk of economic approaches colonizing the public discourse about values. A similar
risk is posed by privileging efficiency and legitimacy over substantive social democracy. The methodological and procedural
goals of governance operate within the context of substantive
normative arrangements. When tension arises, how do we
strike a balance between the ideal of participation as a goal in
itself and the ends it sets out to achieve? Is the Renew Deal era
missing substance?
One of the characteristics of the New Deal regulatory revolution was the affirmation of the permissibility and legitimacy
576
The New Deal model was
of governmental redistribution.
committed to the idea of government as the agent of substantive social reform. Through the creation of large programs such
as Social Security and Medicare, the federal government signaled its role in social provision and distributional reform. The
governance model, innovative and promising for political and
576. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitutional Virtues and Vices of the New
Deal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 220 (1998).
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legal renewal, must not subvert older, long-fought-for substantive arrangements. There is a tendency to equate shifts from
top-down regulation with deregulation, privatization, and devolution. The new governance paradigm resists this dichotomized
world and requires ongoing roles for government and law. Current reform proposals must resist the balkanization of social
policies in ways that reduce governmental roles in social reform-for example, through extensive welfare waivers to the
states. 577
To maintain the balance between the three overarching
projects of governance, ideas of good and value must still be
available and present in public discourse. Some Renew Deal
scholars have argued for a "new form of deliberation," which
employs the pragmatist tradition of "reciprocal determination
of means and ends." 5 78 A strong collapse between means and

ends is a perilous step. The idea that core substantive arrangements are left open becomes, under certain conditions, insufficiently value-oriented. We do not want a paradigm in
which "conceptions of justice are ... infinitely plural,"579 suggesting a lack of ability to have a normative objective standpoint. As we continue to develop the new legal paradigm, Renew Deal scholars must consider how certain versions of the
governance model affect our ability to make normative and prescriptive judgments and to advance public ends. The challenge
to unjust or unequal social realities derives from the rejection
of certain realities and the advancement of alternative ones.
The ability to engage in governance depends on the ability to
hold ideas about what is right and what is wrong. Within the
governance paradigm, reformers will continue to need independent variables to judge the success of innovative approaches. A process or methodological framework alone will not
suffice. For procedural legitimacy to be meaningful, there must
be a commitment to public values, such as political equality,
which is endangered when power and wealth are deeply imbal-

577. Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002).
578. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
284.
579. See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 77. Legal pluralism emphasizes the
existence of plural legal orders that lend themselves to reconciliation, modification or aggregation in a monist, hierarchical way. See id. This is an example
of a structure that is too loose and that does not sufficiently lend itself to orchestration and evaluation.
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anced. 58 0 Substantive criteria of the common good are required
to fully realize the potential of governance.
The multiplicity of projects that underlie the new vision
signifies the importance of a dialectic among normative theovalries. 58 1 Democratic legitimacy embodies the entire range58 of
2 This
ues of effective governance, processes, and outcomes.
diversity is not a new feature unique to the emerging Renew
Deal era. Yet, the new paradigm must seek to fulfill its promise
of better grappling with diversity as it affects the quality of
public life. Indeed, underlying the paradigm shift from a regulatory to a governance model is a fundamental understanding
of the wealth of normative theory and practice. Most of us value
the core of each of the three normative projects of governance.
As William Eskridge asserts,
[Different normative theories] together more accurately capture our
political society than any one separately. We value individual autonomy (liberalism), but we also understand our interdependence (legal
process) and crave a society that stands for values we can be proud of
(normativism). As a result, we usually favor limited government, but
address social and economic problems and
endorse state regulation 5to
83
to foster national values.

Addressing the problems of lawmaking, implementation,
and enforcement, advances in legal theory are increasingly
pointing to the possibility of renewal through governance. Recent policy reform initiatives also provide glimmers of the practical potential of the governance model. Taken together, contemporary legal thought and practice is beginning to shed light
on the mismatch between dominant regulatory theories and sociopolitical realities. Governance at its best signifies the compatibility of different theories of democracy-liberal, constitutional, direct, representative, associative, participatory, and
deliberative. As it struggles to harmonize theory and practice,
580. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 159.
581. To provide an example of a dialectic among normative theories, the
value of individual justice in concrete cases often coexists and potentially conflicts with overall justice.
582. For a discussion of different strands in democratic theory, see generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
1552-53 (1996).
583.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

109 (1994). Frank Michelman, in a similar attempt to link competing ideals
that we commonly value, offers a genealogy of democratic concepts that seem
attractive to many. Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) Is ProgressiveLiberal Democratic Constitutionalism?,4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 184-96
(1999). Michelman moves from liberalism to constitutionalism to democracy to
progressivism. Id.
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the governance model is better positioned to fulfill the promises
of a twenty-first century Renew Deal.

